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Ethnic and racial groups are increasingly challenging the African-American-White
dichotomy that has historically characterized race relations in the United States. In an
increasingly multiracial/multiethnic society, the question of racial and/or ethnic cooperation is an
important aspect of the larger American political process. This study examines what attitudes
will lead to increased support for coalition building between African-Americans and Latinos.
The research questions are: what are the attitudes that are likely to produce strong coalitions
between Latinos and African-Americans? Conversely, what attitudinal barriers stand in the way
of potential multiethnic coalitions? There are four sets of limitations that could affect support for
coalition building: perceived competition, societal constraints that serve to pit minorities against
each other, lack of agreement on issues, and differential perceptions of coalitions. Using
regression and structural equation modeling, this study looks at each group of limitations in
detail in order to understand the characteristics of people who succumb to the limitation
compared to those who would not. After an analysis of these three groups of limitations at the

individual level, they are tested at a macro level to determine if that is how the actual
respondents see the variables as fitting together.
This research identified several trends. Perhaps the most important finding emphasizes
the difference between these two groups. While the same “stuff” matters to each group, it matters
in different ways. Additionally, this study illustrates that the way previous research has thought
about how these different variables fit together may be flawed and quite different in the real
world. Another finding is the effect of the diverse experiences not only of both groups, but also
of the subgroups within each group that contribute to various attitudes on coalition building. One
of the most consistent findings of this research is the role of education and employment in
influencing minority group attitudes.
One of the most fruitful areas for coalition building this research identified is among
those who have higher levels of education and who are employed. Increased education
consistently is associated with more tolerant points of view, increased recognition of structural
factors that can influence minority success, and greater issue agreement. One prescription, then,
for people who try to form coalitions between these two groups, is to focus on those with higher
levels of education and to attempt to increase the overall levels of education for members of
these groups. Additionally, people who are employed overall seem to be more willing to work
with members of other groups, evaluate them more positively, perceive less competition, and be
more likely to align on issues. It may be that one way to pursue coalition building among these
two groups is by economically elevating both populations, instead of focusing on specific
subpopulations of both groups that may be more supportive of coalition efforts. By identifying
these portions of each population, potential coalition builders would likely have the most
success.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“I was raised inside of a Puerto Rican family, but born in Brooklyn, and inside of an African
American community, many of which members had uprooted from the rural South. I was
protected and nurtured by both. I owe all of the people who touched me something for the touch.
Not all of us can discover and realize our capacity to do.”
– Louis Reyes Rivera (1945-2012), Afro-Puerto Rican poet, educator and scholar
“I owe my existence to African American-Latinx solidarity. I’ve spent my whole life navigating
those communities and making sure the voices from one are heard and understood from the
other.” – Sydney Alicia Rodriguez, Puerto Rican & African-American, University of
Pennsylvania.
Ethnic and racial groups are increasingly challenging the African-American-White
dichotomy that has historically characterized race relations in the United States. Debates on race
can no longer be characterized as conflicts fought between two warring camps but will have to
involve more players forming complex alliances. In order to fully explore the changing political
landscape in America, we need to move beyond the traditional dichotomous view in order to
examine the possibility of the construction and maintenance of minority coalition building. This
dissertation is a step in that direction, examining how minority groups interact with each other
and the attitudes that are likely to contribute to support for forming coalitions in America.
Surpassing African-Americans, Latinos now comprise the largest minority in the United
States. The Latino population in the United States has experienced exponential growth since
1970, the first U.S. Census that identified Latinos in a comprehensive way (Ramos 2004; Vaca
2004). Even prior to the recent growth in minority populations, the issue of how minority groups
relate to one another and to the majority population has been a subject of considerable inquiry by
political scientists (Meier, McClain, Polinard and Wrinkle 2004). In an increasingly
multiracial/multiethnic society, the question of racial and/or ethnic cooperation is an important
aspect of the larger American political process.
Why haven’t African-Americans and Latinos built lasting political coalitions? Why
haven't these two groups, which share so much in common, been able to sustain long-term social
and political alliances? I am interested in what attitudes will lead to increased support for
coalition building between African-Americans and Latinos. If these two groups could work
together they would have the opportunity for increased political power.
1

Characteristics of Latino Population
To begin this examination of the attitudes that affect support for coalition building
between Latinos and African-Americans, it is prudent to clarify some issues involving the Latino
population. First, it is important to recognize that there is no such thing as a monolithic “Latino”
group; this group is diverse but tends to get homogenized into one single group (Piatt 1997; de
Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003; Vaca 2004; Masuoka 2007). Latino is a category that includes
people from different countries of origin and from different cultural and racial backgrounds;
although individuals may characterize themselves in many different ways, they are often viewed
as simply “Latino” by the larger American society.
Latino as Racial Group
The U.S. Census treats Latino as a category that is explicitly non-racial but instead
“ethnic”; regardless of the intention of the classification, the category itself still results in racial
treatment of the population (de Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2003; Masuoka 2008). For Latino
immigrants, the social meaning of race and identity begins in their country of origin but is
constantly contested and reformulated within the larger Latino community (Telles, Sawyer and
Rivera-Salgado 2011). How Latinos adjust to being classified as a minority group in America,
which implies a power differential, may contribute to the formation of a new kind of selfperception. Theoretically, we can expect that a Latino racial group identity is forming today.
Proponents of a Latino racial identity argue that in practice, Latinos are subject to discriminatory
treatment as a result of their racialized, non-White status.
Characteristics of the African-American Population
African-Americans have a unique and, at many times, difficult history in the United
States. At the beginning of the country, and for many years that followed, most AfricanAmericans were in slavery (Clayton 2010). After the Civil War a series of amendments were
passed that tried to legally give full citizenship rights on all African-Americans. The 13th
amendment outlawed slavery, the 14th amendment gave African-Americans citizenship rights,
and the 15th amendment gave African-American males the right to vote (Clayton 2010). For a
while after the civil war, African-Americans had many of the same political rights as Whites.
During the Reconstruction period, African-Americans exercised social, political, and
economic rights for the first time and gained substantial political power (Clayton 2010). Soon
2

enough, White Americans fought this growth of political power with White supremacy groups,
illegal intimidation, grandfather clauses, poll taxes, and Jim Crow laws (Clayton 2010). While
African-Americans were being denied political power (and in many cases their lives) at the local
level, there were also efforts at a federal level in the form of Supreme Court decisions to
disenfranchise African-Americans (Clayton 2010). This treatment (both politically and socially)
continued into the 1960’s when the Civil Right Movement had some successes in winning back
the rights of African-Americans. These victories were associated with the desegregation of the
military, school desegregation, the desegregation of many public arenas, the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1965, and the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Clayton 2010). Although
there have been a significant amount of legal victories for African-Americans, there are still wide
discrepancies between the social position of Whites and African-Americans in American,
ranging from education levels to income levels to health disparities. The history of AfricanAmericans has, in some ways, shaped their contemporary position in American society.
Limits on Effective Coalition Building
There are many potential limitations that could affect support for coalition building.
Previous literature is widely organized around several categories of limitations. These include
such things as perceived competition (both economic and political), societal constraints that
serve to pit minorities against each other (perceptions of difference, belief in stereotypes, and
prioritizing group membership over overall minority membership in United States society), lack
of agreement on issues, and differential perceptions of coalitions (coalitions not seen as effective
and potentially detrimental). In each set of limitations there are people who succumb to the
limitation and people who do not.
This dissertation looks at each group of limitations in detail in order to understand the
characteristics of people who succumb to the limitation compared to those who would not. By
doing this I am able to determine which limitations exist, for whom the limitations exist, under
which circumstances the limitations exist, and which limitations do not exist. After I look at all
the individual limitations then I examine how they fit together and potentially affect coalition
building, examining the “real world” relationship between the limitations and coalition building.
Not only am I able to test the limitations according to how they are grouped in the previous
literature at the individual level, but I am also able to demonstrate how these variables work
3

together in reality through the data, which has significant implications for future research. If
previous research has conceptualized these limitations incorrectly, then that affects how attitudes
toward coalition building between these two groups are studied.
What I Do Differently
In general, there is a large amount of research on multi-racial coalitions, but there is a
lack of existing research that uses national survey data. The various data sources that previous
research has used have been mostly local or regional, and this often restricts their findings to
applying solely to the area from which the data has been drawn. This has led to the conflicting
findings that we find in the previous research. I am looking at the underlying context, using
national data sources that could help to explain these disparate findings and provide a unifying
theme for the previous work in this area. Using large national data sets instead of
local/regional/state-level data or case studies will allow me to do this.
Within the existing literature there are conflicting and paradoxical conclusions which are
largely based on research design and research context. My research looks at what is really going
on and unpacks some of the nuances. In this research, an effective multi-racial coalition would
include the majority members of both groups working together to achieve shared goals and/or to
gain more political power. In order to get to that point, however, it is necessary to probe deeper
into what is happening with each set of potential limitations to determine the actual influence of
the limitation.
I propose a model of coalition building between African-Americans and Latinos that can
first help to determine the similarities in attitudes that exist among those who are more likely to
support coalition building, and second, help to predict which sets of attitudes are likely to be
associated with increased support for coalition building. While the next step is to examine actual
events where coalition building takes place that is not the aim of this dissertation. Attitudes are
the precursors to events; as such, this dissertation examines the attitudes that lead to increased
support for coalition politics.
My motivation for this project is that there have been some instances of successful
coalitions but they were not sustained; there are also instances where coalitions were not
successful. Much of the previous research (Priestley 2007; Segura and Valenzuela 2010; Mantler
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2013) focuses on examining specific instances of coalition building, but does little to explain the
conditions that produced that successful instance. It is an enduring empirical puzzle why these
coalitions failed. By extension, this also means that they do not examine the attitudes which are
likely to produce support for coalition building, which are the natural precursors to events.
Rather than focusing on coalitions I focus on attitudes because I want to understand why these
coalitions were not sustained. By identifying which characteristics are likely to produce support,
I hope to be able to predict when and where coalitions will be likely to form.
In my conception there are three sets of attitudes (determined by previous research) that
could be related to coalition building. This dissertation is organized around these three factors.
After I analyze these three groups of limitations at the individual level, I test them at a macro
level to determine if that is how the actual respondents see the variables as fitting together. If the
actual conception of people does not match the theoretical organization that is present in
previous research, it may be that there is a need to re-conceptualize how minorities think both
about the world and about each other. This is another important distinction between what has
been done in previous research and what I do in this dissertation. It is important to analyze
different attitudinal facets of coalitions, what characteristics are likely to be associated with
increased support for coalition building, and identify what similarities and differences there are
in the different populations in order to examine the future potential for minority political power
in the United States. While this dissertation is not able to cover and examine all of these topics, it
is a first step in determining what characteristics are likely to be associated with increased
support for coalition building.
Research Question
Currently, Latinos and African-Americans constitute more than one-quarter of the U.S.
population, and will likely continue to grow in size. The sheer size of these groups suggests an
opportunity for increased political power if they would work together in a sustainable and
substantive manner. My research questions are: what are the attitudes that are likely to produce
strong coalitions between Latinos and African-Americans? Conversely, what attitudinal barriers
stand in the way of potential multiethnic coalitions? Are attitudinal prerequisites necessary for
coalitions and sufficient for coalitions? Those are two different things, and this conditional work
on support for coalition building will help us to understand, and parse out the specificity of both.
5

Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation offers several unique contributions. First, I identify what attitudes are
likely to produce support for coalition politics, and develop a predictive framework that may be
applied to future situations. Second, I use little utilized national data sets to ensure that I am
using the most closely aligned survey items that allow me to answer the questions that I am
interested in. I examine support for coalition building using attitudinal data, which is different
from much of the research that exists on multiracial coalitions that looks at voting patterns or
policy information. This is important because we need to understand the underlying conditions
and attitudes that will be most likely to lead to the construction of multiracial coalitions.
This dissertation is not solely important as an academic exercise; it is a piece of a larger
social problem that America has to grapple with daily. In an increasingly multiracial/ multiethnic
society, the question of racial and/or ethnic cooperation is an important aspect of the larger
American political process. The issue of how racial groups relate to one another, if and when
they will work together and when they will not, and the dispersion of political power in the
United States are all large questions. While I do not claim to be able to answer these large
questions, this work is a small piece of a larger conversation that needs to take place in the
United States. Outside of racial and ethnic politics, the issue of how minority groups relate to
each other and to the majority population is an important aspect of the larger American political
process and has important ramifications.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODS
“The white, the Latino, the black, the Arab, the Jew, the woman, the Native American, the small
farmer, the businessperson, the environmentalist, the peace activist, the young, the old, the
lesbian, the gay and the disabled make up the American quilt.” Jesse Jackson
“I believe in the brotherhood of man, all men, but I don’t believe in brotherhood with anybody
who doesn’t want brotherhood with me. I believe in treating people right, but I’m not going to
waste my time trying to treat somebody right who doesn’t know how to return the treatment.”
Malcolm X
The idea of forming coalitions among different groups to gain political power and
numerical strength is not a new concept in either political science or in American politics. Some
seminal works, such as Gamson (1961) and Riker (1962), offer different predictive models that
explain when coalitions may form and which individuals are likely to find coalition building to
be a useful political strategy. One of the more recent ways that political science has been
interested in coalition formation is in regards to the construction and maintenance of coalitions
between racial and ethnic minority groups in America.
For example, after 2008 many people point to the election of Barack Obama as evidence
of a post-racial era in America, but others argue that this was an individual instance of success
that was made possible because Obama was uniquely situated to overcome obstacles and offer
America a message of hope and reconciliation (Clayton 2010). One of the reasons that Barack
Obama was successful in winning the presidency twice was due to the coalition that he was able
to form among traditionally underrepresented groups: African-Americans, Latinos, young
people, and first time voters (Clayton 2010). There are three purposes of this chapter: first, to
introduce and discuss the existing literature in general on coalition building and explain where
this dissertation fits into the existing research; second, to discuss the previous research regarding
the control variables that are included in subsequent chapters and illustrate specifically how these
concepts relate to attitudes about coalition building among African-Americans and Latinos; and
third, to discuss the data and methods that are used in subsequent chapters in the dissertation.
What We Know in General
Within the previous research there are conflicting results and conclusions in much of the
research on multiracial coalitions. I first discuss what we know to be problems within the
7

existing research generally, and follow with a discussion of the existing research that pertains to
coalition building in general.
Different Frameworks
We know that different data and frameworks yield different results. Previous research has
primarily centered around three frameworks of coalition building between African-Americans
and Latinos: a cooperation framework, a competition framework, and an opportunistic
framework. In a cooperation framework, minorities conclude that they share common interests
and therefore attempt to cooperate and reap benefits from joint political action (McClain 1993).
Previous research has found cooperation among minority groups in a "rainbow coalition"
approach (Henry 1980; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 1990; McClain and Karnig 1990;
Sonenshein 1990, 1993; Munoz and Henry 1990; Henry and Munoz 1991; Saito 1993; Stewart
1993; Regalado 1994). Much of the previous research has argued that this is the “natural”
outcome of minority relations; it is important to note that this may not always be true. The logic
of a Latino-African-American coalition is that both minority groups are likely to perceive they
are discriminated against in the political system and thus likely to form a coalition to attempt to
gain control over government or a fair share of policy benefits. Intra-minority coalitions have
been formed around issues as diverse as immigration (Espiritu 1992), civil rights, and poverty
(Estrada, Garcia and Marcias 1981) among others. Such cooperation may or may not be at the
expense of other groups, such as Anglos (as is suggested by Betancur and Gills (2000)). In the
competition framework, minority groups conclude that they are in conflict with one another—the
zero-sum scenario, where one group benefits at the expense of the other group (Cohen 1982;
Falcon 1988; Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991; McClain 1993; Bobo et
al. 1994; Freer 1994; Bobo and Massagli 2001; Mindiola, Neimann, and Rodriguez 2002; Vaca
2004). This is the other major theoretical position in the literature, and usually is posited against
the cooperation framework. There is also evidence from previous research that relations between
African-Americans and Latinos in cities are characterized by conflict (Morris 2000; Mindiola,
Neimann, and Rodriguez 2002; Gay 2006; Vaca 2003; McClain et al. 2006). Finally, in the
opportunistic framework, the groups can either conclude that their interests are independent of
each other, or they can conclude that there are certain times and conditions where each group can
benefit through the formation of a coalition (McClain 1993). Such relationships are possible in
an ideal pluralist world where actions in one policy sphere do not always affect actions in
8

another. Results from previous research often differs depending on which framework the
research is situated in, which leads to different expectations from the start and yields different
results at the end. It is possible, however, that these frameworks inter-mingle with one another,
resulting in a more complicated picture in the real world.
Hutchings et al. (2011) examine the effects of different theoretical perspectives on
perceptions of zero-sum competition among both Whites and racial minorities in a foundational
study. Using theoretical approaches such as a classical prejudice model, a threat hypothesis
model, a group identity model, and a group position theory model, the authors examine each
quantitatively to determine which perspective explains attitudes better. While this piece and my
dissertation will use the same data source and some of the same variables, it is important to
distinguish my proposed research from this existing study. Hutchings et al. only examine
economic competition, while I analyze both economic and political competition. Hutchings et al.
use economic threat as their dependent variable solely, I use perceptions of economic
competition as both a dependent variable (in Chapter 3) and an independent variable (in Chapter
6) and examine its effect on support for coalition building. Hutchings et al. attempt to determine
which theoretical perspective has more explanatory power in regards to perceptions of
competitive threat, whereas I examine which individual factors have the most impact on support
for coalition politics. The Hutchings et al. piece allows me to have a foundational research piece
from which I build my research on.
Conflicting Arguments and Disparate Findings
We know that there are conflicting arguments in previous research about coalitions. For
example, there are disparate findings involving the role of education in support for coalition
politics. While some research has found that Latinos and African-Americans with higher levels
of education tend to be more supportive of coalition politics (Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994),
other research finds much the opposite. Tedin and Murray (1994) argue that the more politically
savvy are less supportive of coalitional politics because they are more knowledgeable about past
political discord between the two groups, have beliefs about the lack of fair play by the other
group, and see the potential that the other minority group might gain the upper political hand.
Education has also been linked with age, with previous research finding that racial group
identification is the strongest among older African-Americans and least educated urban dwelling
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African-Americans (Broman, Neighbors, and Jackson 1988). Meier and Stewart (1991) found
that certain educational policies were associated with policy tradeoffs between AfricanAmericans and Latinos, while some research finds that there is no significant relationship
between African-Americans and Latinos on educational policy outcomes (McClain and Tauber
1998). and others find that relationships between Latinos and African-Americans in terms of the
allocation of educational resources varies; at times it is competitive when there is a gain-loss
scenario in the allocation of resources, but when scarcity is not a factor the relationships are not
competitive (McClain et al 2004). Why are there such disparate findings about the effect of
education on multi-racial coalition building?
So What Does It All Mean? Looking directly at coalition building
In order to understand the previous research that exists on multiracial coalitions, it is
necessary to define what I mean by coalition. I adopt the definition of Rich (1996): “A process of
creating a working relationship between ethnic or racial groups, which seeks to maximize
political preferences.” (6) This definition recognizes that coalition building is not a singular
instance or moment of political behavior, but is instead the product of repeated interactions and
efforts by separate groups with the intended purpose of getting the most desired political
outcome for each party of the coalition. Previous research has found brief instances of minority
groups forming coalitions but has not been able to explain the underlying characteristics of what
makes coalition formation likely. For instance, it is known that when racial and ethnic minorities
do join forces they often times have different interests, attitudes, and priorities (Robinson and
Robinson 2006; Rodrigues and Segura 2007). Without an understanding of what attitudes are
likely to produce multiracial coalitions, these findings are all disjointed and non-generalizable. I
first discuss a foundational piece on coalition building, followed by the findings of two particular
cases studies and then move on to a discussion of previous research on different, individual
instances of coalition building, and then move into a discussion of some of the characteristics
that are associated with instances of successful coalition building and the difficulties in building
multiracial coalitions.
The Foundational Piece
While previous research on coalition building exists before 1980s, the foundational piece
in terms of coalition building between minority groups was published in 1984. Browning,
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Marshall, and Tabb (1984) develop a theory of political incorporation in which electoral
mobilization is a key to incorporation and incorporation in liberal dominant coalitions is central
to policy responsiveness. They argue that there are three steps that are necessary if excluded
groups are to move toward political equality: they must get selected, they must become part of a
coalition, and the coalition must be dominant (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). Browning,
Marshall, and Tabb (1984) point to the importance of liberal White coalition partners in the
construction of these coalitions, and argue further that minorities must become part of a biracial
coalition and the coalition must be dominant if the interests of minority groups are to influence
policy. Confirming the 1984 findings of Marshall, Tabb, and Browning, Clayton (2010) argues
that Obama could not have been successfully elected without the support of White voters, despite
the strong coalition that he was able to build.
Successful Instances of Coalition Building
Poor People’s Campaign
Perhaps the most well-known example of a successful multiracial coalition occurred in
the late 1960s during the Poor People’s Campaign of 1968. Mantler (2013) examines antipoverty coalition building among African-Americans and Mexican Americans and reveals a
relationship between race-based identity politics and class-based coalition politics was not
antithetical but mutually reinforcing. Ultimately, according to Mantler (2013), such collaboration
was difficult, rarely sustained, and even symbolic at times. Identity politics did not represent an
abandonment of coalitional politics but was actually a necessary element of coalition, as were the
political dynamics of the time (Mantler 2013). Mantler also argues against the idea of
approaching multi-racial organizing as if it is inherent (regardless of whether the subject is
approached from a conflict, cooperation, or something in between perspective), and instead
argues that moments of cooperation should be viewed for what they are: unique instances worthy
of study but not to be held up automatically as the natural and desired outcome.
Harold Washington in Chicago
Other instances of coalition building are often found in the cases of mayoral elections.
One of the most interesting cases occurred in Chicago during and following the election of
Harold Washington, and involves the coalition that was temporarily successful between AfricanAmerican and Latinos in Chicago. The coalition was successful in getting Washington elected
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but was unsuccessful in maintaining a “sustained governance coalition” after the election was
complete (Betancur and Gills 2000). This is another case where there is evidence of a successful
coalition, but the explanations as to why it was successful are too closely associated with a
specific time and place to allow for generalization. The characteristics, in this case, that served to
unite the coalition initially included a shared sense of exclusion, the struggle and opportunity to
bring down the Democratic machine, and the drive to build an alternative government (Betancur
and Gills 2000). The political and historical context which led to the formation of this coalition
is specific to Chicago, and it makes it difficult to generalize any findings out to other instances.
Betancur and Gills (2000) note that the initial formation of the coalition was not very
smooth, and that it encountered many difficulties. After Washington had success in the
primaries, more people joined the coalition, such as the African American and Latino middle
classes, business elites, and some political elites (Betancur and Gills 2000). While the
involvement of more people did help to build support, it also caused problems within the
movement. The electoral coalition was not sustainable as a governing coalition because it did not
pay attention to the “after” of the election. Mass participants assumed that all members had the
same interests and same commitment of power sharing and resource sharing (Betancur and Gills
1997; Betancur and Gills 2000; Clemons 2013). Once Washington was in power, the governing
coalition was unable or unwilling to address all of the interests that were formally represented in
the coalition. The factors that led to the dissolution of the coalition include excessive dependency
on the mayor, unevenness in distribution of opportunities and roles, limited multiracial coalition
experience, absence of agreements on distribution and accountability, inability to work out
differences, class differentiated agendas and competing nationalism (Betancur and Gills 1997;
Betancur and Gills 2000; Clemons 2013). While this case does provide some interesting insights
into multiracial coalitions, it is impossible once again to generalize what happened (successes
and failures) to other cases due to the specificity of the situation.
Electoral Politics
The potential ambiguity of coalition formation can be examined in terms of broader
electoral politics as well. While coalitions may form temporarily in an electoral context (such as
support of a candidate or policy), it generally will not continue to exist after the election (Segura
and Valenzuela 2010). What is more common, however, is that Latino and African-American
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voters tend to diverge instead of form coalitions (Segura and Valenzuela 2010). Evidence of
temporary coalitions have also been found in examinations of the effect of race on coalition
politics (Priestley 2007) and voting coalitions (Segura and Valenzuela 2010). While these
separate instances of coalition building are interesting, they do not help us to predict when
coalitions might form, and when they may not. This dissertation contributes to the literature by
providing an understanding of the underlying attitudes that form the basis of support or
opposition to coalition building; by using a national data set this research is able to draw
generalizable conclusions, which is not possible when using only case studies. If these conditions
can be identified, we will be closer to being able to predict under what conditions electoral
coalitions are likely to form.
Other Instances of Coalition Building
Previous research has examined multiple instances of coalitions (some of which were
successful and some which were not) across various geographic locations and times. One
historical example of a large successful coalition was the New Deal coalition (formed in 1932),
which was centered on anger over Great Depression (Clayton 2010). The initial scope of this
coalition was broad (universal material benefits) which was one reason that it was (temporarily)
successful; it eventually collapsed to racism (Clayton 2010). The coalition was comprised of a
variety of groups that included industrial workers of the northeast and Midwest, ethnic
immigrants (poles, Italians, Irish, small farmers, African-Americans, Catholics, Jews), and the
existing base of southern Whites (Clayton 2010). While the definition of which groups were
marginalized were different during this time period it remains that one of the cornerstones of the
coalition was the support of Whites, which other research has found to be one of the
characteristics of a successful coalition.
In 1968 the Black Panther Party created the first Rainbow Coalition, formed by Fred
Hampton and Bob Lee. The original organization of the Rainbow Coalition included groups such
as the Illinois chapter of the Black Panthers Party, Rising Up Angry, the Young Lords, and the
Young Patriots; the key issues of the coalition included opposition to Daley Democratic
machine’s political corruption, police brutality, urban renewal, and gentrification (Williams
2013). Again we can see that the goals of the coalition were fairly broad in scope, which is one
of the characteristics that is associated with successful coalitions. According to Williams (2013),
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the groups in the coalition were clear that their role was not to organize in the African-American
community but in their own, to heighten the contradictions there, and to educate their own
people. The various groups in the coalition recognized that they could have more of an impact
politically by working together but also recognized that the primary purpose for them to be
involved was to improve the situation of their own communities. It is interesting to note that both
Harold Washington and Jesse Jackson used the term “Rainbow Coalition” in various campaigns,
although often in a different way than what the Black Panthers originally intended.
Several previous studies analyze mayoral elections to examine coalition efforts between
Latinos and African-Americans. In a case study of the election of Mayor Kevin Johnson in
Sacramento, Cook (2013) argues that what made this multiracial electoral coalition successful
was the fact that it was able to articulate a universalized policy framework while simultaneously
generating policies to further African-American group interests. Orr and Nordlund (2013)
analyze the election of Mayor Angel Taveras in Portland and find that the electoral coalition that
led to his successful election was anchored in the White liberal populations and that Latinos and
African-Americans were also a part of the coalition; this confirms Browning, Marshall, and
Tabb’s (1984) argument about the necessity of White liberal support in the formation of
multiracial coalitions. In contrast, Filindra and Orr (2013) find support for Key’s (1949) racial
threat hypothesis in their analysis of Taveras’s election: Latinos were more likely to have a
positive perception of the new mayor, while Whites were less likely to have a less positive
outlook for the city, as were those residents who are African-American and had economic losses
during the recession. Here is an example where two pieces of research about the exact same
election come to completely different conclusions about what happened and the role of the
coalition in the electoral process; which one is correct, or are both?
An example of a successful and unsuccessful coalition was in Los Angeles where a small
African-American community won a major share of political power through membership in a
biracial coalition with White liberals; however; Latinos have been junior partners in the coalition
and have been much less successful than African-Americans in becoming politically
incorporated (Sonenshein 1986). In this instance African-Americans have been successful by
joining a coalition, but because Latinos are not equal partners in that coalition they are not
experiencing the same level of success. In a further analysis of the Los Angeles coalition,
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Sonenshein (1989) finds that when the class interests of African-Americans and White liberals
conflict, alliances between African-Americans and Latinos may become more prominent but
unless African-Americans and Latinos comprise a very high share of the population, such a
minority coalition may fail unless it can obtain liberal support and additional political resources.
Kaufmann (2004) examines how likely African-Americans and Latinos are to support
each other’s candidates in elections. Since minority resources such as jobs and government
contracts do not increase under a minority led government Kaufmann (2004) argues that a
minority group would be better off as the most powerful minority in the coalition with Whites
than as the second most powerful group in a minority led administration. This is an example of
research that is couched in a rational choice argument (Downs 1957) and has conclusions that
conflict with other research that utilizes different frameworks and theoretical orientations.
Characteristics of successful coalitions
So with previous studies and many disparate findings, what are some general
characteristics of successful coalitions? One of the most consistent seems to be that the coalition
must be broad in scope and attempt to address the concerns of all the groups are a part of the
coalition (Rivera, DeMond, and Wright 2008). This is illustrated in several of the examples
above: coalitions are the most successful when the objectives of the group are broad. Often it
seems that coalitions fail when they move away (either consciously or unconsciously) from
broad objects to focus on more specific tailored efforts; of course, the larger the coalition the
more diverse the objectives of those groups involved, which could lead to greater coalitional
instability (Polsby 1980; Rivera, DeMond, and Wright 2008). As coalitions become more diverse
that means that there are a more diverse set of group preferences to satisfy, which can make it
difficult to maintain a broad scope. Other research has suggested that successful coalitions focus
on areas of shared interests, or at least those areas of interest that are not contentious for the
groups that comprise the coalition (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Polsby 1980; Hinkley 1981;
Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984; Sonenshein 1993; Gilliam 1996; Sonenshein 2003). If the
two groups do not agree on any of the issues (or policy preferences) that would negatively affect
prospects for coalition building.
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Problems in the Rainbow
Different experiences of African-Americans and Latinos and perceptions of commonality
It is important to recognize that African-Americans and Latinos have different
experiences in the United States, and this could be one of the limitations in coalition building
between the two groups. For instance, African-Americans and Latinos tend to occupy different
spaces in society: African-Americans tend to be more segregated while Latinos are more likely
to be assimilated (Ransford 1994; Tedin and Murray 1994; Cowan, Martinez and Mendiola
1997). While this may vary based on the geographic location, Latinos are more likely to be able
to “pass” as White if they want to, while African-Americans often cannot. African-Americans
and Latinos also have different experiences with discrimination, with African-Americans more
likely to perceive discrimination than Latinos (Tedin and Murray 1994; Cowan, Martinez and
Mendiola 1997). Additionally, African-Americans are more likely to feel their race hurts them
economically than are Latinos (Tedin and Murray 1994; Cowan, Martinez and Mendiola 1997).
This is another aspect of increased perceptions of discrimination with an economic result.
African-Americans have witnessed massive changes in their neighborhoods and social networks
due to the increased influx of Latinos into more diverse parts of the United States, which has
reshaped those landscapes and led to uncertain power dynamics. There is a significant amount of
previous research that has linked African-American feelings toward Latinos to the composition
of the racial environment. This research tends to find that negative feelings of AfricanAmericans increase as the size of the Latino population increases (Bobo and Hutchings 1996;
Cummings and Lambert 1997; Sears et al. 1999; Bobo and Johnson 2000; Cain, Citrin, and
Wong 2000; Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; Oliver and Wong 2003; Gay 2006).
Previous research has suggested the current and historical social experiences of AfricanAmericans have led to the formation of an African-American consciousness and a racial belief
system (Dawson 1986; Miller et al 1981; Robinson 1987). Previous research (discussed
elsewhere) has conflicting results about the existence and prevalence of this type of
consciousness and racial schema among Latinos.
Unlike African-Americans who were forcefully brought to this country as slaves, many
of today’s Latino newcomers are voluntary migrants, and consequently their experiences are
distinct from those of African-Americans (Lee and Bean 2004). According to Sawyer (2005)
conflicts among African-Americans and Latinos have been nurtured both by unresolved racism
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within Latino communities and the way African-American privilege U.S. born experience.
Narrow definitions of identity prevent interethnic alliances and stimulate conflict among groups
who share interests (Sawyer 2005). If each group only identifies with people who are racially and
ethnically similar and does not identify with a broad minority community in the United States it
becomes more difficult to form alliances that breach traditional group boundaries.
There is also a fair amount of literature that examines the negative feelings of Latinos
toward African-Americans. Immigrants do not come to America racially classified in the
American sense and Latino immigrants often arrive in the United States with defined notions of
African-Americans shaped by the society and culture of the nation of origin, and these defined
notions shape the nature of Latino and African-American relations (Bashi and McDaniel 1997;
Telles, Sawyer and Rivera-Salgado 2011). This is one explanation for the perceived animosity
between Latinos and African-Americans: existing notions of African-Americans among
immigrant groups. Further, according to previous research, foreign-born Latinos are found to
perceive greater competition with African-Americans than native-born Latinos (Mindiola,
Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; Sanchez 2008; Morin, Sanchez and Barreto 2011). Bobo and
Hutchings (1996) find that Latinos are generally likely to view other groups as competitors. They
also believe that as a group African-Americans are less united than Latinos, have less
opportunity, experience more discrimination and that Latinos have not fought for their rights in
the way African-Americans have (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; Gay 2006). Again,
however, there are other studies which offer different and conflicting pieces of the puzzle which
can lead to confusing comparisons and incompatible generalizations of attitudes of Latinos and
African-Americans toward each other.
Other research has found the opposite: that Latinos have higher levels of affect toward
African-Americans. Orr, Morel and Gamble (2014) find that Latinos see more commonality than
conflict with African-Americans, and further, Latinos who perceive linked fate both with their
own group and with African-Americans are likely to perceive both political and economic
commonality with African-Americans. Social integration and diverse social networks are
positively linked to perceptions of both economic and political commonality and that Latinos
who are second generation or greater are more likely than first generation to perceive political
and economic commonality with African-Americans (Orr, Morel and Gamble 2014). The
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findings of Orr, Morel, and Gamble (2014) support previous research that Latinos who have a
high sense of linked fate with other Latinos are more likely to perceive political and economic
commonality with African-Americans.
Previous research has examined African-Americans views of Latinos. Social class
position seems to be more important in explaining the views of African-Americans than in
shedding light on the views of US and foreign born Latinos, but using educational attainment and
level of income as indicators of social class the survey indicates that African-Americans in the
middle and higher classes disagree more than lower class African-Americans that their group is
prejudiced against Latinos (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; Sanchez 2008). Tedin and
Murray (1994) found that politically attentive (registered and efficacious) African-Americans
and Latinos are less supportive of coalitions among minorities than are other African-Americans
and Latinos.
What about Whites?
The role of Whites in multiracial coalition building has been the subject of inquiry in
previous research, and in fact could have an entire dissertation written only about that. Although
this work does not address the role of Whites in depth, there are a few items which are important
to illustrate. First, Meier and Stewart (1991) find that Whites tend to side with Latinos when
faced with the possibility of African-American-Latino coalitions. This would hint to the idea that
Whites have a vested interest in protecting their existing power in society, and would attempt to
thwart minority based political coalitions. Further, Sandoval (2010) finds that it is in the interest
of these two groups to form political alliances with Whites, suggesting that the most benefits can
be achieved when they align with Whites, rather than each other. This could be a limitation in
coalition building, however, it is outside the scope of this dissertation to analyze this as well as
the attitudes of Latinos and African-Americans towards each other and various aspects of
coalition building.
Why Include These Variables?
Previous research has examined many of the control variables included in these analyses
in various ways, and offer both justifications for including them in the present study as well as
some shaping some expectations based on previous results. While this discussion is not an
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exhaustive one, it does help to inform the subsequent research and illustrate the importance of
accounting for these factors in the chapters that follow.
What about religion?
There are significant justifications for including religiosity in the models in this
dissertation. Religion is a major component of civil society in the United States and plays an
important political role, especially for both African-Americans and Latinos (Burns, Scholzman,
and Verba 2001). Not only have many major political movements in American history been
rooted in religious beliefs and religious institutions, but religious involvement can develop skills
to be applied to political activities (Burns, Scholzman, and Verba 2001). Additionally, people
who are active in a religious institution are often members of social networks that allows for
several things: being targeted for political participation, being exposed to political messages and
exposed to discussions of public affairs (Burns, Scholzman, and Verba 2001). Religious
institutions remain one of the ways that people become involved and exposed to politics, and
form their attitudes toward other groups and toward various types of political behavior.
Previous research has found that religion plays an important role for African-Americans
and Latinos: churches are often the place where social capital, psychological resources, and civic
skills are developed (Chaves and Higgins 1992; Tate, 1993; Verba et al., 1993; Robnett, 1996;
Cavendish 2000), that connectedness to religion promotes group identity, group consciousness,
and linked fate (Allen, Dawson, and Brown, 1989; Dawson, 1994; Reese and Brown, 1995) and
that racial group identity is actively mobilized and asserted through the church (Dawson, 1994;
Layman and Green, 2006; Kelly and Morgan 2007). These factors all influence attitudes about
coalition building for African-Americans, and it is important to include measures of religiosity in
the analyses in this dissertation.
Political trust
While both Latinos and African-Americans have factors that can either serve to increase
or decrease levels of political trust, the factors are often different for each population. Previous
research has found that individuals in both groups who perceive more discrimination are more
likely to report lower levels of political trust (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Monforti and
Michelson 2014). Perceptions of discrimination also influence other political attitudes (discussed

19

elsewhere) and it is likely that they influence attitudes about coalition building for both Latinos
and African-Americans.
For Latinos, matters of identity often influence levels of political trust. Monforti and
Michelson (2014) find that Latino respondents who identify more strongly as American tend to
be more trusting while individuals who identify more strongly as Latino or as a member of a
national origin group tend to be less trusting. In this case it appears that levels of assimilation are
significant in predicting levels of political trust. Linked fate is also an important influencing
factor for Latinos: individuals with low linked fate are the most likely to say that they never trust
the government and individuals with high linked fate are the most likely to say they always trust
the government (Monforti and Michelson 2014). Additionally, first generation Latinos and
Latinos who speak Spanish report higher levels of political trust (Lopez and Pantoja 2004;
Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Again, it appears that perceptions of one’s position in society, both
individually and in relation to others, has an important influence on political attitudes broadly,
and likely has a significant effect on attitudes about coalition building.
Belief systems
Converse (1964) defines a belief system as different than an ideology, and conceptualizes
it as a way that people organize their thinking, a structure of ideas and attitudes in which the
elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence which
some people (but not all) possess. It is feasible that all the different components of attitudes
about coalition building examined in this dissertation constitute a cohesive belief system for
African-American and Latino respondents. Campbell et al. (1960) devise the "funnel analogy,"
which operates as follows: political socialization (mainly your parents' party identification)
determines party identification, which determines your political attitudes, which determines how
you actually vote. It is possible (and likely) that those same factors which are early influences on
the formation of political beliefs also influence attitudes about coalition building. I am able to
test this through the examination of issue preferences among African-Americans and Latinos to
determine if those preferences are connected in a cohesive manner and if there are areas where
the two groups could work together.
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Participation
Verba and Nie (1972) define participation as: "acts that aim at influencing the
government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices
made by government personnel" (2). In this dissertation I construct a political participation scale
that contains different forms of participation in order to determine the effect of levels of
participation on attitudes about coalition building. Participation is not equal across all segments
of society and participatory input tends to favor advantaged groups in society (Verba and Nie
1972; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). Thus, it is important not only to analyze levels of
participation among African-Americans and Latinos, but also who is likely to participate and
how that affects attitudes about coalition building.
Previous research has had conflicting findings in regards to Latinos and the factors that
influence their political participation. Jackson (2003) finds that age has a positive association
with political participation for Latinos: as Latinos get older they are more likely to participate at
higher levels. Highton and Burris (2002) find that Latino turnout remains low even after
accounting for the sizable portion of the population that are not citizens but another study by
Hero and Campbell (1996) find that rates of Latino participation as compared to non-Latino rates
of participation are similar. Why are there such conflicting results in the literature? In general,
foreign born and native born Mexican Americans immigrants are the most politically active
while Cubans are the last active (Hero and Campbell 1996; Barretto and Munoz 2013). Previous
research has found that factors such as integration into politically active social networks,
exposure to mobilization, language fluency, percentage of life in the US, immigrant attitudes
toward opportunities in the US and organization affiliation increase the likelihood Latinos will
participate (Hritzuk and Park 2000; Barretto and Munoz 2003). Many of these factors seem
similar to those factors that influence African-American participation rates, but do they function
in the same way for both groups?
Marriage, Age, Voting
There are certain factors that influence an individual’s life in ways that are distributed
throughout both the physical life cycle and the life cycle of an individual’s political activity. One
of these factors is whether or not an individual is married. Arvizu and Garcia (1996) examine the
effect of marriage on Latino participation, arguing that these “life cycle effects” could potentially
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stimulate political behavior and increase the effect of family responsibility on political behavior.
Following their reasoning, I include a measure of marriage in my analyses in order to determine
the effect of marriage on attitudes about coalition building.
Age is another factor that functions differently throughout an individual’s life and could
serve to influence political behavior. Arvizu and Garcia (1996) argue that as an individual ages,
the accumulation of material possessions and the increases in responsibility give that person a
greater interest in governance which increases the potential that a person will participate
politically. It is reasonable to hypothesize that older respondents will have a different set of
attitudes toward coalition building than younger respondents will. Lau and Redlawsk (2008) find
that age negatively affects correct vote choice: as people get older it becomes more difficult for
them to process information and make the vote choice that aligns with their preferences. Here we
can see the interaction between age and voting and the effect it can have on political
participation. Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) argue that social groups enter the voter decision
either through identification with the in-group or through attitude toward the out-group, and
further that the aspects of group identity and group attitude that become important in voters’
choices (which aspects are activated) depend on political circumstances. This study in particular
illustrates how conceptions of group membership and identity can influence political behavior.
Racism/race
Marable (1994) conceptualizes race as “…an unequal relationship between social
aggregates, characterized by dominant and subordinate forms of social interaction…” (30). Not
only does race (in this conception) serve as a framework for social interaction but it is also
perpetuated by the institutions in society, including political institutions. Prewitt (2013) argues
that in addition to the socially constructed meanings of race in the United States, we also have
statistical races that are constructed and reconstructed by the government and have political
purposes and political consequences. If we take both of these conceptions together then race
serves to legitimize the unequal treatment of groups of people both in an informal way in society
and in a formal way through government treatment. Hero (1992) argues that Latinos are
incorporated into a two-tiered pluralist system in the United States: due to the historical and
sociological factors in United States society minority groups have largely been relegated to a
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lower social and political tier; further, despite equal legal and political status of Latinos formally
distinct factors and processes have led to systematically lower political and social status.
National Origin differences for Latinos
One area of discussion is the differences between groups of Latinos along national origin
lines, and the likelihood of cohesive Latino coalitions that could then enter a coalition with
African-Americans. Historically Latinos have formed political organizations along national
origin lines but after the 1960s Latino groups attempted to form broader coalitions that could
represent Latinos on a national level (Rodriguez 2002). In general, Latinos prefer groups and
organizations formed along national origin boundaries, which would make it difficult for Latino
coalitions to develop and maintain multi-group organizations since Latino identity is singlegroup oriented (Rodriguez 2002). While Latinos have a strong national origin sentiment they
also report that they have little interaction with each other, do not have a strong belief in
common culture, and prefer organizations that are national origin based (Rodriguez 2002). In
general, the different political experiences of groups have negative effect on Latino national
coalitions (Rodriguez 2002). It is important to recognize, however, that partisanship could also
be divisive within Latino communities as the different national origin groups often identify
differently (Rodriguez 2002). While different national origin groups are all classified under the
umbrella term of Latino there are important and significant differences between the groups
themselves.
As an example of this, we can look at the differences between Mexican Americans and
Cuban Americans to see some of the diversity that exists within the Latino community.
Historically, the Mexican American population is the longest existing Latino demographic in the
United States, containing large amounts of both native born and immigrant members, and
historically experiencing discrimination and disenfranchisement, and are adept at using political
organizations and mobilizing members of their group to address problems and grievances
(Antunes and Gaitz 1975; McLemore and Romo 1985; Affigne 2000; Marquez and Jennings
2000). Cubans have achieved the greatest level of political incorporation and power and are less
likely to perceive discrimination than are other groups (Affigne 2000). Cubans are largely
Republican, middle class, and are influenced by larger resources brought with them when
immigrating; additionally, Cubans also have legal immigration because they are given automatic
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asylum and status which removes immigration status as a barrier to the growth of their
communities and their political incorporation (Menchaca 1994; Verba 1994; McClain and
Steward 1995; DeSipio and Henson 1997; Barreto and Segura 2014). These factors help to shape
Cubans’ political attitudes, including their attitudes toward coalition building both with other
Latino groups and with African-Americans. While these two groups do have some similarities
there are also significant value-based differences that could make coalition building difficult. It
may be then that there are negative attitudes within the Latino community as well as negative
attitudes toward African-Americans. It appears from the previous research that there are as many
factors that could serve to unite the Latino community as there are ways that those factors could
be divisive.
Language Choice
Previous research has consistently identified language as a primary influencing factor in
Latino political behavior (Johnson, Stein, and Wrinkle 2003; Garcia and Sanchez 2004). One of
the ways that language influences political behavior for Latinos is through the formation and
maintenance of identity: speaking a language other than English at home significantly increases
the likelihood of the formation and continual identification with a non-White identity (Zhou and
Bankston 1998; Saenz et. Al. 1995; Fox 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Johnson, Stein and
Wrinkle 2003). This expression of ethnic identity could also work in the opposite manner in that
non-Latino respondents may perceive that the widespread use of Spanish in official government
documents represents a diminishing of their own racial or ethnic identity. Use of the Spanish
language could serve as a way to overcome differences within the Latino community and also
serve as a way to reinforce a more encompassing Latino identity as opposed to identity primarily
based on national origin.
Identity, Culture and Political Attitudes
Traditional Latino culture is generally thought of as conservative and patriarchal with a
strong focus on the family and a foundational view of religion (Abalos 1993; Dutwin, Hermann,
and Levin 2005). Oboler (1995) argues that differences in social and racial backgrounds,
personal life, life experiences, and political beliefs are key to understanding not only the meaning
of the ethnic label Latino in people’s lives, but also Latino’s decisions to participate actively in
politics. Masouka and Junn (2013) argue that when modeling immigration attitudes it is
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important to recognize that levels of group identity vary systematically across American racial
groups, and the sense of commonality with others in one’s racial group acts as a moderating
force of public opinion on immigration. Garcia and Sanchez (2004) find that Latinos do not see
inconsistency between becoming Americanized while maintaining distinct cultures.
Research Questions
While each chapter has its own set of research questions, they all are an effort to answer
two broad questions. First, what are the attitudes that are likely to produce strong coalitions
between Latinos and African-Americans? Conversely, what attitudinal barriers stand in the way
of potential multiethnic coalitions? By first breaking down each limitation by chapter in an effort
to understand the nuances among the sample and then looking more generally at coalition
building I am able to offer a more complete answer to these two questions.
Data Type
To test my hypotheses about coalitions among African-Americans and Latinos I utilize
the 2004 and 2008 National Politics Study (NPS). The NPS is a telephone survey that was
conducted from September 2004 to February 2005 and September 2008 through December 2008
and resulted in 4,816 interviews total between the two years. Exploring the nature of political
involvement and participation among individuals from different racial and ethnic groups, the
survey included questions about voting preferences, party affiliation, organizational membership,
immigration, racial consciousness, acculturation, and views of government policies (NPS). The
sample (from both years) consisted of 1,085 African-Americans, 1,438 non-Latino Whites, 501
Caribbean Blacks, 1,201 Latino Americans, and 591 Asian Americans (NPS).
I chose these studies because they ask the questions about the possibility of coalition
building that I am interested in. While other studies ask some of the same questions, they often
lack another component of the research that I am conducting, or their samples are not adequate
for this research. In addition to the specification of the coalition building variable, the National
Politics Studies asks some other relevant questions that I did not find in other surveys that I
believe allows me to better analyze the questions that I ask. These questions allow me to directly
evaluate my hypotheses within the proposed thematic frameworks. Although the surveys are a bit
older, the benefits of using them outweigh the time issue, from the measurable dependent
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variable to the large national sample to the inclusion of unique questions that ask respondents
about racial and ethnic perceptions.
Methods
This research proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the limitation is the dependent
variable; in the second stage the dependent variable becomes coalition building and the previous
dependent variables become independent variables. It is important to understand the reasons
individually before we can more fully understand coalition building. In the first stage I use
regression modeling1 in order to unpack the nuances that I am interested in. In the second stage I
use structural equation modeling to correct for some of the weaknesses in the model and some of
the potential complications that are a result of the causal structure of the formation of attitudes
(Figure 1).
→

Potential
Factors in
Support for
Coalition
Building

Limit Set
1

→

Coalition Building
Limit Set
2

→
Limit Set 3

Figure 1. Diagram of Research Process
This methodology allows me to more fully answer the research questions that I am
interested in, and additionally allows me to unpack the nuances of which characteristics are more
likely to produce support for coalition building. By examining each set of limitations
individually, I am better able to understand how each functions on its own, and also how each
limitation functions with the other limitations once they are all put in the final model (Chapter 6).

1

I ran the models using both OLS regression and logistic regression where appropriate for each technique, and the results were
not substantially different. As such, the results from the OLS regressions are included for ease of interpretation.
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This strategy also allows me to see how the various “pieces” fit together through the
respondent’s own views. This is integral to the goals of this dissertation.
One of the issues in conducting this type of analysis relates to the causal structure: one
simply cannot argue with conviction that attitudes toward other groups and toward policies are
formed prior to and independent of attitudes toward coalition building. Due to this, regression is
not an appropriate statistical method to use in the final chapter, because the attitudes are not
independent. By using structural equation modeling I am able to address the concern that the two
sets of attitudes are likely jointly determined.
Within each chapter there are three sets of models that are estimated for each dependent
variable: one that combines both African-American and Latino respondents, one that only
includes African-American respondents, and one that only includes Latino respondents. While
ordinary regression uses one model to determine the effect of independent variables on
dependent variables, there is a flaw with these assumptions when one tries to compare certain
types of groups: regression models are predicated on the idea that the social processes under
examination operate in the same way for men and women but the reality is that men and women
often have different experiences in social institutions (Burns, Scholzman, and Verba 2001). The
same reality holds true in this dissertation: African-Americans and Latinos often have different
experiences in social institutions, and to ignore that is a methodological peril. A separate
modeling technique allows me to examine whether social processes work in the same way, or
different ways, for African-Americans and Latinos, and in general the use of separate regression
equations for African-Americans and Latinos to differentiate the way that social processes work
for the two groups.
Conclusion
This chapter serves as a useful way to lay the foundation for the following chapters for
the dissertation. By introducing the previous literature on coalition building I am able to show
how this research contributes to the existing body of knowledge and attempt to provide a
unifying framework for many disparate results. I have also discussed the inclusion of variables
that are common among the subsequent chapters, and discussed the methodology I use to answer
my research questions.
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CHAPTER III
WHAT IF THEY TAKE ALL MY STUFF? PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETITION BETWEEN
AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND LATINOS
“They’re afraid we’re going to take over the governmental institutions and other institutions.
They’re right. We will take them over…We are here to stay.” Richard Alatorre, Los Angeles City
Council
“We do not see how black people can form effective coalitions with groups which are not willing
to question and condemn the racist institutions which exploit black people; which do not
perceive the need for, and will not work for, basic change.” Stokely Carmicheal and Charles
Hamilton
What stands in the way of cooperation? One potential barrier is perceived competition
(both economic and political) over scarce resources. If the world is understood to be a zero-sum
game, any benefits that accrue to one group come at the expense of another group. This chapter
looks at the perceived competition limitation in detail in order to understand the characteristics of
people who succumb to the limitation compared to those who would not. The following ideas are
examined: discrimination, unfair treatment of the respondent’s racial group, the threat of
immigrants, perceptions of economic competition with other racial groups, perceptions of
political competition with other racial groups, and concerns of personal job security.
Competition
One area that has received plenty of attention in previous research involves the role of
competition (or perceptions of competition) in support for coalition building. Competition is
defined here as when two or more groups strive for the same finite objectives, so that the success
of one may imply a reduced probability that another will attain its goals (McClain and Karnig
1990; McClain 1993). Perceptions of competition may be detrimental to support for coalition
building: if the two groups perceive that they are in competition with each other it seems unlikely
that they would want to form coalitions with one another. Research in this area generally begins
from the idea that competition and conflict between African-Americans and Latinos are too
intense to allow for coalition building (Falcon 1988; Johnson and Oliver 1989; Karnig 1990;
McClain 1993; McClain and Tauber 1998, 2001; Alozie and Ramirez 1999; McClain and
Franklin and Seltzer 2002; Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; Kaufmann 2003; Mohl
2003; Lopez and Pantoja 2004; Vaca 2004; Sandoval 2010; Segura and Valenzuela 2010). Due
to scarce resources and the structure of the American sociopolitical environment, Latinos and
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African-Americans are not able to form cohesive political coalitions. There are several areas
where competition can be found: the lack of an adequate number of jobs, sparse educational
resources that are allocated between African-American and Latino children, and housing
conflicts, among others. These are not small issues in society, and perceptions of a zero-sum
scenario between (and within) groups may be a limitation that cannot be overcome.
Economic competition
Previous research has found that African-Americans often view Latinos as competitors
for economic resources (Gay 2006; Pastor and Carter 2009; Nteta 2012; Clemons 2013; Orr,
Morel, and Gamble 2014). Previous research has found that African-Americans are especially
likely to have negative views of Latinos and feel threatened when they perceive Latinos as
economic competition (Gay 2006). Does the relationship apply to Latino’s views of AfricanAmericans? There are some general findings about perceptions of competition among Latinos.
First generation Latinos are more likely to perceive political and economic competition with
African-Americans (Orr, Morel, and Gamble 2014). In the case of Southern cities, multiple
studies have found that Latino immigrants who are new to these locations often hold negative
views of African-Americans, and that both African-Americans and non-African-Americans
perceive threats from Latino immigration (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; McClain et
al. 2006; McClain et al. 2007). Part of the reason for these negative views are the perceptions of
competition over the resources in these communities. These findings, coupled with the findings
of other previous research (discussed elsewhere) help to inform my research questions and
hypotheses.
We know, from the previous research, that there are specific instances of increased
perceptions of competition, and certain locations that have been examined, but what we do not
know if these findings can be generalized the broader American public. What is needed (and
what this chapter does) is to move from these macro-level findings to the individual level in
order to determine which people (in each group) are most likely to allow the limitation of
economic competition to interfere with coalition building. While the macro level findings are
interesting and informative, a micro-level analysis is needed to move the discussion forward and
to unpack the nuances that are found at the individual level.
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It appears that there are several instances of specific findings in the literature, but that
many of them are spatially bound and do not examine attitudes. My analysis in this area extends
these findings to a national population and examines, at the micro-level, what characteristics are
associated with attitudes about economic competition. My research questions in this area are as
follows: what are the characteristics that are associated with higher perceptions of economic
competition for both African-Americans and Latinos? Are there differences between those
respondents who perceive higher levels of economic competition and those who perceive higher
levels of political competition?
My hypotheses in this section are as follows:
H1: I hypothesize that higher levels of education will be associated with lower
perceptions of economic competition for both African-Americans and Latinos due to a
scarcity of low-skilled jobs for those with lower levels of education.
H2: I hypothesize that foreign born Latinos will be more likely to perceive economic
competition than native born Latinos.
H3: I hypothesize that men will be more likely to see higher levels of economic
competition and be more concerned about losing their jobs than women will across all
groups due to a higher degree of economic displacement.
H4: Regardless of other factors, overall African-Americans will be more likely to
perceive economic competition and negative economic conditions.
Political competition
The effect of perceptions of competition has also been examined in terms of politics.
While coalitions may form temporarily in an electoral context (such as support of a candidate or
policy), it will not continue to exist once the election has passed (Segura and Valenzuela 2010).
Mayoral elections have been the location of much of the previous research in this area, and these
are interesting cases of temporary coalitions between Latinos and African-Americans. Using
survey data about the election of Mayor Taveras in Providence, Rhode Island, Filindra and Orr
(2013) find that race and perception of their personal economic position influence how a person
perceives interaction between different races and ethnicities in electoral politics and argue that
this is an indication of competition. This tendency to diverge politically instead of forming
coalitions could be due to perceptions of increased political competition where Latinos appear to
be gaining the upper hand. If the political world is a zero-sum scenario, then gains by one group
in the political arena would necessarily indicate losses by another.
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From the previous research we can see that case studies provide interesting instances of
temporary, successful, and unsuccessful instances of coalition building, but the findings cannot
be extended beyond specific instances. While case studies do provide a place to start, it is likely
that the national population has some differences from the population in the case study, and it is
necessary and important to understand what those differences are.
Using the findings of the case studies as building blocks, analysis in this area examines
national trends in attitudes toward political competition and what individual characteristics are
associated with those people who perceive more political competition. My research questions in
political competition are as follows: what are the characteristics that are associated with higher
perceptions of political competition for both African-Americans and Latinos?
My hypotheses for this section are as follows:
H1: I hypothesize that higher levels of education and political trust will be associated with
lower perceptions of political competition for both African-Americans and Latinos, based
on previous research.
H2: I hypothesize that men and conservatives will be more likely to see higher levels of
political competition than women will across all groups, based on the findings from the
case study that found that these groups were likely to perceive competition.
Racial threat
One of the most foundational theories of race is Key’s 1949 racial threat hypothesis,
which argues that racial hostility will increase when the political position of the dominant group
is challenged by the subordinate group. According to the threat hypothesis the source of
interracial hostility is more in an individual’s immediate surroundings than in psychological
disposition. It becomes more difficult, however, to assess this hypothesis when there are multiple
subordinate groups in the picture. Subsequent studies have tested the validity of this theory
(mostly in African-American and White relations) and have found support for it (Blumer 1958;
Blalock 1967; Glaser 1994; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Taylor 1998; Tolbert and Hero 2001),
and in a limited fashion in Latino-White relations (Hero 1987; Taylor 1998; Dixon and
Rosenbaum 2004). Negative perceptions of immigration by African-Americans can be viewed as
an extension of Key’s (1949) racial threat hypothesis: due to the uncertain economic situations of
many African-Americans, a rapid influx of Latino immigrants may be viewed as economically
detrimental. While we know quite a bit about the application of the threat hypothesis in terms of
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relations between African-Americans and Whites, little has been done in apply this hypothesis to
minority groups. It is likely that there are a different set of factors that affect support of the racial
threat hypothesis between African-Americans and Latinos, and the only way to determine what
those are is to move from the macro to micro level and determine which individual
characteristics are associated with this limitation.
A more recent version of Key’s hypothesis can be found in Huntington’s work.
According to Huntington (1996; 2014) the single most immediate and most serious challenge to
America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin
America. In this narrative, Latinos are thought of as different from previous immigrant groups
who previously immigrated to the United States, and are unwilling or incapable of becoming a
part of the United States in the way that previous immigrant groups have (Chavez 2013). This
could (in theory) lead to a reconfiguration of the existing racial structure in the United States.
While this argument is potentially distasteful, it is one that is prevalent right now in American
political discourse- most noticeably in the recent presidential campaign. We need to understand
which people are sympathetic with this perspective, and which are not; an individual level
analysis allows us to move from broad generalization to the more specific and nuanced
characteristics of the population.
One way to test the racial threat hypothesis includes perceptions of immigrants in the
United States, and what role they play in our current society. While there are levels of nuance, at
a base level people can either consider immigrants to be good for society, or to be bad for
society. Additionally, the topic of English as a national language can be a proxy for racial threat,
as those people who think English should be the official language could think of the threat of
immigrants as endangering this. The previous research does not address which portions of each
population may have commonalities from which they could work together, and which portions
may not be able to work together.
In this area, I have two primary research questions. Each of these questions encapsulates
a facet of the racial threat hypothesis in a way that it can be applied to African-Americans and
Latinos. First, what are the characteristics that are associated with those people who perceive that
immigrants are bad for the United States? Second, who is more likely to support English as the
official language of the United States?
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My hypotheses in the area of racial threat are as follows:
H1: Men will be more likely than women to perceive that immigrants are taking jobs from
Americans due to an increased presence in the labor force.
H2: Older people will be more likely to be supportive of English as the official language
of the United States than younger people will.
Discrimination/prejudice/unfair treatment
One aspect of potential conflict and competition among African-Americans and Latinos
involves perceptions of discrimination, prejudice, and unfair treatment of each respective group.
Potential limitations in multi-racial coalition building between Latinos and African-Americans
are the different experiences of the two groups in the United States, the differential level of
integration of the two groups, differential perceptions of discrimination, perceptions of prejudice,
and perceptions of unfair treatment (Tedin and Murray 1994; Fraga 2010). Which people in
which group see these limitations, however, needs to be explored. Perceptions of discrimination
could work in different ways. One way that perceptions of discrimination could help build
increased support for coalition building is that it would allow both groups access to an identity
that would bridge other identities (Uhlaner 1991). Perceptions of discrimination may also work
the other way in that experiences with prejudice may lead to increased perceptions of
competition with other members of non-majority groups (Henry and Munoz 1991; Bobo and
Hutchings 1996; Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999). This could be because when members
of minority groups feel like they are not treated fairly by society they are more likely to perceive
other groups as threats, regardless of whether the other groups are minorities as well.
While the literature tells us that there are multiple ways for discrimination to function, it
does not tell us when and for what people it will work for in which manner. My research
questions in this area are as follows: who is the most likely to perceive higher levels of
discrimination? What factors are most likely to be associated with higher perceptions of
discrimination? Does the way that Latinos and African-Americans view discrimination of the
other group vary significantly?
My hypotheses in the discrimination area are as follows:
H1: I hypothesize that higher levels of political efficacy will be associated with lower
perceptions of discrimination for both African-Americans and Latinos.
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H2: I hypothesize that respondents with higher levels of education and who are employed
will have lower perceptions of discrimination due to better economic positions.
H3: I hypothesize that respondents with higher levels of political trust will have lower
perceptions of discrimination for both African-Americans and Latinos due to the role of
political elites.
Variables
While a full description of each of the dependent and independent variables can be found
in the appendix, a brief description of the general coding of each of the dependent variables is
helpful in understanding the subsequent tables in this chapter. The following dependent variables
are coded as dummy variables with the affirmative position having the higher value: better
national economic position and better racial economic position. The following dependent
variables are coded on a scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”: group
treatment, immigrants take jobs, immigrants improve America, support for English as official
language, economic competition with other groups, and political competition with other groups.
The following dependent variables are coded on a scale that ranges from “None” to “A lot”:
racial group discrimination and personal discrimination. Concern over job loss is coded on a
scale from “Not at all” to “A lot.” The independent variables are those discussed in Chapter 2.
Analysis2
The analysis is broken into several parts and the structure reflects the structure of the
literature review. To begin each section there is a table showing the general levels of support for
each dependent variable. Following the levels of support are regressions that examine which
factors influence the dependent variable at the individual level.
Economic Competition Models
Table 1
Economic Competition Models (Top 2 categories)

Economic competition with Whites
Economic Competition with the other group
Better National Economic Position
Better Racial Economic Position
Employment Uncertainty

African-Americans
2004
2008
48.2%
48.5%
34.8%
41.4%
31.30%
47.62%
36.53%
48.00%
14.6%
54.9%

2

Latinos
2004
40.1%
26.7%
68.70%
63.47%
20.7%

2008
33.3%
24.6%
52.38%
52.00%
39.0%

I also ran crosstabs using regional variables but they did not contribute to the discussion so they are not included in
this chapter.
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In table 1 we can see the levels of support for both groups in regards to different
statements about economic competition with other groups. In terms of attitudes about economic
competition with Whites, just under half of the African-American sample (in both years) agrees
that they are in economic competition with Whites. Interestingly, Latinos have lower perceptions
of economic competition with Whites, and the percentage of the sample who does perceive
competition decreases from 2004 to 2008. This could indicate a potential barrier to coalition
building as it is possible that Latinos are more likely to align economically with Whites than
African-Americans are. In terms of perceptions of economic competition with the other group,
about 33% of African-Americans perceive economic competition with Latinos, while only about
25% of Latinos perceive economic competition with African-Americans. Also, it appears that
perceptions of competition increase over time, which is also problematic. Overall, Latinos are
more positive about both the national economic position and their racial group economic position
than African-Americans are, which again could indicate a barrier to coalition building. 3 If one
group views the economy and their place in it more favorably than the other, then it is possible
that the group with the more negative perceptions would view other groups as competition,
which is what this table alludes to. It could also be that these models are just a retrospective
evaluation of President George W. Bush, and are not indicative of any relationships between
African-Americans and Latinos. Finally, both groups have higher perceptions of employment
uncertainty in 2008 than they did in 2004, which is reflective of the economic recession at the
time.4

3

The regression models for perceptions of the national and racial economy did not contribute to our understanding of potential
competition between these two groups beyond the levels of support, and as such have been removed.
4 The regression models for employment uncertainty did not contribute to our understanding of potential competition between
these two groups beyond the levels of support, and as such have been removed.
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Table 2
Perceptions of Economic Competition with Whites5
Base Model
2004
-.009 (.037)
Ideology
-.037 (.073)
Male
.009***(.002)
Age
.022 (.078)
Employed
-.080 (.074)
Married
-.026 (.034)
Income
-.091**(.034)
Education
-.028 (.028)
Elec.Activity
-.065 (.106)
Voted
.286***(.034)
Efficacy
-.106**(.048)
Trust
-.149**(.051)
Partisan
-.020 (.049)
Religiosity
.165**(.078)
Black
Foreign Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panaman.
2.09***(.290)
Constant
.1682
R2
.1549
Adjusted R2
886
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.016 (.054)
.065 (.109)
.008 (.018)
-.124 (.117)
.009 (.112)
-.030 (.038)
-.072* (.050)
.015 (042)
.448** (.214)
.260***(.053)
-.062 (.073)
-.242** (.083)
-.034 (.066)
N/A

2.06***(.414)
.1235
.0940
401

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.021 (.049)
.018 (.099)
.009** (.003)
-.071 (.103)
-.210**(.100)
-.021 (.046)
-.087* (.047)
-.046 (.035)
.126 (.150)
.299***(.045)
-.115* (.066)
-.157* (.081)
-.003 (.066)

2.11***(.390)
.1522
.1306
524

Latinos
2008
.032 (.074)
-.045 (.149)
.0002 (.026)
.095 (.165)
.103 (.156)
.006 (.051)
-.105*(.070)
.022 (.053)
.681**(.328)
.389***(.070)
.034 (.103)
-.426*** (.142)
-.096 (.091)

2004
.019 (.059)
-.122 (.110)
.010**(.026)
.246**(.124)
.104 (.114)
-.039 (.054)
-.113**(.052)
-.021 (.048)
-.241* (.155)
.273***(.053)
-.120* (.075)
-.135**(.069)
-.057 (.075)

2008
-.015 (.082)
.331** (.169)
.003 (.028)
-.306* (.178)
.058 (.176)
-.081* (.059)
-.079 (.075)
-.013 (.072)
.281 (.294)
.146* (.084)
-.075 (.109)
-.139 (.112)
-.061 (.101)

1.72**(.612)
.1790
.1267
218

-.144 (.152)
.013 (.188)
-.031 (.127)
-.234 (.211)
-.110 (.360)
1.34** (.600)
2.22***(.476)
.2004
.1548
353

-.207 (.214)
.159 (.254)
-.266* (.171)
-.885* (.656)
.249 (.521)
.056 (1.06)
2.53***(.647)
.1382
.0345
178

In table 2 I analyze perceptions of economic competition with Whites. In general, less
than half of each population in both years view themselves in economic competition with
Whites. It appears that there is not much overlap between the two groups where they would
perceive that they have a common interest. Where there is overlap in the findings, the areas of
commonality are associated with a decrease in perceptions of economic competition with
Whites. While this appears to be a widely held view for African-Americans, it is not for Latinos;
this indicates that at the micro level there is significant diversity of attitudes toward economic
competition with Whites. Further, the general finding is that these two groups do not perceive as
much economic competition with Whites as the previous research would indicate, although
African-Americans overall are more likely to do so. There is no support for either the gender
hypothesis or the foreign born hypothesis in this table.

5

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean VIF:
1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19; Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.26.
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While increased efficacy is associated with increased perceptions of competition,
increased education has the opposite effect. This confirms my hypothesis about the effect of
education on perceptions of economic competition. This could be due to the liberalizing effect of
education and a recognition of structural factors of inequality. Republican respondents in both
groups are less likely to agree that they are in economic competition with Whites across models,
which aligns with Republican ideology. In 2004, older respondents perceive more economic
competition with Whites. As this trend did not continue to 2008, it is possible that the election of
President Obama had an effect of reducing perception of competition with Whites across groups.
In 2004, more politically trusting respondents perceive less economic competition with Whites
across groups. This is likely due to the role of political elites in shaping mass attitudes.
African-American respondents perceive more economic competition with Whites, even
when controlling for all the other variables. This confirms my hypothesis about the prevalence of
perceptions of economic competition among African-Americans. African-Americans who voted
in 2008 and Latinos who voted in 2004 are more likely to perceive that they are in economic
competition with Whites. This could be due to increased participation in the electoral system and
a desire to change American society through voting.
Latino men and employed Latinos are less likely to think they are in economic
competition with Whites in different years. As men are more highly represented in the
workforce, it would seem that these two factors would move together, but that is not the case.
Mexicans and Cubans are less likely to perceive economic competition with Whites, while
Panamanians are more likely to do so. Of the ethnic identity factors, it appears that the Latino
population is split in perceptions of economic competition with Whites, which is problematic for
coalition building: the two largest populations perceive less competition, while the more tertiary
populations perceive more.
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Table 3
Perceptions of Economic Competition with the Other Group6
Latinos toward
African-Americans
2004
-.028 (.051)
Ideology
-.203** (.097)
Male
.005* (.003)
Age
-.093 (.108)
Employed
.057 (.100)
Married
-.026 (.047)
Income
-.087** (.045)
Education
-.039 (.042)
Electoral Activity
.099 (.136)
Voted
.148** (.047)
Political Efficacy
.031 (.065)
Political Trust
-.041(.061)
Partisanship
-.035 (.065)
Religiosity
.177* (.132)
Foreign Born
.203 (.165)
Speaks Spanish
.179* (.110)
Mexican
-.166 (.188)
Cuban
.292 (.314)
Dominican
.725* (.524)
Panamanian
1.40*** (.416)
Constant
.1421
R2
.0930
Adjusted R2
352
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.092 (.072)
.199* (.146)
-.012 (.024)
-.184 (.154)
-.087 (.153)
.027 (.051)
-.131** (.065)
-.021 (.062)
-.228 (.255)
-.031 (.072)
-.139* (.094)
.024 (.097)
.040 (.088)
.069 (.186)
.092 (.220)
-.020 (.149)
-.426 (.569)
.143 (.452)
.521 (.924)
2.73*** (.562)
.0975
-.0111
178

African-Americans
toward Latinos
2004
.134** (.049)
.130* (.100)
.011*** (.003)
.032 (.104)
-.216** (.100)
.023 (.046)
-.128** (.047)
.004 (.036)
-.033 (.150)
.244*** (.046)
.019 (.067)
-.148* (.081)
.036 (.067)

2008
.132* (.078)
-.014 (.157)
.015 (.027)
-.051 (.172)
-.018 (.162)
.026 (.053)
-.078 (.074)
-.034 (.056)
-.077 (.363)
.299*** (.073)
.062 (.110)
-.423** (.149)
-.051 (.097)

1.12** (.394)
.1209
.0981
515

2.07*** (.638)
.1428
.0873
215

In table 3 I examine perceptions of economic competition with the other group. From
table 1 we know that less than half of each group view themselves in competition with the other
group, with Latinos significantly less likely to do so. While gender is significant across groups, it
does not appear that this is a widely held view of competition. The areas where there are
increased perceptions of competition are not surprising: conservatives, Republicans, and men,
but overall this data indicates that significant portions of each population do not see competition
as a limitation. Within the Latinos models, there are certain groups that perceive more
competition and this is likely due to increased participation and struggles for the same limited
low-skilled positions.
Gender functions differently for each group and year in this table. This is in contrast to
the previous table, and indicates that there are perceptions of competition among some segments
of the population, just not with Whites. It is interesting that there is support for the gender

6

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Black mean VIF: 1.19, Latino mean
VIF: 1.20; 2008 models: Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.26.
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hypothesis in terms of perceptions of competition with other minority groups, but not with
Whites. In most models increased education and efficacy are associated with lower perceptions
economic competition with the other group. This again confirms my hypothesis about the effect
of education. In 2004 older respondents are more likely to perceive economic competition with
members of the other group. It appears that those populations that are more involved in the
workforce (and potentially low-skilled jobs) are the most likely to perceive increased
competition.
Conservative African-American respondents are more likely to perceive that they are in
economic competition with Latinos. This makes sense as it aligns with more conservative
ideologies. As levels of political trust rise for African-Americans in 2008 they are less likely to
perceive they are in economic competition with Whites. It appears that those African-Americans
who are more invested in society are the least likely to perceive competition with Latinos.
Republican Latinos are less likely to perceive economic competition with AfricanAmericans. Given the emphasis of the Republican Party on individual achievement this makes
sense. Foreign born respondents, Mexicans, and Panamanians are more likely to perceive that
they are in economic competition with African-Americans in 2004. This confirms the foreign
born hypothesis, and indicates that recent immigrants have selective perceptions of economic
competition with other groups.
In this set of tables it appears that where there are increased perceptions of economic
competition, they primarily occur between African-Americans and Latinos and Whites, and not
with each other (although African-Americans are more likely overall to perceive economic
competition with Whites). This indicates that perceptions of economic competition between
these two minority groups is in fact not a widely held perception of members of both groups, but
it would be a limitation for some portions of each group such as conservatives, Republicans, and
men. One factor that seems to mitigate perceptions of competition at the micro level, however, is
if an individual has a job-employed people seem to have lower perceptions of competition.
According to this data, perceptions of competition will likely be a limitation for some portions of
each population, but it is not as widespread a limitation as previous research would indicate.
Additionally, there is limited support in these tables for my hypotheses.
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Political Competition Models
Table 4
Political Competition Models (Top 2 categories)

Political Competition with Whites
Political Competition with the other group

African-Americans
2004
2008
58.1%
54.9%
33.6%
35.4%

Latinos
2004
53.2%
35.5%

2008
47.1%
36.0%

In table 4 we can see the overall levels of support towards questions about political
competition with other groups. For both groups, perceptions of political competition with Whites
decreases from 2004 to 2008, although about half of each population still perceives high levels of
political competition with Whites. Although the election of Barack Obama is likely the reason
for this decrease, it still appears that both groups recognize the racial power struggle in American
politics. In terms of perceptions of competition with each other, just over a third of each group
perceives political competition with the other group, and this remains consistent across time. It
appears, from this data, that while there are segments of each population that see members of the
other group as political competition, it would not be as significant of a barrier to coalition
building as previous research may suggest.
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Table 5
Perceptions of Political Competition with Whites7
Base Model
2004
2008
-.053* (.037)
-.013 (.056)
Ideology
.131* (.074)
.123 (.113)
Male
.003* (.002)
-.004 (.019)
Age
-.060 (.079)
-.188* (.122)
Employed
-.061 (.076)
-.048 (.116)
Married
-.064* (.034)
.037 (.039)
Income
.020 (.035)
-.101**(.051)
Education
-.020 (.029)
.012 (.043)
Elec.Activ.
-.056 (.109)
.296* (.218)
Voted
.245***(.035)
.203***(.055)
Efficacy
-.119** (.050)
-.014 (.075)
Trust
-.218***(.052)
-.185** (.085)
Partisan.
-.011 (.050)
-.084 (.069)
Religiosity
.005 (.080)
N/A
Black
For. Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panaman.
2.76*** (.296)
2.58*** (.426)
Constant
.1252
.0844
R2
.0539
Adjusted R2 .1112
888
404
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.038 (.050)
.216**(.101)
.004* (.003)
-.066 (.105)
-.220**(.102)
-.020 (.046)
.044 (.048)
-.032 (.036)
.085 (.153)
.227***(.046)
-.136**(.068)
-.191**(.083)
-.060 (.068)

2.63***(.397)
.0963
.0733
525

Latinos
2008
-.045 (.077)
.292* (.155)
.012 (.027)
-.015 (.171)
-.035 (.162)
.037 (.053)
-.070 (.073)
.028 (.055)
.413 (.341)
.314***(.341)
-.011 (.107)
-.111 (.147)
-.200**(.095)

2004
-.061 (.060)
-.049 (.113)
.0005 (.004)
.001 (.127)
.154* (.117)
-.132**(.055)
-.019 (.053)
-.011 (.050)
-.150 (.160)
.282***(.055)
-.128* (.077)
-.234***(.071)
.055 (.077)

2008
.071 (.088)
.066 (.178)
-.033 (.030)
-.335* (.189)
-.065 (.185)
.058 (.063)
-.152**(.079)
-.025 (.076)
.217 (.312)
.104 (.088)
-.017 (.115)
-.323**(.119)
.048 (.107)

2.14***(.631)
.1372
.0822
218

.131 (.156)
-.096 (.194)
.095 (.129)
-.250 (.216)
-.114 (.369)
.867* (.615)
2.99*** (.487)
.2152
.1704
353

.075 (.228)
.147 (.266)
-.349**(.181)
.135 (.697)
-.146 (.553)
.794 (1.13)
3.02***(.687)
.1327
.0297
180

In table 5 I analyze perceptions of political competition with Whites. In most models
increased efficacy is associated with increased perceptions of political competition with Whites.
In contrast to the findings about economic competition with Whites, there are far more areas of
commonality both between groups and across time about attitudes about perceptions of political
competition with Whites. In these models, it is the most politically trusting and efficacious that
are likely to see competition with Whites, which reinforces some of the findings of previous
research. Joining together to gain more political power, therefore, appears to be an area where
African-Americans and Latinos could benefit. It appears that this is a limitation that could be
overcome. It also appears that there is not much support for either the ideology hypothesis or the
trust hypothesis in these models.
In most models Republican respondents are less likely to believe that they are in political
competition with Whites. Marriage functions differently dependent on group and year, indicating

7

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean VIF:
1.18, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19; Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.26.
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that being married has a differential effect for each group. The findings from this table echo
previous tables in two distinct respects: the politically trusting and efficacious perceive more
competition, and marriage increases perceptions of competition for Latinos. Also, Republicans
are less likely to perceive competition with Whites, which aligns with the findings from table 4.
Unlike previous tables, being African-American overall is not indicative of increased
perceptions of competition with Whites in this instance. African-American men and older
African-Americans in both years are more likely to perceive political competition with Whites.
This confirms the gender hypothesis, but it does not appear that gender produces the same results
among Latinos. Again, this is likely due to increased experience in political society throughout
the life cycle.
Employed Latinos are less likely to perceive political competition with Whites in 2008,
which aligns with the findings from table 4: being employed seems to mitigate perceptions of
competition. Increased income and education are associated with decreased perceptions of
political competition for Latinos. This offers limited support for the education hypothesis. In
other words, this does not seem to be a zero-sum scenario between Latinos and Whites. This
table also illustrates differences in attitudes among subgroups of the Latino population, which is
possibly due to differential levels of integration.

42

Table 6
Perceptions of Political Competition with the Other Group 8
Latinos toward
African-Americans
2004
.061 (.058)
Ideology
.081 (.109)
Male
.003 (.004)
Age
-.151 (.122)
Employed
-.007 (.113)
Married
-.007 (.053)
Income
-.048 (.051)
Education
-.057 (.048)
Electoral Activity
-.021 (.155)
Voted
.172*** (.053)
Political Efficacy
.131* (.074)
Political Trust
-.073 (.069)
Partisanship
.051 (.074)
Religiosity
.152 (.150)
Foreign Born
-.083 (.186)
Speaks Spanish
-.005 (.125)
Mexican
-.154 (.208)
Cuban
.133 (.354)
Dominican
.470 (.590)
Panamanian
1.32** (.468)
Constant
.0937
R2
.0416
Adjusted R2
350
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
.002 (.079)
.082 (.164)
-.022 (.027)
-.309* (.171)
-.092 (.167)
.112* (.057)
-.145** (.073)
-.123* (.069)
.277 (.281)
.108* (.079)
-.047 (.103)
-.111 (.108)
.115 (.096)
.172 (.205)
-.160 (.239)
-.140 (.163)
1.15* (.625)
.495 (.496)
.209 (1.01)
2.25*** (.616)
.1399
.1583
178

African-Americans
toward Latinos
2004
.042 (.047)
-.036 (.096)
.008** (.003)
-.018 (.100)
-.081 (.097)
-.047 (.044)
-.054 (.045)
.041 (.034)
-.050 (.145)
.174*** (.044)
.028 (.064)
-.064 (.078)
-.056 (.065)

2008
.032 (.071)
-.056 (.144)
.051** (.025)
.078 (.158)
.105 (.150)
.014 (.049)
-.024 (.067)
.010 (.051)
-.030 (.315)
.246*** (.068)
.211** (.099)
-.204* (.136)
-.151* (.088)

1.78*** (.378)
.0654
.0414
520

1.42** (.583)
.1101
.0531
217

In table 6 I analyze perceptions of political competition with the other group. In contrast
to the previous table, less than 40% of each sample perceives political competition with the other
group. Overall, there are significant portions of each population that do not perceive increased
political competition with the other group. This indicates that working together for increased
political power would be a better strategy rather than attempting to work together on economic
issues as there will be less resistance. These findings differ from the previous research, and
contribute new knowledge in that this limitation is likely one that could be overcome more easily
than the more divisive perceptions of economic competition. In each model more efficacious
respondents are more likely to perceive political competition with the other group. Where
political trust is significant, increased trust is associated with increased perceptions of political
competition with the other group, which confirms the trust hypothesis. Here again we see that
increased trust and efficacy increases perceptions of competition.

8

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Black mean VIF: 1.19, Latino mean
VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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Older African-Americans are more likely to perceive political competition with Latinos.
This could be due to longer participation in the political system and personal experience of
Latinos winning elections having detrimental impacts on African-Americans. Republican
African-Americans and more religious African-Americans in 2008 are less likely to perceive
political competition with Latinos. In the areas where there are significant indicators they mainly
serve to decrease perceptions of competition.
Employed Latinos in 2008 are less likely to perceive political competition with AfricanAmericans, which aligns with several of the previous tables. For Latinos in 2008 as income
increases so does perceptions of political competition with African-Americans. This is
interesting, as in previous tables higher income is associated with lower perceptions of
competition. As Latinos levels of education and political participation increase perceptions of
political competition with African-Americans decreases in 2008. This offers support for the
education hypothesis. Cubans are more likely to perceive that they are in political competition
with African-Americans in 2008. As the most conservative subgroup of the Latino population, it
appears that the increase in perceptions of political competition may have been spurred by the
election of President Obama.
In general, this set of tables indicates that Latinos and African-Americans do not see high
levels of political competition with each other, which indicates that the limitation of political
competition is not likely to be a widespread barrier to coalition building. Additionally, both
groups are more likely to perceive increased political competition with Whites, which indicates
that this could be a common ground for the two groups to work together. In general, it appears
that there is the most support among this set of tables for the gender and education hypotheses,
limited support for the political trust hypothesis, and no support for the ideology hypothesis.
Racial Threat Models
Table 7
Racial threat Models (Top 2 categories)

Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Pro-Immigrant Sentiment
English as Official Language

African-Americans
2004
51.9%
84.6%
87.4%

2008
49.6%
84.7%
88.4%
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Latinos
2004
23.6%
90.9%
67.7%

2008
17.0%
93.0%
63.9%

In table 7 we see the levels of support in regards to racial threat questions. Overall,
African-Americans are much more likely (around 50%) than Latinos (less than 25%) to perceive
that immigrants are a negative influence on society and are likely to take jobs. As immigration is
often a hot-button issue for Latinos, this could potentially be a significant barrier to coalition
building. Interestingly, the vast majority of both groups in both years also perceive that
immigrants are good for society, which indicates that it is not simply the presence of immigrants
that is problematic, but it is the economic impact of immigrants that seems to be the problem. 9
Also, while over half of both groups perceive that English should be the official language of the
United States, a larger percentage of the African-American population is more likely to believe
this.
Table 8
Attitudes toward Economic Competition with Immigrants (Taking Jobs) 10
Base Model
2004
2008
.045 (.038)
.097* (.052)
Ideology
-.039 (.076)
.182* (.106)
Male
.002 (.002)
.002 (.018)
Age
-.204**(.082) -.087 (.115)
Employed
-.130* (.078)
-.069 (.112)
Married
-.002 (.035)
-.053* (.036)
Income
-.112**(.036) -.083* (.049)
Education
-.011 (.029)
-.023 (.041)
Elec.Activity
-.091 (.112)
.121 (.213)
Voted
.107** (.036)
-.017 (.051)
Pol. Efficacy
.022 (.051)
-.079 (.071)
Pol. Trust
-.027 (.053)
-.014 (.081)
Partisanship
.067*(.051)
-.075 (.065)
Religiosity
.605***(.082) .831*** (.107)
Black
Foreign Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
1.82***(.304) 2.25*** (.405)
Constant
.1358
.1900
R2
.1220
.1607
Adjusted R2
888
402
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
2004
.045 (.052)
-.029 (.106)
.001 (.003)
-.235** (.110)
-.153* (.106)
.009 (.049)
-.145** (.050)
.0006 (.038)
.004 (.160)
.144** (.048)
.045 (.071)
-.178** (.086)
.092* (.071)

2.38***(.415)
.0846
.0611
522

9

Latinos
2008
.193** (.074)
.120 (.152)
-.008 (.026)
-.020 (.167)
-.195 (.159)
-.008 (.051)
-.112* (.071)
-.043 (.054)
.711** (.332)
.034 (.071)
-.139* (.105)
-.298** (.144)
-.118 (.093)

2004
.030 (.060)
.025 (.112)
.004 (.004)
-.102 (.126)
-.114 (.116)
.008 (.055)
-.091* (.053)
-.039 (.049)
-.195 (.158)
.094* (.054)
.014 (.076)
.087 (.071)
.049 (.076)

2008
-.061 (.073)
.368** (.149)
.019 (.025)
-.217* (.157)
.203*(.155)
-.117**(.053)
-.091* (.068)
.008 (.063)
-.447* (.271)
-.056 (.074)
-.031 (.095)
.179* (.099)
-.079 (.092)

2.96*** (.615)
.1175
.0612
218

-.516***(.154)
.116 (.192)
-.197* (.128)
-.197 (.214)
-.208 (.366)
-.397 (.611)
1.67***(.484)
.0862
.0345
356

-.351* (.190)
.189 (.218)
-.061 (.151)
-.317 (.500)
-.748* (.462)
-.927 (.943)
2.62***(.569)
.1809
.0831
179

The regression models for pro-immigrant sentiments did not contribute to our understanding of potential competition between
these two groups beyond the levels of support, and as such have been removed.
10 Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.21, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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In table 8 I analyze attitudes toward the idea that immigrants take jobs from Americans.
In Table 8 we saw that about half of African-Americans perceive that immigrants take jobs,
while less than 25% of Latinos think so. One interesting thing that table 7 illustrates is that the
potential for coalitions in this case is most likely to be successful among those portions of the
population that have negative attitudes toward immigrants. In this case, the two groups have
more commonality in that sense than in support of immigrants, which could indicate a more
general “American” identity as well as the specific racial or ethnic identities. Additionally, at the
micro level there is a fair amount of division within the Latino group, which is also problematic
for coalition building.
Education is significant in every model, and more highly educated respondents are less
likely to say that immigrants take jobs. This indicates a more positive view of immigrants and
supports the education hypothesis. As education can create economic equality between the two
groups and is widely considered to be a liberalizing factor, this makes sense. Employed
respondents in both groups are less likely to perceive that immigrants take jobs from Americans.
Again, being employed seems to mitigate many of these negative attitudes toward the other
group. Similar to previous table, marriage has a differential effect by group and year, as does
voting. Negative perceptions of immigrants by Latinos could be due to the increased exposure of
Latinos to immigrants in their communities, and indicates that there are significant divisions
within the Latino population. Political efficacy is consistently associated with increased
perceptions that immigrants take jobs. Partisanship has a varied effect by group. This again is
indicative of significant fissures within the Latino group.
In both years African-Americans are more likely to think that immigrants take jobs away
from Americans even when controlling for other factors. This is problematic, and indicates that
immigration is potentially a divisive issue for the two populations. Conservative AfricanAmericans are more likely to perceive that immigrants take jobs from Americans. This aligns
with a conservative ideology and is not surprising. In 2008 as levels of political trust increases
African-Americans are less likely to think that immigrants take jobs from Americans. In this
analysis there are a significant amount of factors that are associated with African-Americans
having negative views of immigrants.
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Latino men are more likely to perceive that immigrants take jobs in 2008. It is interesting
that there is support for the gender hypothesis in these models, since it is counter-intuitive that
Latino men would have more negative attitudes toward immigrants. This could be due to
increased interaction in the workforce between the two groups. Foreign born respondents,
Mexicans, and Dominicans are less likely to think that immigrants take jobs away from
Americans. This makes sense as immigrants often do jobs that no one else wants to do. It appears
that not all men think that immigrants take jobs, but only specific segments.
Table 9
Attitudes toward English as Official Language of United States11
Base Model
2004
-.017 (.033)
Ideology
.026 (.066)
Male
.004** (.002)
Age
.043 (.071)
Employed
-.156** (.068)
Married
.060** (.031)
Income
.013 (.031)
Education
Elec. Activity .002 (.026)
-.007 (.098)
Voted
-.038 (.031)
Pol. Efficacy
.027 (.044)
Pol. Trust
.153*** (.046)
Partisanship
.019 (.044)
Religiosity
.414*** (.072)
Black
Foreign Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
2.55*** (.265)
Constant
.0726
R2
.0577
Adjusted R2
891
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.048 (.052)
-.074 (.106)
.018 (.018)
.051 (.114)
.069 (.111)
.073** (.036)
.001 (.048)
.003 (.040)
.002 (.208)
.008 (.051)
.046 (.071)
.059 (.081)
.040 (.065)
.396***(.107)

2.50***(.403)
.0640
.0303
403

AfricanAmericans
2004
.003 (.038)
.030 (.078)
.005** (.002)
.094 (.081)
-.048 (.079)
-.020 (.036)
.067* (.037)
-.001 (.028)
-.050 (.121)
-.033 (.036)
.079* (.052)
.072 (.064)
.078* (.052)

2.75***(.311)
.0371
.0127
526

Latinos
2008
-.141** (.064)
-.056 (.131)
-.014 (.022)
-.084 (.144)
.140 (.136)
.024 (.044)
-.022 (.061)
.010 (.046)
-.145 (.288)
.067 (.061)
-.030 (.090)
.038 (.124)
.027 (.080)

2004
-.016 (.061)
.111 (.115)
.007* (.004)
-.013 (.129)
-.254**(.120)
.143** (.057)
-.066 (.054)
.010 (.051)
.020 (.163)
-.038 (.056)
.031 (.078)
.169** (.073)
-.031 (.078)

2008
.020 (.088)
-.187 (.182)
.073** (.030)
.200 (.192)
.127 (.190)
.157** (.063)
-.010 (.079)
-.032 (.077)
.061 (.313)
-.063 (.089)
.079 (.115)
.005 (.120)
.043 (.111)

3.75*** (.532)
.0387
-.0220
220

-.364**(.158)
.030 (.198)
-.394**(.132)
.165 (.220)
-.877**(.377)
-.001 (.628)
2.82***(.500)
.1322
.0830
355

-.125 (.229)
-.245 (.264)
-.330* (.182)
.627 (.701)
-.129 (.555)
.634 (1.13)
2.34***(.683)
.1446
.0418
178

In table 9 I analyze attitudes toward making English the official language of the United
States. From table 7 we saw that over half of each group supports the institution of an official
language policy, with African-Americans being more likely overall to support such a policy.
While it is true that there are segments of populations that do not support this type of policy

11

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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(such as older respondents), there are more who are supportive. This could be symbolic of a
pluralist approach to identity in which a general American identity is of higher priority than a
more specific ethnic or racial identity. This data confirms the age hypothesis.
In general African-Americans are more likely to support an official language policy. This
could be an expression of perceptions of cultural competition and a desire to “protect” the
American culture via language. Conservative African-Americans are less likely to agree that
English should be the official language of the United States. In 2004 as levels of education,
levels of religiosity, and levels of trust increases African-Americans are more likely to think that
English should be the official language. This finding is in the opposite direction expected by the
education hypothesis. These findings do not translate to 2008, which may indicate increased
levels of tolerance or diversity among African-Americans. In 2004 married Latinos are less
likely to think that English should be the official language. Wealthier Latinos are more likely to
support an official language policy. In 2004 Republican Latinos are more likely to think that
English should be the official language. Foreign born respondents, Mexicans, and Dominicans
are less likely to think that English should be the official language. In the majority of cases
micro-level groups of Latinos are less supportive of English as the official language.
In the tables in this section it appears that perceptions of the influence of immigrants in
America could potentially be a uniting force for African-Americans and Latinos, but not in the
way expected. There are more similarities across groups, years, and conceptions that are against
immigrants than pro-immigrant, and so one way to surpass this limitation could be by activating
a more general “American” identity to oppose increased immigration. These tables also illustrate
the presence and effect of intra-group competition for Latinos.
Discrimination/Prejudice/Unfair Group Treatment Models
Table 10
Discrimination/Unfair treatment Models (Top 2 categories)

Discrimination against Whites
Discrimination against Blacks
Discrimination against Latinos
Personal Discrimination
Unfair Group Treatment

African-Americans
2004
2008
33.3%
37.4%
92.6%
91.4%
85.4%
90.3%
64.4%
71.7%
80.7%
75.6%

Latinos
2004
23.9%
79.1%
83.9%
45.0%
50.0%
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2008
25.9%
79.4%
87.9%
52.9%
48.3%

In table 10 we see levels of support regarding perceptions of discrimination against other
groups and the respondent’s own group. Just over 30% of African-Americans and 25% of
Latinos perceive discrimination against Whites,12 which are fairly similar levels. In terms of
perceptions of discrimination against African-Americans, over 90% of African-Americans
perceive discrimination against themselves, and 79% of Latinos have similar perceptions. This
could be a fertile ground for coalition building in terms of an alliance against discrimination
against minorities. In terms of perceptions of discrimination against Latinos, higher percentages
of African-Americans in both years perceive discrimination against Latinos than Latinos do
against themselves. Interestingly, members of both groups are less likely to perceive personal
discrimination than they are to perceive discrimination either against their own group or against
the opposite group. This suggests the influence of group consciousness in evaluations of
discriminatory treatment against minority groups. Finally, African-Americans are much more
likely (about 75%) to perceive unfair group treatment in general than Latinos are (about 50%); it
is important to recognize that over half of each sample have higher perceptions of unfair group
treatment, which could provide the basis for successful coalition building.

12

The regression models for perceptions of discrimination against Whites did not contribute to our understanding of potential
competition between these two groups beyond the levels of support, and as such have been removed.
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Table 11
Perceptions of Discrimination against African-Americans13
Base Model
2004
-.023 (.024)
Ideology
.112** (.048)
Male
-.0009 (.001)
Age
-.099** (.051)
Employed
.024 (.049)
Married
.028 (.022)
Income
.081*** (.022)
Education
.028* (.018)
Elec.Activity
.036 (.070)
Voted
.081*** (.022)
Pol. Efficacy
-.039 (.032)
Pol. Trust
-.128***(.033)
Partisanship
-.044* (.033)
Religiosity
.298*** (.051)
Black
For. Born
Speak Spanish
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
3.03*** (.191)
Constant
.1359
R2
.1221
Adjusted R2
891
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
.029 (.038)
.082 (.077)
-.016 (.013)
-.182** (.083)
-.074 (.081)
.043* (.026)
.046* (.035)
.051* (.029)
.328** (.150)
.042 (.037)
-.062 (.051)
-.104* (.059)
.024 (.047)
.219** (.078)

2.83***(.294)
.1016
.0694
405

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.014 (.029)
.072 (.060)
.001 (.002)
-.048 (.062)
.021 (.060)
.014 (.028)
.119*** (.028)
.020 (.021)
.080 (.092)
.100*** (.027)
.004 (.040)
-.063 (.049)
-.049 (.040)

2.89*** (.238)
.0916
.0685
526

Latinos
2008
.005 (.047)
.150* (.096)
-.007 (.016)
-.007 (.106)
.056 (.100)
.024 (.032)
.030 (.045)
.054* (.034)
.396* (.211)
.114** (.045)
-.137** (.066)
-.074 (.091)
.013 (.059)

2004
-.004 (.043)
.178** (.080)
-.003 (.002)
-.162* (.090)
.028 (.083)
.012 (.040)
.028 (.038)
.025 (.035)
.027 (.114)
.035 (.039)
-.127** (.054)
-.168*** (.051)
-.043 (.054)

2008
.062 (.068)
.048 (.138)
-.015 (.023)
-.352** (.146)
-.123 (.144)
.062 (.049)
.050 (.062)
.050 (.059)
.300 (.243)
-.008 (.069)
.030 (.088)
-.130* (.092)
.045 (.083)

2.92*** (.390)
.1071
.0505
219

-.197* (.110)
-.009 (.138)
.037 (.092)
.013 (.154)
-.054 (.263)
.450 (.439)
3.76*** (.348)
.1206
.0707
355

-.072 (.177)
-.012 (.203)
-.047 (.141)
-.520 (.468)
.050 (.430)
-.124 (.881)
2.83***(.532)
.0912
-.0167
180

In table 11 I examine contributing factors of perceptions of discrimination against
African-Americans. Over 75% of each population perceives significant discrimination against
African-Americans. Even though African-Americans are overall more likely to perceive
discrimination against themselves, there are large amounts of the Latino population that share
these perceptions. This could lead to a common ground for coalition building. Men in both
groups are more likely to perceive discrimination against African-Americans. It appears that
there is a common recognition of this discrimination among men that was not present in the
previous table. Increased political trust is associated with decreased perceptions of discrimination
against African-Americans. This echoes the findings of the previous tables, and confirms the
political trust hypothesis.
African-Americans perceive more discrimination against themselves, which is not
surprising. In 2004 increased education increase is associated with increased perceptions of
13

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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discrimination among African-Americans. This disproves the education hypothesis. As political
participation increases among African-Americans in 2008 so does the perception of
discrimination against African-Americans, as well as for African-Americans who voted.
Increased efficacy is associated with increased perceptions of discrimination. This disproves the
efficacy hypothesis. It is not surprising that African-Americans would have higher perceptions of
discrimination against themselves given the social and political history of the United States.
Employed Latinos are less likely to perceive discrimination against African-Americans.
Republican Latinos are less likely to perceive discrimination against African-Americans in both
years. Foreign born respondents are less likely to perceive discrimination against AfricanAmericans in 2004. At the micro level it appears that Latinos perceive less discrimination against
African-Americans across several factors.
Table 12
Perceptions of Discrimination against Latinos14
Base Model
2004
-.027 (.026)
Ideology
.146** (.051)
Male
-.0005 (.001)
Age
.048 (.055)
Employed
.011 (.052)
Married
-.022 (.024)
Income
.076** (.024)
Education
-.011 (.020)
Elec.Activity
.185** (.076)
Voted
.032* (.024)
Pol. Efficacy
-.055* (.034)
Pol. Trust
-.079** (.036)
Partisanship
.046* (.034)
Religiosity
-.021 (.055)
Black
For. Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
2.85***(.207)
Constant
.0493
R2
.0340
Adjusted R2
886
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
.012 (.034)
-.009 (.070)
-.012 (.012)
.014 (.076)
-.018 (.074)
.021 (.024)
.036 (.032)
.011 (.027)
.081 (.136)
.005 (.034)
-.067*(.047)
-.137** (.083)
.030 (.043)
.054 (.071)

3.23***(.268)
.0440
.0095
403

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.006 (.033)
.159** (.068)
-.001 (.002)
.028 (.071)
-.007 (.069)
.044* (.032)
.112*** (.032)
-.009 (.024)
.308** (.105)
.011 (.031)
-.032 (.046)
-.083* (.056)
.031 (.046)

2.52*** (.274)
.0886
.0652
521

14

Latinos
2008
.013 (.046)
.135* (.093)
-.020 (.016)
-.042 (.103)
-.070 (.097)
.043* (.031)
.030 (.043)
.022 (.033)
.120 (.205)
.010 (.044)
-.152**(.064)
-.074 (.089)
.034 (.057)

2004
-.029 (.041)
.086 (.077)
-.001 (.002)
.072 (.087)
.014 (.080)
-.129***(.038)
.036 (.036)
-.007 (.034)
.116 (.110)
.067* (.037)
-.123** (.052)
-.035 (.049)
.039 (.053)

2008
-.007 (.058)
-.154*(.117)
.002 (.019)
.082 (.124)
-.052 (.123)
.010 (.041)
.058 (.053)
.019 (.050)
.191 (.206)
.015 (.058)
.038 (.075)
-.137*(.078)
.048 (.070)

3.32***(.380)
.0730
.0140
218

.223** (.107)
.033 (.133)
.064 (.089)
-.379** (.148)
-.276 (.253)
.414 (.422)
3.36*** (.334)
.1281
.0786
355

.187 (.150)
.049 (.173)
.009 (.120)
-776**(.397)
.259 (.365)
-.111 (.747)
2.69***(.453)
.0941
-.0142
179

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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In table 12 I analyze perceptions of discrimination against Latinos. Again, over 75% of
each group perceives increased discrimination against Latinos. It appears that Latinos are less
likely to perceive discrimination against their own group while African-Americans are more
likely to perceive it. This echoes the findings from table 11, and indicates a more general trend.
There seems to be less recognition of structural inequality factors among Latinos than among
African-Americans, however, the vast majority of each group recognize discriminatory behavior
against both their own group and the other minority group, which is promising for coalition
building. This indicates two very similar views of the social and political systems in the United
States, which could be a foundation for coalition building.
Men being more likely to perceive increased discrimination against Latinos. Increased
income has a differential effect based on group and year. Where political trust is significant,
increased trust is associated with decreased discrimination against Latinos. This confirms the
political trust hypothesis.
In 2004 more highly educated African-Americans and African-Americans who voted are
more likely to perceive discrimination against Latinos. This does not support the education
hypothesis. It appears that African-Americans in general are more likely to perceive
discrimination against Latinos; in the other tables they also had higher perceptions of
discrimination which may indicated that there is a general perception of more discrimination.
Cubans and Republicans are less likely to perceive discrimination against Latinos. In
contrast, those with increased efficacy and the foreign born are more likely to perceive
discrimination against their own group. At the micro level there are segments of the Latino
population who perceive more discrimination against their own group, but there are far more
who do not.
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Table 13
Perceptions of Personal Discrimination 15
Base Model
2004
-.0007 (.032)
Ideology
.373*** (.064)
Male
.007*** (.002)
Age
-.007 (.069)
Employed
-.005 (.066)
Married
-.023 (.030)
Income
.067** (.030)
Education
.112*** (.025)
Elec.Activity
-.020 (.094)
Voted
.116*** (.030)
Pol. Efficacy
-.131** (.043)
Pol. Trust
-.094** (.045)
Partisanship
-.006 (.043)
Religiosity
.392*** (.070)
Black
For. Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
1.72*** (.258)
Constant
.1881
R2
.1747
Adjusted R2
864
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.0009 (.045)
.031 (.092)
.014 (.015)
-.044 (.099)
-.034 (.096)
-.008 (.031)
.021 (.042)
.104** (.035)
.155 (.177)
.140** (.044)
-.079* (.061)
-.043 (.070)
.053 (.056)
.421***(.093)

1.83*** (.348)
.1527
.1224
406

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.002 (.041)
.471*** (.082)
.011*** (.002)
.056 (.085)
.051 (.083)
-.056* (.038)
.189*** (.039)
.106*** (.029)
-.055 (.125)
.082** (.038)
-.171** (.055)
-.103* (.068)
-.041 (.056)

1.92*** (.326)
.2082
.1873
506

Latinos
2008
-.004 (.062)
.227* (.126)
.014 (.021)
-.104 (.138)
-.139 (.131)
-.002 (.043)
.103* (.059)
.083* (.044)
.544** (.277)
.142** (.059)
-.094 (.087)
.103 (.119)
.033 (.077)

2004
.027 (.055)
.242** (.104)
.002 (.003)
-.072 (.116)
-.077 (.107)
-.014 (.051)
-.085* (.049)
.096** (.045)
.041 (.147)
.159** (.050)
-.110* (.070)
-.077 (.065)
.061 (.071)

2008
.044 (.070)
-.107 (.144)
.020 (.024)
-.004 (.152)
.051 (.150)
-.035 (.051)
.012 (.065)
.077 (.061)
.011 (.252)
.125* (.072)
-.022 (.091)
-.146*(.096)
.134* (.086)

1.55** (.511)
.1213
.0658
220

-.158 (.142)
.074 (.181)
-.034 (.119)
-.146 (.197)
-.322 (.336)
-.100 (.559)
2.00*** (.452)
.1022
.0502
348

-.318*(.184)
-.109 (.211)
.173 (.146)
-.055 (.486)
.804* (.447)
-1.21*(.914)
1.85*** (.552)
.1370
.0345
180

In table 13 I examine perceptions of personal discrimination. In table 10 we saw that
respondents are less likely to perceive personal discrimination than they are to perceive groupwide discrimination. Table 10 has the most areas of commonality between the two groups,
indicating that there are many similarities between groups and across time among those who
perceive more personal discrimination. It may be easier to pursue coalition building on the basis
of group-based discrimination rather than individual discrimination, as this appears to have
resistance in the populations. In every model increased efficacy is associated with increased
perceptions of personal discrimination. This does not prove the efficacy hypothesis. Men, those
who participate more, and those with increased levels of education are more likely to perceive
higher levels of personal discrimination. This does not support the education hypothesis.
Republicans are less likely to perceive personal discrimination. In all 2004 models as levels of
political trust increase respondents are more likely to perceive higher levels of personal
15

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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discrimination. This does not support the political trust hypothesis. While there were significant
differences in evaluations of group discrimination, across groups there are similar factors that are
associated with increased perceptions of personal discrimination.
African-Americans are more likely to perceive higher levels of personal discrimination.
This follows the trend of the previous three models. There are far more indicators associated with
higher perceptions of personal discrimination for African-Americans than lower ones. Foreign
born respondents, Dominicans, and Panamanians are all less likely to perceive personal
discrimination in 2008. This follows the general trend from the previous tables, but also indicates
ethnic group differences at the micro level among the Latino population.
Table 14
Perceptions of Unfair Group Treatment16
Base Model
2004
-.051* (.033)
Ideology
.143** (.065)
Male
-.0008 (.002)
Age
.024 (.069)
Employed
.060 (.066)
Married
-.039 (.030)
Income
.018 (.031)
Education
.064** (.025)
Elec.Activity
-.154* (.094)
Voted
.170*** (.030)
Pol. Efficacy
-.057* (.043)
Pol. Trust
-.177*** (.045)
Partisanship
-.005 (.043)
Religiosity
.675*** (.070)
Black
For. Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
2.56*** (.259)
Constant
.2165
R2
.2038
Adjusted R2
882
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.073* (.048)
-.112 (.098)
-.011 (.017)
.110 (.107)
.084 (.103)
-.082** (.034)
-.088** (.045)
.092** (.037)
.502** (.205)
.207*** (.047)
-.067 (.065)
-.071 (.075)
-.048 (.061)
.602*** (.099)

2.34*** (.375)
.2143
.1858
401

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.021 (.041)
.039 (.082)
-.002 (.002)
.037 (.085)
.044 (.083)
-.191 (.038)
.054* (.039)
.087** (.029)
-.113 (.124)
.161*** (.038)
-.131** (.055)
-.209** (.067)
-.084* (.055)

3.48*** (.326)
.1053
.0825
523

16

Latinos
2008
-.082 (.064)
-.024 (.131)
-.015 (.022)
.260* (.143)
.079 (.136)
-.092** (.044)
-.041 (.061)
.112** (.046)
.463* (.281)
.236*** (.061)
-.124* (.090)
-.012 (.125)
-.140* (.081)

2004
-.160** (.057)
.293** (.106)
.001 (.003)
-.034 (.120)
.046 (.110)
.009 (.053)
-.034 (.051)
.012 (.047)
-.270* (.150)
.175*** (.051)
.052 (.072)
-.137** (.067)
.130* (.072)

2008
-.056 (.078)
-.161 (.160)
.0009 (.027)
-.122 (.171)
-.047 (.167)
-.064 (.057)
-.113* (.074)
.052 (.069)
.661** (.303)
.225** (.080)
.072 (.102)
-.107 (.106)
.053 (.097)

3.04*** (.534)
.1614
.1082
219

.111 (.146)
-.219 (.184)
.122 (.121)
.177 (.204)
.599* (.363)
-.539 (.574)
2.13*** (.461)
.1502
.1012
350

-.153 (.205)
.203 (.233)
.037 (.162)
-1.16**(.536)
.503 (.543)
1.11 (1.00)
1.11** (.604)
.1795
.0803
177

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.21, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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In table 14 I analyze perceptions of unfair group treatment. In every model as political
efficacy increases perceptions of unfair group treatment increases. This does not support the
efficacy hypothesis. Education has a differential effect based on year and group. It appears that
there is partial support in this table for the education hypothesis. African-Americans in 2008 and
Latinos in 2008 who voted are more likely to perceive unfair group treatment, but Latino who
voted in 2004 are less likely to perceive unfair group treatment. In general Republicans are less
likely to perceive unfair group treatment. Religiosity also has a differential effect based on group
and year. In many instances this table looks like the previous ones in this section: although there
is overlap, significant indicators serve to increase African-Americans perceptions of unfair group
treatment while decreasing Latino perceptions.
African-Americans in general, employed African-Americans, and African-Americans
who participate more are more likely to perceive unfair group treatment. For African-Americans
in 2008 as income increases perceptions of unfair group treatment decreases. In the majority of
instances micro level factors are associated with higher perceptions of unfair group treatments.
There is support for the political trust hypothesis. For Latinos, men and Dominicans are more
likely to perceive unfair group treatment. Conservatives and Cubans are less likely to perceive
unfair group treatment. While the relationships are not as clear in this table, there are still a fair
number of micro level indicators that are associated with lower perceptions of unfair group
treatment for Latinos.
The findings of this group of tables are helpful. If it is the case that across groups there
are higher perceptions of personal discrimination then that could potentially be an area where
African-Americans and Latinos could work together. While it is true that African-Americans are
more likely to see discrimination than Latinos are, the majority of each population still perceives
unfair treatment and discrimination against both themselves and the other minority group.
Discrimination can leave lasting legacies, and shared perceptions of discrimination could be a
foundation for coalition building. This indicates two very similar views of the social and political
systems in the United States.
Conclusion
In this chapter I examined attitudes about various facets of competition among Latinos
and African-Americans to determine who is more likely to see increased competition among
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groups and who is not, and what are potential areas where the two groups could work together. In
general it appears that people who perceive less competition are more highly educated,
Republican, and conservative. People who perceive more competition, in general, seem to be
older, more efficacious, more politically trusting, and African-American. The findings in this
chapter indicate a couple potential areas of coalition building, as well as distinguishing, at the
micro level, who is more likely to support coalitions in each group, which is a contribution to the
literature.
Race has a significant effect in many cases, but not always in the way that is predicted in
the previous research. While African-Americans do have higher perceptions of competition of
both types, it is more common that they perceive increased competition with Whites and not with
Latinos. This indicates that perceptions of competition are influenced more strongly by other
factors than simply race, which is a new finding. It appears that race matters more in certain
circumstances. While African-Americans do not perceive competition with Latinos, they do have
more negative attitudes toward immigrants. This is problematic, and indicates that immigration is
potentially a divisive issue for the two populations. In every instance being African-American is
associated with increased perceptions of discrimination (both against other groups and one’s own
group) and higher perceptions of unfair group treatment.
There are some interesting trends among the various groups of Latinos as well. For
instance, Cubans perceive the most political competition with African-Americans, and are also
the least likely to perceive discrimination or unfair treatment. In contrast, Mexicans not only
perceive decreased competition with Whites, but perceive less discrimination overall. Foreign
born respondents perceive more discrimination against their own group (but not against
themselves personally) but less against other groups. At the micro level there are segments of the
Latino population who perceive more discrimination against their own group. This indicates
ethnic group differences at the micro level among the Latino population. In nearly every case for
Latinos at the micro-level they are less positive about the role of immigrants in the United States,
with the Mexican population having the most variation. This indicates that there is a perception
of intra-group as well as the inter-group competition, which complicates things even more.
In terms of perceptions of competition, it appears that education and employment are
significant forces in diminishing perceptions of competition across models and years. In most
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cases, people with higher levels of education are less likely to perceive competition with other
groups, which indicates that increasing education levels could be a good way to increase support
for coalition politics. Increased education is associated with increased perceptions of personal
discrimination and discrimination against minority groups, but not against Whites. Across
spectrums, it seems that education is a liberalizing factor in attitudes between Latinos and
African-Americans, and also creates economic opportunity across groups. Having a job seems to
help to mediate perceptions of competition with other groups in general. It would seem, then,
that a good place to begin coalition building efforts would be to provide people in these
populations with more jobs-if being employed helps to mitigate the perceptions of competition
then decreasing the unemployment rates of Latinos and African-Americans is one way to
increase support for coalition building.
In many cases, Republican respondents are less likely to perceive competition with other
groups or discrimination, regardless of the type of competition or the reference group. This
indicates that there is potential for coalitions built on Republican partisanship, which is
something that previous research has not found. This, however, seems unlikely given that there
are so few African-American Republicans and that there are significant amounts of the Latino
population who do not identify as Republicans either. This again is indicative of significant
fissures within the Latino group. In general, more conservative ideologies are associated with
more negative views of immigrants across groups and topics and lower perceptions of
discrimination and unfair treatment.
In terms of the explanatory variables, gender, efficacy, and trust seem to have consistent
effects that suggest two other broader trends. Men seem to perceive different levels of
competition based on who the group referenced is, with most seeing increased economic
competition with members of other minority groups. This suggests that increased perceptions of
competition are occurring between Latino and African-American men, but not with Whites.
Both groups of men have higher perceptions of personal discrimination, although perceptions of
group discrimination vary between African-Americans and Latinos. Additionally, while
increased efficacy is consistently associated with higher perceptions of competition and
increased perceptions of discrimination, increased trust is associated with increased perceptions
of political competition, but lower perceptions of discrimination both against other groups. It
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appears that perceptions of discrimination and competition are effected by different things,
which is lacking from the previous research.
It appears that there are several areas of overlap between the two groups where they
would perceive that they have a common interest, but also that often the two groups are not
overtly hostile to one another. It could be inferred that Latinos may see Whites as potentially
better coalition partners, while African-Americans may see Latinos as a better partner; these
different perceptions could definitely be a limitation for coalition building. Further, the general
finding is that these two groups do not perceive as much competition with Whites as the previous
research would indicate, although African-Americans overall are more likely to do so. This
indicates that perceptions of competition between these two minority groups is in fact not a
widely held perception of members of both groups, but it would be a limitation for some portions
of each groups such as conservatives, Republicans, and men.

58

CHAPTER IV
MY GROUP IS BETTER THAN YOURS!
“I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong.” Frederick Douglass
“We cannot seek achievement for ourselves and forget about progress and prosperity for our
community... Our ambitions must be broad enough to include the aspirations and needs of
others, for their sakes and for our own.” Cesar Chavez
One potential barrier in coalition formation is an “us vs. them” worldview. While pride in
one’s group can be a positive thing, it can also lead to an unwillingness to work with others
whose racial or ethnic group may be different from one’s own. In this chapter, the following
ideas will be examined: linked fate, stereotypes, environmental racial composition, feelings of
closeness to others, participation in organizations to help minorities, group identification, and
cultural maintenance.
Stereotypes and the “Other”: The “Them” Side
The limited research that exists on stereotypes between African-Americans and Latinos
show that both groups hold negative stereotypes of each other (Mindola, Niemann and Rodriguez
2002). One major issue in intergroup relations is the degree that groups support stereotypes
about each other (Niemann et al. 1994; Cowan, Martinez and Mendiola 1997). If stereotypes are
prevalent, then coalition building efforts would need to address these preconceived notions.
Stereotypes are defined here as either positive or negative sets of beliefs that are held by
an individual about the characteristics of a group, and they vary in the extent that they capture
the traits that they describe (Mindola, Niemann and Rodriguez 2002). While these statements
may not be true, it may still be imprinted on the collective conscious of the group. Not all the
members of a group will believe stereotypes, and those who do believe in them vary in the extent
that they believe them.
Previous research finds that some Latinos hold negative stereotypes about AfricanAmericans and perceive greater commonality with Whites than African-Americans (McClain et
al. 2006; Segura and Valenzuela 2010). These results suggest that Latinos view AfricanAmericans in terms of the “them” part of this analysis. For instance, Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn
(1997) find that many Latinos view African-Americans as less intelligent and more welfare
dependent than themselves. Oliver and Wong (2003) find that people who live in neighborhoods
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where their group dominates tend to harbor greater negative stereotypes toward other racial
minority groups.
Another facet of stereotypes between African-Americans and Latinos that previous
research highlights is diversity of attitudes in these two groups. Previous research shows that
African-Americans are more likely to hold positive views of Latinos than vice versa; further,
within the Latino community foreign-born Latinos are more likely to hold negative views of
African-Americans than native-born Latinos (Mindola, Niemann and Rodriguez 2002). The
degree and severity of negative stereotypes varies between and among groups. According to
previous research, among African-Americans, those that held negative stereotypes of Latinos
were significantly more likely to feel that continued immigration will lead to decreased
economic opportunity for African-Americans (Cowan, Martinez, and Mendiola 1997; McClain et
al 2007). So another possible dimension of the origin and prevalence of stereotypes among these
two groups could be perceptions of the threat caused by immigration.
While the previous research indicates mixed evidence for the existence of stereotypes
between the two populations, the explanation ends there. The next piece of the puzzle is to
determine two things: first, what proportion of each group actually hold negative stereotypes
about the other group, and second, who is most likely to believe those stereotypes. In addition to
the standard demographic explanations, I use sociological proximity variables to determine the
effect of contact on the belief and prevalence of stereotypes between Latinos and AfricanAmericans. In this chapter I address both gaps in the literature, providing a more nuanced
examination of who is most likely to allow stereotypes to be a significant limitation to coalition
building. My research questions related to stereotypes are as follows: who is more likely to
believe stereotypes about the opposing group? What are the characteristics of those people who
are more likely to allow stereotypes to be a limitation to coalition building?
My hypotheses for this section are as follows:
H1: Latinos who are less assimilated (for example, those who are foreign born and
Spanish speaking) will be more likely to believe negative stereotypes about AfricanAmericans.
H2: Older African-Americans and lower income African-Americans will be more likely
to believe negative stereotypes about Latinos due to increased perceptions of racial threat
and competition.
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H3: Increased contact between Latinos and African-Americans will result in decreased
perceptions of negative stereotypes of the other group, while increased contact with
Whites will result in increased perceptions of negative stereotypes of the other group.
Prejudice
Environmental composition and prejudice
In classical prejudice theory Allport (1954) defines prejudice as a hostile attitude toward
a person who belongs to a group simply because he or she is a group member and is assumed to
have the negative characteristics of that group, and argues that increased prejudice is likely under
certain conditions: a diverse society, rapid social change, increasing sizes of minority groups,
existence of direct competition, and exploitation that helps to sustain the community.
African-Americans have witnessed massive changes in their neighborhoods and social
networks due to the increased number of Latinos new destination areas, which has changed the
demographics of those areas and upset power dynamics. Previous research has had mixed results
with some finding that racially mixed surroundings generate conflict while others find that mixed
surroundings are conducive to increased interracial contact and understanding (Browning,
Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Demo and Hughes 1990; Oliver and Wong 2003). There is a
significant amount of previous research that has found support for racial threat theory and that
negative feelings of African-Americans increase as the size of the Latino population increases
(Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Cummings and Lambert 1997; Sears et al. 1999; Bobo and Johnson
2000; Cain, Citrin, and Wong 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Gay 2006). Bledsoe et al. (1995)
find the strongest expressions of racial solidarity among those African-Americans living in
African-American dominated areas; further, an increased sense of racial solidarity are associated
with perceiving oneself as a victim of discrimination, perceptions of discrimination against one’s
racial group, and increased attempts to maintain African-American culture instead of favoring
integration.
One explanation of the relation between spatial proximity and racial perceptions is the
racial threat hypothesis. In this hypothesis a superordinate group becomes more racially hostile
as the size of a proximate subordinate group increases, which threatens the superordinate group’s
social and economic privilege (Key 1949; Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings
1996) and that intergroup contact may trigger individuals’ anxieties and perceptions of groups
threat and hardening of group boundaries (Jones-Correa, Wallace and Zepeda-Milian 2015).
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Previous research argues that African-American-Latino tensions are more tense outside the
workplace, especially in trailer parks and some neighborhoods (Massey and Hajnal 1995). So in
addition to having conflicting theoretical frameworks in the literature, there are also differential
findings about the type of contact that occurs.
Another explanation is the contact hypothesis where larger populations of out-groups are
likely to improve intergroup relations as increased contact allows individuals to correct racial
stereotypes (Allport 1954; Ellison and Powers 1994). Allport (1954) argues that prejudice can be
reduced through equal status contact between groups in the pursuit of common goals; further, the
effect of contact is enhanced if the contact is officially or institutionally sanctioned and leads to
the perception of common interests between the two groups. Ellison and Powers (1994) use the
contact hypothesis to examine the distribution of racial attitudes in the African-American
population towards Whites, and find that interracial friendship is among the strongest predictors
of African-Americans’ racial attitudes. It is important to recognize that the contact hypothesis
could function differently for different groups.
It is possible that different types of contact are associated with both hypotheses. The
previous research does not differentiate which contact will be associated more positive group
relations, and which will be associated with increased perceptions of racial threat. My research
questions relating to prejudice and social distance are as follows: how does environmental
composition related to feelings of towards other groups and belief in stereotypes? What are the
characteristics of those respondents who are likely to feel closer to other groups?
My hypotheses in this area are as follows:
H1: Increased contact between Latinos and African-Americans will result in higher
perceptions of closeness with the out-group, while increased contact with Whites will
result in lower perceptions of closeness with the out-group.
H2: Contact that occurs in social situations (friendships, religious institutions) will result
in increased feelings of closeness between Latinos and African-Americans, while contact
that occurs in higher-stakes situations (work, neighborhoods) will be associated with
increased perceptions of racial threat.
Immigration and Assimilation
One of the primary debates in the literature is between assimilationist and pluralist
perspectives on ethnicity. In the assimilationist camp, the primary importance of ties to the ethnic
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group fades over time and for later generations, similar to many European immigrant groups
(Waters 1990; De la Garza 1996; O’Brien 2008; Schleef and Cavalcanti 2009; Abrajano and
Alvarez 2010). Pluralists are more likely to argue that not only is ethnic assimilation not
inevitable (there is no natural progression) but also that ethnic identification is maintained even
as primary relationships diversify and become more heterogeneous, especially when the
structural reasons that contribute to the importance of ethnic identity (such as discrimination,
residential segregation, and strong religious identification) do not disappear with time (Waters
1990; O’Brien 2008; Schleef and Cavalcanti 2009).
While it is not yet clear which path Latino immigrants will take, there is reason to believe
that different perspectives within the Latino community on levels of assimilation that are
desirable likely influence attitudes toward coalition building. Previous research has not
adequately dealt with the influence of attitudes toward assimilation. My research questions about
assimilation are as follows: how does the view that Latinos should assimilate into American
society influence perceptions of closeness with other groups and belief in negative stereotypes?
My hypothesis in this area is as follows:
H1: Latinos who support assimilation will be less likely to perceive closeness with other
groups and will be more likely to believe negative stereotypes about African-Americans
due to attempts to mirror values and attitudes of mainstream White society.
Group Identity: The “Us” Side
Group identification is defined as a perceived self-location within a particular social
stratum along with a psychological feeling of belonging to that particular stratum involving a
political awareness of the group’s relative position in society (Jackman and Jackman 1973; Gurin
et al. 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Conover 1984). Group identification not only affects how
individuals identify and understand themselves, but also how different groups interact and
respond to each other, which is foundational in coalition building. This identification can occur
at several levels, such as identification with one’s national origin group, one’s pan-ethnic group
(broadly, Latinos in the United States), or one’s racial group (Masouka 2008). As an individual
moves through the various categories, each implies an increased psychological connection and
awareness of group position within the society. Group consciousness literature argues that
perceptions of commonality and linked fate are cultivated by shared perceptions and shared
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experiences of discrimination (Miller et al., 1981; Henry and Munoz 1991; Dawson 1994;
Jennings 1997; Garcia 2003; McClain and Stewart, 2003; Stokes, 2003; Sanchez 2006; McClain
et al. 2009). In this research scholars argue that group consciousness involves a shared
marginalized status with other group members that leads to collective action to gain resources.
For Latinos conceptions of group identity and ethnic politics are an important facet in
both their general political participation and in the potential for coalition building with AfricanAmericans. While national origin identities strongly influence Latinos’ political choices, it is not
the only identity which has an impact on political decision-making. Likewise, AfricanAmericans also have a multidimensional sense of identity; African-American identity means
different things to various segments of the population (Demo and Hughes 1990). Thus, it is
important to analyze our population in different configurations as to ensure that we are
measuring the different levels of group consciousness that people may be located in.
Racial and ethnic identity
While they are sometimes used interchangeably, there is a significant difference between
racial and ethnic identity. Racial identity incorporates the physical, psychological, sociopolitical,
and cultural elements of African-American life in the United States (Brown 1931; McClain et al.
2009). Previous research has found that racial group identification is strongest among older
African-Americans and the least-educated African-Americans who live in urban areas (Broman,
Neighbors and Jackson 1988). Ethnic identity is similar to racial identity, but is based on
conceptions of difference from others instead of a focus on similarity to others. Ethnic identity is
a psychological construct that constitutes a basic part of a person’s personality and is clarified
through meeting people who are different from themselves (Waters 1990; Bernal and Knight
1993; Marquez 2007). One of the difficulties in studying ethnic identification is that it is always
changing and is multifaceted.
African-Americans are a case where the individual is highly socially constrained by their
ethnic and racial identity. Due to the visibility of the group membership, African-Americans are
often forced to accept an African-American racial identity despite the diversity in political
attitudes among the African-American population (Waters 1990; Watts-Smith 2014). AfricanAmerican group consciousness is influenced by a number of factors such as closeness with one’s
in-group, experiences and perceptions of discrimination, socioeconomic status, socialization, and
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interracial interactions (Herring, Jankowski, and Brown 1999; Watts-Smith 2014). It is possible
that this theory may also apply to Latino-African-American relations in a similar manner. Due to
the increasing ethnic diversity (similar to the increasing diversification of the Latino community)
there is a fair amount of diversity among African-American political attitudes and views of
commonality with other groups.
There may be environmental factors associated with identity expression as well. Using
two different studies Sellers and Shelton (2000) find that although individuals’ racial identity
remains the same across situations the situation context can influence certain dimensions of
one’s racial identity. Likewise, Simpson (1998) finds that African-American students in majority
African-American environments are more likely to express ideological differences with other
African-American students, while African-American students at a majority White university are
more likely to embrace a African-American identity that expresses African-American unity to
protect themselves from feeling like they do not belong. Latinos may also possess a racial
identity based on their status as a non-White group in the United States. This idea has met
resistance in the literature, but others argue that due to the discriminatory treatment that Latinos
experience in the United States and the fact that other groups classify Latinos as non-White is
indicative of the potential for a racial identity (Masuoka 2007). Padilla recognizes that Latino
individuals have multiple identities that they may choose to mobilize based on the situation, and
that they realize that it is sometimes more suitable to mobilize a pan-ethnic identity and other
times more suitable to mobilize a national origin identity (1985).
Again, the previous research leaves some unanswered questions at the macro level, and
many at the micro level. To truly understand the impact of racial and ethnic identity on support
for coalition building, it is first necessary to understand which individuals are more likely to
allow this to be a limitation. My research questions related to identity are as follows: what is the
impact of a strong racial identity on perceptions of other groups? How does racial and ethnic
identity affect Latino’s perceptions of and attitudes toward others? How do in-group closeness,
socioeconomic status, and interracial interactions affect attitudes toward the other group?
My hypotheses regarding racial identity are as follows:
H1: As respondent’s environments become more homogenous there will be a higher value
on racial and ethnic identity.
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H2: Latinos with higher levels of ethnic identity will be more likely to believe negative
stereotypes about the other group and feel less close to African-Americans.
H3: African-Americans with higher levels of racial identity will be more likely to believe
negative stereotypes about Latinos and feel less close to Latinos.
Linked fate
Linked fate can be thought of as an acute awareness that what happens to the group will
also affect the individual members (Dawson 1994; Gay and Tate 1998; Jaynes and Williams
1989; Simien 2005). Dawson (1994) argues that African-Americans have an African-American
utility heuristic where African-Americans draw self-interests from broader group interests, and
contends that political coalition formation and collective action requires individuals to perceive
that their fate is linked to others in their own social group and between their group and another.
According to previous research linked fate comes from lived experiences such as discrimination,
segregation, and oppression in day to day life (Dawson 1994; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson 1989;
Tate 1994; Herring, Jankowski and Brown 1999; Sanchez and Masouka 2010). According to
Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) linked fate can help to explain individual choices and why
minority group members may prioritize the needs of the group over their own individual selfinterest.
Linked fate has been shown to exist among African-Americans and other research has
had some success finding evidence of linked fate for other groups. Latinos do not have the same
historical experiences in the United States as African-Americans but they do have a common
experience of marginalization in the United States and exposure to increased anti-immigrant
sentiment that targets all Latinos (Kaufmann 2003; Stokes 2003; Sanchez 2008; De la Garza
2008; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010; Zepeda-Millan and Wallace 2013). These shared factors may
form the basis of linked fate for Latinos. The commonality thesis applies the idea of the
African-American utility heuristic to the realm of minority politics and argues that the more
Latinos see their social, economic, and political opportunities as tied to the status of minorities
generally in the US, the more likely they are to participate in minority-led political coalitions
(Kaufmann 2003). It may be that the idea of linked fate can be extended not only to other groups,
but across minority groups.
There is still research to be done regarding how linked fate operates outside of the
African-American community, and if it exists among other groups. My research questions
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regarding linked fate are as follows: who is most likely to see linked fate as important? What are
the characteristics of those people who see linked fate as influential and important in their lives?
Which Latino subgroups are more likely to see increased linked fate and closeness with other
groups?
My hypotheses in this section are as follows:
H1: Foreign born Latinos will be more likely to perceive linked fate than native born
Latinos will be.
H2: Older African-Americans will be more likely to perceive linked fate perhaps because
many of them experienced first-hand racism of an earlier era and lived through the Civil
Rights Movement.
H3: Mexicans will be the most likely to see closeness to other groups and linked fate.
H4: Cubans will be the least likely to perceive linked fate and closeness to other groups.
Variables
Dependent variables
The racial closeness variables are all coded on a scale ranging from not close at all to
very close. The linked fate variable, and importance of working together are coded on a scale
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The stereotype questions are coded on a scale
ranging from lazy to hardworking.
Independent variables
The environmental composition variables are all coded as dummy variables that highlight
one of the racial categories (White, African-American, Latino) for each aspect of the
respondent’s environment. Participation in a minority organization is also coded as a dummy
variable. The assimilation variable is coded as a dummy variable. The “identify with ethnicity”
and “identify with race” are coded as a dummy variable. Additionally, I include the same
independent variables used in Chapter 3. Full descriptions of all variables can be found in
Appendix 1.
Analysis
The analysis is broken into two parts and the structure reflects the structure of the
literature review. Preceding the discussion of the shape of support of each dependent variable is a
short discussion of the overall level of support within each group. In each of the two parts two
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models for each dependent variable are presented; in each case the demographic model comes
first followed by the sociological model. There is a short summary of each table directly beneath
each table, and following each pair is a short summary comparing the two sets of explanations.
The “Them” Models
Table 15
Belief in Stereotypes of other Groups as Hardworking (top 3 categories)
African-Americans
(2004 only)

Latinos (2004 only)

Whites as Hardworking

66.69%

67.82%

Blacks as Hardworking

65.58%

43.24%

Latinos as Hardworking

71.27%

76.87%

Before examining which people in each group are most likely to allow belief in
stereotypes to be a limitation to coalition building, it is important to examine the overall level of
belief of stereotypes toward each group. If the two groups simply do not like each other then it
would make sense that they would not want to work together. In general, over 60% of the
African-American population perceives each group as hard-working, and Latinos actually have
the highest level of support of perceptions of them as hardworking. It appears that for AfricanAmericans, belief in negative stereotypes will not be a significant limitation for over half of the
sample. On the other side, however, Latinos have a much more negative perception of AfricanAmericans’ work ethic, which indicates that for Latinos, belief in stereotypes and negative
perceptions of other groups may be a significant limitation to coalition building. On the basis of
believing negative stereotypes about other groups, it appears that Latinos would be more likely
to align themselves with Whites rather than with African-Americans. On the other hand, AfricanAmericans appear to feel most favorably toward Latinos. After knowing the levels of support, it
is important to unpack the nuances of what parts of each population will allow these attitudes to
be significant limitations.17 In the following set of tables we turn to that task.

17

The regression models for perceptions of stereotypes of Whites did not contribute to our understanding of potential
competition between these two groups beyond the levels of support, and as such have been removed.
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Table 16
Belief in Stereotypes about African-Americans (Data only available for 2004)18
Base Model
.036 (.053)
Ideology
-.113 (.105)
Male
.011** (.003)
Age
-.008 (.112)
Employed
-.072 (.106)
Married
-.078* (.049)
Income
.061 (.049)
Education
Elec. Activity .017 (.041)
-.091 (.153)
Voted
-.167*** (.049)
Efficacy
.007 (.070)
Trust
-.118* (.073)
Partisanship
-.125* (.070)
Religiosity
.562*** (.113)
Black
Foreign Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
White Work
Black Work
Latino Work
White Neigh.
Black Neigh.
Latin Neigh.
White Friend
Black Friend
Latin Friend
White Wor.
Black Wor.
Latino Wor.
Help minor.
Race Import.
Assimilate
Ethnicity
Important
5.38*** (.418)
Constant
0.0745
R2
0.0594
Adjusted R2
873
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
.021 (.069)
.021 (.142)
.012** (.004)
-.039 (.147)
.047 (.142)
-.045 (.066)
.029 (.067)
-.002 (.051)
-.171 (.216)
-.107* (.065)
.028 (.096)
-.289** (.116)
-.161* (.096)

Latinos
.037 (.086)
-.370** (.160)
.013** (.005)
.159 (.181)
-.304* (.166)
-.118 (.080)
.099 (.076)
.041 (.071)
-.123 (.227)
-.222** (.078)
-.001 (.109)
.0009 (.102)
-.089 (.108)
-.235 (.222)
-.534** (.278)
.202 (.186)
.164 (.307)
-.253 (.521)
-.401 (.869)

.116 (.136)
-.001 (.147)
-.079 (.133)
-.064 (.183)
.059 (.124)
.244* (.131)
-.391 (.243)
.011 (.127)
-.352** (.138)
-.277 (.202)
.349** (.135)
-.424** (.139)
.144 (.097)
.090 (.168)

4.85***(.122)
0.0826
0.0713
1157

.049 (.158)
-.103 (.156)
-.102 (.304)
.397 (.268)
.083 (.140)
.033 (.294)
-.580 (.384)
-.086 (.131)
.155 (.555)
-.143 (.317)
.292** (.153)
-.200 (.815)
.137 (.125)
.314 (.215)

6.05***(.564)
0.0369
0.0119
515

4.99***(.175)
0.0269
0.0031
587

.161 (.221)
.582 (.507)
-.029 (.162)
-.423* (.262)
-.244 (.324)
.198 (.165)
-.315 (.355)
.473 (.814)
-.370** (.158)
-.370 (.158)
-.904 (.566)
-.337** (.162)
.130 (.162)
-.218 (.285)
-.322** (.145)
-.175 (.168)
5.72*** (.689)
0.0975
0.0452
348

5.08*** (.215)
0.0537
0.0245
537

In table 16 I examine what factors contribute to belief about stereotypes about AfricanAmericans. Both in terms of the demographic explanation and the sociological explanation it
appears that Latinos evaluate African-Americans more negatively than they did Whites. In terms

18

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: Demographic models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black
mean VIF: 1.18, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; Sociological models: Base mean VIF: 1.49, Black mean VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF:
1.20.
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of limitations to coalition building, this indicates that for about half of the population of Latinos
negative perceptions of African-Americans is a significant limitation. Contact does not appear to
alleviate this issue, and neither does the level of assimilation; there is no support for the contact
hypothesis for Latinos in this table.
Older respondents have more positive evaluations of African-Americans; this could be
due to an increase of exposure over time and accumulated life experiences. It is interesting that
older people are more likely to evaluate African-Americans positively, and is potentially
problematic as the Latino population is much younger generally. Efficacy is associated with
negative perceptions of African-Americans, which could be due to perceptions of competition
among the groups. People who are invested in the political system and believe that they matter
are likely to think negatively of African-Americans, which for Latinos indicates that levels of
assimilation are associated with negative evaluations of African-Americans.
African-American respondents are more likely to have positive views of other AfricanAmericans, as are those who attend an African-American place of worship. Again, there is
evidence that in-group exposure is associated with positive evaluations of a group. Republicans
and more religious African-Americans are more likely to believe negative stereotypes about
African-Americans. This could be due to the influence of more traditional and conservative
viewpoints.
Latino men and married Latinos are more likely to believe negative stereotypes about
African-Americans. For Latinos, increased exposure to both their own group and Whites are
associated with negative perceptions of African-Americans. Additionally, both the assimilation
and cultural maintenance (language) variables are associated with negative perceptions of
African-Americans. There is support for the assimilation hypothesis. It would appear that
Latinos, regardless of level of assimilation, consistently have more negative perceptions of
African-American stereotypes.
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Table 17
Belief in Stereotype about Latinos (Data only available for 2004) 19
Base Model
-.012 (.052)
Ideology
-.038 (.102)
Male
.005* (.003)
Age
.058 (.110)
Employed
-.012 (.104)
Married
.019 (.048)
Income
-.007 (.048)
Education
-.039 (.040)
Elec. Activity
-.152 (.150)
Voted
-.034 (.048)
Political Efficacy
-.050 (.068)
Political Trust
-.077 (.072)
Partisanship
-.038 (.069)
Religiosity
-.010 (.111)
Black
Foreign Born
Speaks Spanish
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
White Work
Black Work
Latino Work
White Neighbors
Black Neighbors
Latino Neighbors
White Friends
Black Friends
Latino Friends
White Worship
Black Worship
Latino Worship
Help minorities
Race Important
Assimilate
Ethnicity
Important
5.86***(.111)
Constant
0.0084
R2
-0.0080
Adjusted R2
864
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
.048 (.068)
.051 (.139)
.004 (.004)
.042 (.145)
-.074 (.140)
.096 (.066)
-.008 (.067)
-.061 (.050)
-.283 (.212)
-.004 (.064)
-.057 (.094)
-.177 (.115)
-.178 (.094)

Latinos
-.138* (.083)
-.189 (.156)
.006 (.005)
.045 (.175)
.002 (.161)
-.024 (.078)
-.003 (.074)
-.002 (.069)
-.004 (.221)
-.066 (.076)
-.063 (.106)
-.0008 (.099)
.136 (.105)
.238 (.215)
-.245 (.271)
.431** (.181)
.396 (.298)
.958* (.532)
.287 (.846)

.137 (.114)
.059 (.135)
.078 (.118)
.125 (.166)
.058 (.114)
.181 (.117)
-.384* (.220)
-.149 (.116)
.274** (.122)
-.133 (.183)
.194 (.123)
-.048 (.124)
.022 (.088)
-.057 (.150)

5.42***(.111)
0.0201
0.0082
1166

.033 (.152)
.050 (.152)
-.040 (.291)
.608**(.259)
.133 (.136)
.279 (.282)
-.460 (.367)
-.082 (.127)
.844 (.531)
-.130 (.303)
.302** (.147)
-.170 (.779)
.106 (.121)
-.147 (.209)

6.22***(.552)
0.0247
-0.0011
505

5.19***(.169)
0.0318
0.0074
572

.224 (.188)
.343 (.439)
.123 (.137)
-.253 (.223)
.130 (.277)
.064 (.140)
-.622** (.307)
-.453 (.633)
.145 (.134)
-.227 (.246)
-.218 (.488)
-.139 (.137)
-.125 (.138)
.124 (.230)
-.042 (.141)
.011 (.141)
5.44*** (.670)
0.0545
-0.0001
349

5.71***(.183)
0.0320
0.0033
557

In table 17 I look at what variables are associated with belief in stereotypes about
Latinos. Stereotypes appear to be a limitation for Latinos primarily, and not as much of a
limitation for African-Americans. Additionally, the impact of interaction with Whites on shaping

19

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: Demographic models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black
mean VIF: 1.18, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; Sociological models: Base mean VIF: 1.49, Black mean VIF: 1.20, Latino mean VIF:
1.20.

71

relations between these two groups appears to be a problem. We now turn to the other side of
the question: the “us” models.
In this set of tables we can see that the demographic variables illustrate which Latinos are
likely to have negative evaluations of their own group: conservative Latinos are more likely to
believe negative stereotypes about Latinos. There is no support for either the demographic
hypothesis or the racial identity hypothesis for African-Americans in this table. The sociological
explanations are not much better. Exposure to Whites has a differential effect by group. In
general, the same trend holds in this table as in the previous one: Latinos who are in contact with
Whites (in a variety of circumstances) consistently have more negative evaluations of minority
groups-even their own. For African-Americans, however, where contact is significant it is
associated more positive evaluations of other groups. It appears that interactions with Whites
may be influencing not only belief in stereotypes for Latinos, but potentially also affecting the
likelihood for future coalition building between Latinos and African-Americans. As such, there
is some support for the contact hypothesis, but only for African-American respondents.
Additionally, there is support for the White contact hypothesis but only for Latinos.
The “Us” Models
Table 18
Percentage of each population who agree (top 2 categories) with each statement
AfricanAmerican
2004

AfricanAmerican
2008

Latino 2004

Latino 2008

Importance of Working Together

97.06

99.39

94.98

96.78

Importance of Linked Fate

69.59

74.29

47.14

53.90

Closeness with Whites

61.28

65.22

71.41

73.44

Closeness with Blacks

90.57

91.59

56.35

63.51

Closeness with Latinos

68.76

65.72

90.59

93.83

In table 18 I examine the overall levels of support that are associated with each of the
dependent variables in order to determine how much of a limitation each of the issues may be in
coalition building. In terms of attitudes toward the value of working with other minorities to
improve one’s group position, both groups have high levels of agreement that this is important
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and valuable. These high levels of agreement indicate that there is a widespread agreement and
recognition between these two groups that there is value in working with other minorities, and as
such it does not appear that this would be much of a limitation for these groups.
In terms of attitudes toward linked fate, and its importance in respondent’s lives, in
general it appears that African-Americans (across years) place a higher value on linked fate than
Latinos do. There are significant differences between the two groups in levels of support or
agreement in the importance of linked fate in a person’s life, which could indicate a real
limitation to coalition building. If African-Americans perceive that group related activities are
the way to increase political power, and Latino perceive that individual activities are the way to
increase power that may indicate a barrier that cannot be surmounted. Additionally, the
importance of linked fate increased for both groups from 2004 to 2008, which could indicate an
increasing recognition among both groups that their individual success is related to the success of
the group overall.
While over half of the majority perceive that they are close to Whites, Latinos feel closer
to Whites than African-Americans do. What is more problematic, however, is that Latinos feel
closer to Whites than they do to African-Americans, which could be a significant limitation in
coalition building overall. The data also shows that, in general, members of each group feel a
strong affinity for those in their own group. If the preferred rank order of coalition partners is
different for each group that could indicate different potential coalition formations for each
group, which may not mesh and could repel other potential coalition members.20

20

The regression models for perceptions of closeness with Whites (both sociological and demographic) did not contribute to our
understanding of potential competition between these two groups beyond the levels of support, and as such have been removed.
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Table 19
Willingness to Work Together21
Base Model
2004
2008
-.016 (.020)
-.034* (.023)
Ideology
.0001 (.039)
.023 (.047)
Male
.002 (.001)
-.001 (.008)
Age
.090** (.042)
.018 (.051)
Employed
.070* (.040)
.016 (.049)
Married
.002 (.018)
.007 (.016)
Income
.021 (.018)
-.019 (.021)
Education
-.009 (.015)
.020 (.018)
Elec.Activity
-.002 (.058)
.035 (.092)
Voted
.048** (.018)
-.0008 (.023)
Efficacy
-.004 (.026)
-.023 (.031)
Trust
-.024 (.027)
-.128*** (.036)
Partisanship
-.004 (.026)
-.010 (.029)
Religiosity
.119** (.043)
.144** (.048)
Black
Foreign Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
3.40** (.043)
4.00*** (.180)
Constant
.0374
.0942
R2
.0219
.0618
Adjusted R2
885
407
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.017 (.023)
.004 (.048)
.002 (.001)
.054 (.050)
.047 (.048)
-.028 (.022)
.067** (.022)
-.019 (.017)
.088 (.074)
.046** (.022)
.055* (.032)
-.062 (.039)
.018 (.032)

3.28*** (.192)
.0554
.0314
525

Latinos
2008
-.019 (.025)
.004 (.051)
.004 (.008)
.064 (.056)
-.045 (.053)
.005 (.017)
.012 (.024)
.0009 (.018)
-.081 (.113)
-.007 (.024)
-.019 (.035)
-.076* (.049)
.021 (.031)

2004
.021 (.035)
-.001 (.066)
.0003 (.002)
.114 (.074)
.107 (.068)
.034 (.032)
-.042 (.031)
.003 (.029)
-.041 (.094)
.045 (.032)
-.090** (.045)
.015 (.042)
-.035 (.045)

2008
-.014 (.039)
.081 (.080)
-.00007 (.013)
-.053 (.084)
.050 (.083)
.009 (.028)
-.074** (.035)
.025 (.034)
.075 (.140)
-.012 (.039)
-.052 (.051)
-.156** (.053)
-.032 (.048)

3.97***(.209)
.0449
-.0154
220

.075 (.091)
-.058 (.112)
-.065 (.075)
-.182 (127)
.127 (.226)
.213 (.358)
3.82***(.285)
.0723
.0189
350

-.117 (.102)
.150 (.117)
-.209** (.081)
-.077 (.271)
-.513** (.249)
.318 (.509)
4.31*** (.305)
.1791
.0823
181

In table 19 I analyze the willingness of Latinos and African-Americans to work together
to improve their respective group positions. In table 18 we saw that there are high levels of
support in general across groups and years for this, but it is important to delve deeper and
determine who exactly is the most and least supportive of this. African-Americans in general
appear to be more willing to work with others, while Latinos seem to be less likely. This
indicates that there is likely to be some resistance for Latinos to the idea of working with other
groups, which could be a barrier to coalition building.
Political trust has a differential effect based on group and year. This indicates that this
result may be time bound, and that the political and social climate of 2008 may have served to
depress these conceptions. Republican respondents are less likely to want to work with other
groups to improve group positions. As Republicans often place a high value on individual

21

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.20; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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achievement and there was the election of the first African-American president (who was also a
Democrat), these findings make sense.
African-American respondents with higher levels of education and higher levels of
political efficacy are more willing to work with others to improve group positions. These
findings indicate that people who are more invested in society overall are more likely to value
working with other groups. This trend does not hold, however, for Latinos. Education is
significant for Latinos, but in this case more highly educated people are less likely to want to
work with others. Additionally, Mexicans and Dominicans are both less likely to want to work
with others. In other words, where there are significant Latino-specific variables, they are
associated with less willingness to work with others.
Table 20
Willingness to work together22
Base Model
2004
.002 (.045)
White Work
-.021 (.053)
Black Work
-.075 (.047)
Latino Work
White Neighbors .002 (.066)
-.047 (.044)
Black Neighbors
-.053 (.047)
Latino Neigh.
.025 (.090)
White Friends
.071 (.045)
Black Friends
-.032 (.049)
Latino Friends
-.043 (.074)
White Worship
.049 (.048)
Black Worship
.053 (.049)
Latino Worship
.067** (.035)
Help minorities
-.085 (.059)
Race Important
Assimilate
Ethnicity
Important
3.74***(.043)
Constant
0.0236
R2
0.0120
Adjusted R2
1195
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.059 (.051)
-.005 (.068)
-.031 (.059)
-.115** (.059)
-.012 (.058)
-.083* (.063)
.024 (.088)
.130** (.063)
-.043 (.058)
.132* (.081)
.138** (.065)
.054 (.061)
.015 (.043)
-.044 (.070)

AfricanAmericans
2004
.011 (.052)
-.022 (.052)
-.171*(.103)
-.037 (.088)
-.050 (.046)
.045 (.100)
.063 (.128)
.061 (.043)
.004 (.187)
-.222** (.105)
.040 (.050)
.239 (.273)
.087** (.041)
-.018 (.070)

Latinos
2008
-.044 (.049)
-.050 (.049)
.023 (.144)
-.146** (.076)
-.089** (.043)
.045 (.162)
-.044 (.117)
.126** (.043)
.090 (.279)
.229** (.107)
.093** (.048)
-.016 (.312)
-.0003 (.039)
-.098* (.061)

2004
.005 (.084)
.066 (.196)
-.071 (.061)
.094 (.100)
-.052 (.125)
-.013 (.062)
-.030 (.137)
.0002 (.315)
-.043 (.060)
.046 (.111)
-.367 (.231)
.064 (.061)
.019 (.062)
-.231** (.104)
-.179*** (.055)
.085 (.063)

2008
-.098 (.083)
.191 (.236)
-.064 (.075)
-.102 (.082)
.202 (.170)
-.061 (.081)
-.007 (.120)
.161 (.380)
-.052 (.073)
.058 (.114)
-.0003 (.324)
.047 (.077)
.034 (.077)
-.006 (.128)
-.077 (.066)
.050 (.079)

3.75***(.054)
.0866
.0590
478

3.75***(.057)
0.033
0.0090
600

3.86*** (.056)
.1158
.0489
200

3.82*** (.082)
0.0465
0.0183
557

3.81*** (.096)
.0514
-.0124
255

Turning to the sociological explanations, in table 20 there are no indicators that are
significant across groups and years. For African-American respondents, having Latino
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Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.49, Black mean
VIF: 1.18, Latino mean VIF: 1.20; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.54, Black mean VIF: 1.23, Latino mean VIF: 1.34.
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coworkers, White neighbors, or African-American neighbors is associated with less willingness
to work with others. Having African-American friends, however, is associated with more
willingness to work with others. Attending a White place of worship has different effects based
on the year. Being in an organization to help minorities has a positive impact in 2004 but the
effect disappears in 2008. Additionally, African-American respondents who prioritize racial
identity are less likely to want to work with others. In this set of explanations it appears that
overall, for African-Americans, there is more support for a racial threat conception of group
relations rather than a contact conception. Additionally, those with a stronger sense of racial
identity are less likely to want to work with others. If all of these factors are taken together, it
appears that there is more of a value on “protecting” African-Americans from other groups; the
exception appears to be from those individuals who formally participate in an organization to
help minorities.
Latino respondents who prioritize racial identity are less likely to want to work with
others, as are those who believe in assimilation, but only in 2004. In this instance, contact with
other groups or one’s own group has little effect on the willingness of Latinos to work with
others. What does matter, however, is which aspects of one’s identity are prioritized-similar to
African-American respondents, an emphasis on racial identity is associated with less willingness
to work with others. It appears that there is limited support for the contact hypotheses in this
table, but more support for the racial identity hypothesis.
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Table 21
Perceptions of Linked Fate23
Base Model
2004
2008
-.009 (.016)
-.027 (.024)
Ideology
.081** (.033)
.023 (.049)
Male
.0008 (.001)
-.012* (.008)
Age
-.036 (.035)
-.049 (.053)
Employed
-.011 (.033)
-.010 (.052)
Married
.010 (.015)
-.015 (.016)
Income
.030** (.015)
.0002 (.022)
Education
.034** (.012)
.060** (.019)
Elec.Activity
-.030 (.048)
.065 (.098)
Voted
.024 (.015)
.032* (.024)
Efficacy
-.041** (.022) -.025 (.033)
Trust
-.010 (.023)
.026 (.037)
Partisanship
.008 (.022)
-.045* (.030)
Religiosity
.192***(.035) .175*** (.050)
Black
Foreign Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
.192***(.035) .709*** (.189)
Constant
0.0943
.0897
R2
0.0796
.0559
Adjusted R2
879
393
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
2004
-.006 (.020)
.058 (.042)
.001 (.001)
-.009 (.043)
-.019 (.042)
.051** (.019)
.032* (.019)
.023 (.015)
.036 (.063)
.013 (.019)
-.039 (.028)
.021 (.034)
-.003 (.028)

.382** (.165)
0.0674
0.0435
522

Latinos
2008
-.001 (.031)
.153** (.063)
-.009 (.011)
-.046 (.070)
.004 (.066)
-.003 (.021)
.031 (.029)
.060** (.022)
.042 (.138)
.063** (.030)
-.069* (.043)
-.007 (.060)
-.045 (.039)

2004
-.0008 (.029)
.095* (.054)
.001 (.002)
-.074 (.061)
.015 (.056)
-.062** (.026)
.024 (.025)
.043* (.024)
-.090 (.076)
.043* (.026)
-.055 (.036)
-.046 (.034)
.008 (.036)

2008
-.053* (.040)
-.114* (.082)
-.020* (.013)
-.023 (.087)
-.025 (.086)
-.021 (.028)
-.039 (.036)
.055* (.035)
-.024 (.148)
-.0003 (.041)
.003 (.052)
.057 (.054)
-.047 (.049)

.719** (.256)
.1207
.0633
213

-.122* (.074)
.026 (.092)
.058 (.062)
.118 (.104)
-.076 (.176)
.208 (.294)
.618** (.233)
0.0869
0.0340
348

-.191* (.105)
.014 (.118)
.130* (.084)
.523* (.302)
-.245 (.275)
-.295 (.512)
1.00** (.314)
.1436
.0380
174

In table 21 I examine what demographic variables are associated with higher perceptions
of linked fate. It appears that there is not as strong of a sense of linked fate among Latinos as
there is of African-Americans, but also the people who are more likely to see linked fate are
those who are active and invested in the political system. Assimilation also seems to play a role
in perceptions of linked fate, with those people who are less assimilated being less likely to agree
that linked fate is important.
The effect of gender differs based on group and year. Income also has a differential effect
based on group and year. In terms of gender and income, it appears that African-Americans are
more likely to agree with conceptions of linked fate, while Latinos are less likely to do so. For
both groups, respondents with higher levels of participation and higher levels of political efficacy
have higher perceptions of linked fate. People who are more invested in the political system are
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Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis; Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean VIF: 1.19, Latino
mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.26.
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more likely to see linked fate as important, which could indicate one way to overcome this
limitation-involve more people in the political system.
African-American respondents in general are more likely to perceive higher levels of
linked fate. This conforms to much of the previous research. Interestingly, there is no evidence
that age plays a role in shaping conceptions of linked fate for African-Americans. Foreign born
Latinos are less likely to perceive linked fate, which indicates that how assimilated a person is in
American society likely has an effect on how they view their position with others, and the
opportunities available to them. There is not support for the assimilation-linked fate hypothesis
in this data. Mexican and Cuban respondents are more likely to perceive linked fate, which
provides support for the ethnic identity hypotheses for Mexicans but not for Cubans. This is
likely due to several things: the size of each group, the stronger sense of group identity, and the
length of time that each population has been in the United States.
Table 22
Perceptions of Linked Fate24
Base Model
2004
.117** (.038)
White Workers
.057 (.045)
Black Workers
.092** (.040)
Latino Workers
White Neighbors .070 (.056)
Black Neighbors .066* (.038)
.012 (.040)
Latino Neigh.
-.131* (.074)
White Friends
.082** (.039)
Black Friends
.004 (.042)
Latino Friends
-.066 (.064)
White Worship
.073* (.041)
Black Worship
-.049 (.042)
Latino Worship
.141***(.029)
Help minorities
.010 (.050)
Race Important
Assimilate
Ethnicity
Important
.421***(.037)
Constant
0.0745
R2
0.0634
Adjusted R2
1189
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
-.032 (.056)
.005 (.075)
-.042 (.064)
.057 (.064)
-.068 (.063)
-.030 (.069)
-.194** (.095)
.069 (.069)
.021 (.063)
-.046 (.087)
.162** (.071)
-.083 (.066)
.146** (.047)
-.010 (.077)

AfricanAmericans
2004
.145** (.046)
.051 (.046)
-.041 (.089)
.132* (.081)
.049 (.041)
.184** (.088)
-.037 (.112)
.055 (.039)
-.098 (178)
-.122 (.095)
.009 (.044)
.100 (.245)
.146***(.037)
.120** (.062)

2008
-.017 (.077)
-.019 (.077)
.145 (.219)
.190*(.122)
-.070 (.067)
-.068 (.247)
.154 (.179)
.091*(.068)
.315 (.425)
.023 (.163)
.106*(.075)
-.834* (.476)
.128**(.061)
.100 (.096)

2004
.033 (.068)
-.006 (.159)
.120** (.050)
.059 (.081)
.096 (.101)
-.013 (.051)
-.140 (.111)
-.306 (.230)
.046 (.049)
.012 (.092)
.020 (.177)
.004 (.050)
.095* (.050)
-.157* (.084)
-.010 (.045)
.074 (.051)

2008
-.031 (.083)
.056 (.237)
-.060 (.075)
.007 (.082)
-.170 (.161)
-.054 (.081)
-.363** (.120)
-.684* (.496)
.013 (.073)
-.051 (.113)
.130 (.338)
-.047 (.077)
.187** (.077)
-.107 (.127)
-.139** (.065)
.070 (.077)

.583*** (.059)
.1014
.0734
464

.490***(.051)
0.0696
0.0472
595

.597***(.088)
.1028
.0318
192

.369***(.067)
0.0387
0.0101
555

.684*** (.095)
.1056
.0449
253

24

Latinos

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.49, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.20; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.53, Black mean VIF: 1.23, Latino mean VIF: 1.30.
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In table 22 I use sociological explanations to examine differences in perceptions of linked
fate.25 In every case being in an organization to help minorities is associated with increased
perceptions of linked fate regardless of group or year. This is intuitive as those individuals who
participate in these organizations likely have preexisting values of groups working together.
Having African-American friends makes African-Americans perceive more linked fate but
results in Latinos seeing less linked fate in 2008. Again, the effect of contact is different, which
is similar to the trends in the stereotype tables. African-Americans who prioritize racial identity
are more likely to perceive increased linked fate while Latino who prioritize racial identity are
less likely to. This is also similar to the trends observed in the above tables, and suggests that
African-Americans use race and conceptions of difference as a mobilizing factor for linked fate,
while differentiation from other groups serves to depress conceptions of linked fate among
Latinos.
Exposure to Whites appears to have the effect of increasing a recognition of group
importance for African-Americans, while exposure to Latinos appears to depress it. AfricanAmericans with White coworkers and neighbors are more likely to perceive increased linked
fate. Having Latino neighbors is associated with lower perceptions of linked fate for AfricanAmericans. African-Americans who attend a mostly African-American place of worship are
more likely to see higher levels of linked fate, while those who attend a Latino place of worship
are less likely to see increased linked fate.
Latinos with Latino coworkers are more likely to perceive increased linked fate.
Interestingly, in-group contact increases perceptions of linked fate, while out-group contact does
not. Having White friends is associated with lower perceptions of linked fate for Latinos. Latinos
who value assimilation are less likely to perceive high levels of linked fate. It could be that those
people who have more contact with Whites and who value assimilation simply do not find that
linked fate is the best way to achieve their personal goals.

25

I also examined the extent of linked fate but did not include the table for several reasons: there was very minimal explanatory
power, there were very few significant variables, and it did not contribute to the overall understanding of the chapter.
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Table 23
Perceptions of Closeness with Other Group26
AfricanAmericans
toward Latinos
2004
.002 (.039)
.133* (.080)
-.006** (.002)
-.038 (.083)
.035 (.080)
-.009 (.037)
.027 (.038)
.070** (.028)
.176 (.121)
.012 (.037)
.012 (.054)
-.102 (.066)
.054 (.053)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec. Activity
Voted
Efficacy
Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Foreign Born
Spanish La.
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
2.57*** (.315)
Constant
0.0370
R2
0.0123
Adjusted R2
522
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

Latinos toward
African-Americans
2008
-.086* (.062)
.090 (.127)
-.010 (.022)
.279** (.142)
.191* (.133)
-.004 (.043)
.013 (.060)
.059* (.045)
-.507* (.278)
-.008 (.060)
.127* (.088)
.078 (.120)
.050 (.078)

2004
-.113** (.048)
.071 (.090)
-.001 (.003)
-.055 (.102)
-.122 (.093)
-.002 (.044)
-.028 (.043)
.079** (.040)
.268** (.128)
-.064 (.044)
.055 (.061)
-.053 (.057)
-.006 (.061)
-.057 (.123)
-.007 (.156)
-.033 (.103)
-.094 (.172)
-.286 (.294)
.236 (.490)
2.95*** (.394)
0.0803
0.0275
351

2.55*** (.519)
.0931
.0344
215

2008
-.032 (.069)
.069 (.140)
.002 (.023)
.053 (.148)
.032 (.146)
-.050 (.049)
.010 (.062)
.074 (.060)
-.056 (.246)
-.029 (.069)
-.132* (.089)
-.011 (.093)
-.084 (.084)
-.155 (.180)
-.098 (.206)
-.143 (.143)
.296 (.475)
-.240 (.437)
.340 (.894)
3.59*** (.536)
.0667
-.0435
181

In table 23 I examine perceptions of closeness with the other group. It is important to
recognize that not all factors traditionally associated with participation serve to consistently
increase tolerance. Voting is significant but functions differently by group. This could be due to
different conceptions of what voting means in each group, and the purpose of voting may be
different for Latinos and African-Americans. Political trust also functions differently based on
group. Again, the impact of political elites is likely a contributing cause to these differential
effect.
In both groups more conservative respondents are less likely to perceive closeness with
the other group, which indicates that in terms of real world politics, while ideology may be a
factor in limitations, it is less likely to be so for African-Americans than for Latinos. In this set
of models it appears that indicators of political participation remain important in increasing

26

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: Latino models: 2004 VIF: 1.21, 2008 models: 1.27;
Black models: 2004 VIF: 1.19, 2008 VIF: 1.24.
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perceptions of closeness with the other group for both groups. Again, there is the trend that
increased investment in the political system is associated with increased tolerance.
There are some indicators that are specifically related to African-Americans as well.
African-American men are more likely to perceive closeness with Latinos, which could be due to
increased exposure at work or in other institutional situations. Older African-Americans are less
likely to perceive closeness with Latinos. Employed African-Americans and married AfricanAmericans are more likely to perceive closeness with Latinos, which again indicates that
increased investment in society is associated with increased tolerance.
Table 24
Perceptions of Closeness to Other Group27
AfricanAmericans
toward Latinos
2004
-.170** (.087)
-.155* (.086)
-.154 (.167)
.034 (.147)
-.047 (.077)
-.173 (.164)
.388* (.213)
-.056 (.072)
.695** (.308)
.111 (.173)
.077 (.083)
.571 (.452)
.154** (.069)
.011 (.116)

White Co-Workers
Black Co-Workers
Latino Co-Workers
White Neighbors
Black Neighbors
Latino Neighbors
White Friends
Black Friends
Latino Friends
White Place of Worship
Black Place of Worship
Latino Place of Worship
Help minorities
Race more Important
Assimilate
Ethnicity more Important
2.76*** (.096)
Constant
0.0410
R2
0.0176
Adjusted R2
590
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

2008
.078 (.151)
.123 (.150)
.977** (.431)
-.291 (.234)
-.222* (.133)
-.997** (.486)
-.522* (.351)
-.411** (.134)
-.155 (.837)
-.162 (.321)
-.052 (.149)
.348 (.937)
.128 (.121)
.152 (.189)

3.08*** (.172)
.1413
.0733
192

Latinos toward
AfricanAmericans
2004
.272** (.122)
.371 (.282)
-.078 (.088)
-.064 (.144)
.110 (.180)
.049 (.089)
-.279 (.197)
.362 (.453)
-.300*** (.086)
-.013 (.158)
-.524* (.315)
-.140 (.088)
.255** (.089)
-.122 (.149)
-.018 (.079)
.0005 (.090)
2.70*** (.118)
0.0875
0.0606
559

2008
-.182 (.149)
-.593* (.414)
-.305** (.132)
-.021 (.146)
.029 (.283)
-.216* (.143)
-.041 (.212)
.949* (.665)
-.085 (.129)
-.428** (.203)
.703 (.566)
-.206* (.135)
-.027 (.135)
-.087 (.229)
-.062 (.115)
-.074 (.137)
3.13*** (.166)
.1083
.0481
254

In table 24 I examine perceptions of closeness with the other group using a sociological
explanation. In this table we can see that the type of contact matters in terms of who feels close
to the other group. Overall, being in an organization to help minorities is associated with
increased perceptions of closeness with the other group for both groups; this continues the trend
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Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: Latino models: 2004 VIF: 1.19, 2008 models: 1.34;
Black models: 2004 VIF: 1.19, 2008 VIF: 1.23.
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that we have seen in previous tables. Contact at work seems to have different effects for each
group. It appears that exposure to the dominant group is associated with increased recognition of
group difference in terms of majority and minority for Latinos, while exposure to other
minorities does not have the same effect. For African-Americans, increased contact with Latinos
at work is associated with increased tolerance. The more the contact occurs in higher-stakes
environments, the more negative it appears the evaluations of the other group are.
More social forms of contact seem to also have differential effects. For both groups,
having Latino neighbors is associated with lower perceptions of closeness with the other group.
This indicates that there is both an in-group and an out-group factor influencing feelings of
closeness between the two groups. Additionally, African-Americans who have AfricanAmerican neighbors have lower perceptions of closeness with Latinos, which indicates more of
an in-group identification.
It appears that having friends of the opposite group increases feelings of tolerance, but
friends from one’s own group decreases feelings of tolerance. Having African-American friends
is associated with decreased perceptions of closeness for African-Americans, but increased
perceptions of closeness for Latinos. Having Latino friends is associated with increased
perceptions of closeness for African-Americans but decreased perceptions of closeness for
Latinos. African-Americans with White friends perceive less closeness with Latinos. There is no
support for the racial identity hypothesis, ethnic identity hypothesis, or assimilation hypothesis.
Conclusion
So after all of these explanations and tables, what does this chapter tell us that we did not
know before? First of all, there seems to be widespread agreement and recognition between these
two groups that there is value in working with other minorities. With that being said, however, it
also appears that Latinos feel closer to Whites than African-Americans do, and further that
Latinos feel closer to Whites than they do to African-Americans, which could be a significant
limitation in coalition building overall. If the preferred rank order of coalition partners is
different for each group that could indicate different potential coalition formations for each
group, which may not mesh and could repel other potential coalition members. While this is not
intrinsically a limitation to coalition building, it does muddy the waters. For instance, if African82

Americans and Latinos do not feel as close to each other as they do to other groups, it is possible
that they would not choose to work with each other in coalition building, and would instead
choose a group that they more strongly identified with.
It appears that, between Latinos and African-Americans, the effect of contact differs and
the circumstance of the contact affects how that contact affects attitudes toward the other group.
One of the biggest factors seems to be the ability to choose the type of contact (for example:
neighbor vs. friend) in affecting if the contact increases or decreases feelings of closeness with
the out-group. It appears that having friends of the opposite group increases feelings of tolerance,
but friends from one’s own group decreases feelings of tolerance. This indicates that there is both
an in-group and an out-group factor influencing feelings of closeness between the two groups.
This is potentially problematic given the high level of informal segregation that exists in the
United States, and the likelihood that minority respondents are more likely to associate with
other members of their own group than with people from other groups. One of the most
contentious spaces for contact is at work, and it appears that this is where there is the most
evidence for the racial threat hypothesis instead of the contact hypothesis. It appears that
exposure to the dominant group at work is associated with increased recognition of group
difference in terms of majority and minority for Latinos and African-Americans, while exposure
to other minorities does not have the same effect. This indicates that this could be a significant
limitation for coalition building, as it is possible that contact increases feelings of distance.
One trend across tables and models that emerges from this chapter is the importance of
feeling invested in the political and social climate and actually participating in mitigating
feelings of racial threat and in increasing perceptions of closeness and tolerance. One of the
strongest findings is that being active in an organization that helps minorities is consistently
associated with more tolerance. This is intuitive as those individuals who participate in these
organizations likely have preexisting values of groups working together. Also higher levels of
participation is repeatedly associated with more tolerance as well. People who are more invested
in the political system are more likely to be more tolerant of others and be more willing to work
with them, which could indicate one way to overcome this limitation-involve more people in the
political system. Another interesting trend is that Latinos who are more invested in society,
across a variety of measures, tend to evaluate other groups more negatively. Age seems to matter
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across groups for evaluations of African-American stereotypes, and older respondents have more
positive evaluations of African-Americans; this could be due to an increase of exposure over
time and accumulated life experiences. Older African-Americans are less likely to perceive
closeness with Latinos.
The effect of identity overall is less consistent throughout this chapter. In general it
appears that African-Americans are more willing to work with others, feel closer to others, and
see their fate as intertwined with those of other groups, however, racial identity seems to have a
negative impact for members of both groups. Respondents who have higher levels of racial
identity are less likely to want to work with others. It appears that African-Americans use race
and conceptions of difference as a mobilizing factor for linked fate, while differentiation from
other groups serves to depress conceptions of linked fate among Latinos. Ethnic identity has an
effect on perceptions of other groups as well. The general trend seems to be that where there are
significant Latino-specific variables, they are associated with less willingness to work with
others and negative out-group evaluations. Additionally, levels of assimilation seem to matter in
terms of attitudes toward other groups: the general trend is that those Latinos who are less
assimilated generally demonstrate higher levels of in-group favoritism and more negative
feelings toward members of out-groups, with African-Americans experiencing the most negative
evaluations.
The findings regarding linked fate and stereotypes are also mixed. In terms of attitudes
toward linked fate, and its importance in respondent’s lives, in general it appears that AfricanAmericans (across years) place a higher value on linked fate than Latinos do. There are
significant differences between the two groups in levels of support or agreement in the
importance of linked fate in a person’s life, which could indicate a real limitation to coalition
building. If African-Americans perceive that group related activities are the way to increase
political power, and Latino perceive that individual activities are the way to increase power that
may indicate a barrier that cannot be surmounted. In terms of the potential limitation of belief in
negative stereotypes, it appears that overall it is less likely to be a problem for AfricanAmericans than for Latinos. In particular, a larger percentage of the Latino sample is more likely
to think negatively of African-Americans; this problem is compounded by the tendency to
evaluate Whites more positively simultaneously.
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CHAPTER V
THE ISSUE IS THE ISSUES YOU SUPPORT!
“This law of immigration, race hatred, separation, Can we find a way to come together? Right
now!!! Both sides of the conversation, Keep the freedoms of our nation, Any points of view
neglected, Civil rights are not protected, Stopped, questioned, blamed, arrested! I wanna know is
it fair? Is it fair!?”—Sweet Honey in the Rock, song lyrics

Another potential limitation is that there is not enough agreement in terms of issue
positions, so it is important to determine where there is agreement and where there is not.
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (2003) argue that coalitions between groups depend on some
combination of similarity of interests and exchange of support for each other’s separate goals. If
there is lack of agreement on the issues, it could be that coalitions just are not seen as effective,
which is a significant barrier on its own. In the chapter the following issue areas will be
examined to determine if there is agreement in issue areas: trust in police, minorities responsible
for their own fate, equality of opportunity, terrorist imprisonment, racial profiling, affirmative
action, death penalty, positions on immigration, and the Iraq war.
The Issue is the Issues You Support! Issue compatibility among African-Americans and
Latinos
In this set of limitations coalitions will form and exist when there is some benefit to both
groups to form them. Previous research does not determine what issue areas are likely to produce
these coalitions, and which groups of people are more likely to support coalition politics through
working together on issue areas. One of the arguments of this chapter is that the potential for
coalitions (and their stability) often depends on a set of perceived shared interests.
Race Specific Policies
If there is significant disagreement on policy issues between Latinos and AfricanAmericans, it would seem likely that the most likely issue area where there would be
disagreement would be in the issue area of race specific policies. These are the issues that are
most often conceived of as zero-sum, where one group winning would indicate a loss for the
other group. One of the most important influences on issue positions (as they relate to this
dissertation) involves the level and type of affect that each group has toward the other. Previous
research has found that feelings of distrust and hostility among African-Americans have
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prevented political alliances between the two groups that are primarily based in terms of
potential economic threats from continued Latino immigration (McClain et al 2007; Sanchez
2008; Telles, Sawyer and Rivera-Salgado 2011) but in more recent research 70% of AfricanAmericans and 57% of Latinos say the groups get along very or fairly well (Malave and Giordani
2015). Further, 77% of African-Americans have a very or somewhat favorable view of Latinos,
while 79 % of Latinos have a similarly positive view of African-Americans (Malave and
Giordani 2015). 50% of Latinos believe that when it comes to job opportunities, education,
income, and political issues, their problems are similar to those of African-Americans (Malave
and Giordani 2015). This could be due to the likelihood that new immigrant populations would
most likely be employed in service or low income industries, which are traditionally jobs that are
occupied by African-Americans. More recent research has found, however, that 22% of Latinos
reported feeling discriminated against in their current job, compared to 25% of AfricanAmericans (Malave and Giordani 2015). It would appear, from previous research that AfricanAmericans view Latinos as competitors for scarce resources, and may feel a sense of entitlement
in regards to minority rights that they fought to gain.
There are many factors that could potentially affect Latino issue positions. Not only are
there multiple experiences of Latinos based on length of time in the United States and what
region they live in, but there is also the heterogeneity of the population. Thus, there can be
additional differences in issue positions between African-Americans and different portions of the
Latino population (on various dimensions), further complicating the potential of coalition
building. Another aspect of chosen identity includes and individuals’ language choice. Previous
research finds that speaking Spanish may be reflective of an individual’s choice to continue to
access community specific resources that allow for more political participation, and the choice to
speak Spanish in the United States represents the expression of ethnic identity (Fox 1996;
Johnson, Stein and Wrinkle 2003). According to Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2002) there
are two primary patterns of issue disagreement between African-Americans and Latinos: the first
is where African-Americans have different views from native and foreign born Latinos and the
second is where foreign born Latinos have a view that differs from that shared by native born
Latinos and African-Americans. This potentially complicates potential coalition formation
because in some cases there are three (or more) groups to get to work together instead of just
two. According to Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2002) a significant number of Latino
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immigrants express a fear of African-Americans and believe that African-Americans have too
much power. These conceptions are partially an adoption of mainstream American values and
partially are artifacts of conceptions of the racial structures in their country of origin. Pantoja and
Segura (2003) found that racialized policies, such as various ballot propositions in California,
resulted in an increased perception among Latinos that racialized issues were the most important
issues. The prevalence of racialized policies does depend somewhat on the local context, but also
on the broader national context. Previous research has found that African-Americans are the
most supportive of race-conscious policies, while Latinos are more split in their support
(Franklin and Seltzer 2002; Lopez and Pantoja 2004). Again, it appears that the type of policy
matters in affecting attitudes toward coalition building.
Previous research has also examined the types of issues in the propensity to construct
multiracial coalitions. Previous research finds that when Latinos and African-Americans come
together on issues that unite them (such as access to health care, affordable housing, reliable and
affordable transportation, and accountability from the police) they are often successful
(Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002; Priestley 2007). These issues seem to be characterized
by less of a zero-sum framework, or they are issues where both groups can work together.
Previous research also finds that some issues are divisive for the two groups, such as demands
for access to education and jobs (that is, affirmative action issues), housing, social services, and
educational resources, have led to increasing competition, and struggles over political
representation, particularly at the municipal level (Priestley 2007; Filindra and Orr 2013). These
issues are characterized more by a zero-sum framework. Additionally, Segura and Valenzuela
(2010) found evidence of Latino hostility toward African-Americans and African-American
targeted policies. This would appear to be the reciprocal effect of African American animosity
toward Latinos, especially regarding civil rights. While there is some evidence that perceived
discrimination motivates issues positions for Latinos, in general Latinos support government
action that protects minority rights and provides individual opportunity (Sanchez 2006). There
appears to be a duality in several issues areas for Latinos: there is an issue position that is
consistent with the group position as a minority group but also an issue position that is reflective
of more mainstream American values.
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Another potentially racialized policy area involves group’s attitudes toward the police. It
is possible that each group has a different perception of their relationship with the police, which
could frame group relations differently. In reality, however, the two groups have much in
common (statistically) in terms of their interactions with the police. For instance, AfricanAmericans and Latinos are three times more likely to be searched than White motorists and more
likely to be ticketed, be arrested, and be charged with a disproportionate share of all felony and
misdemeanor arrests (Malave and Giordani 2015). Beyond vehicular interactions, most Latinos
do not live in areas where they feel safe, but Latinos report being victims of violent crime and
property crime, such as burglary, at lower rates (Malave and Giordani 2015). Even with all of
this, in general Latinos have positive attitudes toward the police; according to previous research
many Latinos still feel that their local police do a good job enforcing the law and the U.S. courts
treat Latinos fairly (Malave and Giordani 2015). Perhaps one of the issue areas of contention
between the two groups involves treatment by the police, and the amount of trust each group
places in law enforcement.
Immigration has been both a hot issue politically and a hot issue in the recent literature.
Immigration can be viewed as a contested issue that could be antithetical to coalition formation
between African-Americans and Latinos, and has been used as a proxy measure for support of
coalition building. Some research suggests that African-Americans have been relatively positive
toward immigration when compared to other racial groups (Citrin et al 1997). Other research
shows that African-Americans often view immigrants (especially undocumented) as an economic
threat, and that attitudes toward undocumented immigration policies are often conditioned by
factors beyond economic competition, and that African-Americans with lower levels of income
are more likely to reject punitive policies such as deportation while African-Americans who hold
negative racial stereotypes about Latinos are more likely to favor more punitive policies toward
undocumented immigrants (Cowan, Martinez, and Mendiola 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000;
Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodrieguez 2002; Nteta 2013; Frasure-Yokley and Greene 2014;
Hutchings and Wong 2014; Zamora and Osuji 2014). Why are there such conflicting findings?
This chapter assesses the personal characteristics that are associated with support for increasing
the immigration levels.
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Immigration is also a divisive issue among the Latino population. Previous research has
found that a sizable proportion of the Latino community believes there are already too many
immigrants coming the United States based on a variety of factors: native born Latinos are more
likely to favor more restrictive policy than foreign born Latinos (Binder, Polinard, Winkle 1997),
wealthier, more educated, and older Latinos more likely to favor restrictive policy (Binder,
Polinard, and Wrinkle 1997; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997), non-citizens are more concerned
with immigration issues than citizens (Michelson 2001), and among subgroups Cubans are most
concerned with illegal immigration, and Mexicans are more likely to believe that the government
is already doing too much to stop illegal immigration (Michelson 2001). Overall, it appears that
many Latinos are concerned about the economic impact of increased immigration which is
indicative of intergroup perceptions of competition (Polinard, Wrinkle, and de la Garza 1984;
Rodriguez and Nunez 1986; Gutierrez 1995; de la Garza 1998). Not only is there a fear of
competition between the two groups but also within the Latino population.
In much of the previous research racialized and/or highly salient policies seem to pose the
greatest limitation to potential coalition building. It could be that these policy areas are simply
too divisive to allow for much overlap in policy preferences. My research questions in this area
are as follows: is there any agreement on issue positions between African-Americans and Latinos
on highly racialized policies? Is immigration a divisive policy area both between and among
populations?
My hypotheses in this area are as follows:
H1: There will not be much overlap on issue positions between Latinos and AfricanAmericans on highly racialized policies.
H2: Foreign born Latinos will support increased immigration to a greater extent than
other Latinos due to recent arriving immigrants potentially having greater personal
experiences with the current immigration policies in the US.
H3: On nearly every characteristic African-Americans will not be supportive of
increasing immigration levels.
General Policy Support
When a policy does not result in a zero-sum conception there seems to be the potential
for a fair amount of overlap between the two groups. It could be that these types of polices are
the most fertile ground for potential coalition building. Previous research has examined the
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difference between Latino and White public opinion on policy preferences. Leal (2007) finds
substantial opinion difference across policy issues in areas such as health care, gun control, and
bilingual education, along with several other policy areas between Whites and Latinos. What this
study does not do, however, is examine the difference in policy preferences between AfricanAmericans and Latinos. It does serve as a useful beginning to determine what the policy
preferences of Latinos are in the specified areas. In a different study Rodrigues and Segura
(2007) pick up where Leal stopped and examine the similarities of issue positions between
Latinos, African-Americans, and Whites, and found that African-Americans and Latinos had the
most common issue positions in the three groups examined (Rodrigues and Segura 2007). It
would appear then that there is a potential basis for coalition building in terms of issue
preference, but this needs to be re-examined in terms of more temporally relevant issues and
larger data sets.
In terms of social issues there are a number of policy areas where Latinos and AfricanAmericans tend to agree. For example, both groups tend to be supportive of prayer in schools
and both tend to be supportive of gay rights (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002). While
this is surprising, it appears in several places in the previous research. Neither of these issue
areas are associated with specifically allocating resources to one group or another, but more
focus on the rights of some marginalized group in American society. One area where Latinos and
African-Americans tend to agree is in terms of government support for the poor and in terms of
welfare: both groups tend to feel that government should do more to help the poor and
disadvantaged but also agree that there are limits for how long people should receive welfare
(Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002). Again, there is a recognition of the protection of a
marginalized group, but there is also a reflection of the more mainstream view in American
society that assistance should be limited. In terms of government programs Latinos are more
likely to agree that most government programs that are designed for minorities favor AfricanAmericans, but African-Americans disagree and do not think that government programs favor
them (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez 2002). This is an area of contention, as these types of
policies do potentially affect the allocation of resources for each group.
In general, the Latino population is diverse in terms of policy positions and political
participation rates. According to Malave and Giordani (2015) while Cubans comprise a smaller
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percentage of the overall Latino group than other ethnic groups do (such as Mexicans and Puerto
Ricans), they are much more likely to vote and to align themselves with the Republican Party.
These factors also influence groups’ policy positions with the larger Latino group, as some
Latinos are more likely to exhibit positions more in line with the Democratic Party while others
express more Republican policy positions. Latinos are more socially conservative than the
general public about abortion, equally accepting of homosexuality, and more supportive of
interracial and interethnic marriage (Malave and Giordani 2015; Brown 2015). On the other
hand, however, the majority of Latinos align with the majority of the American public and agree
that homosexuality should be accepted rather than discouraged by society (Malave and Giordani
2015). Overall, Latinos’ views of gender roles and relations are as or more egalitarian than many
other Americans (Malave and Giordani 2015). It is important to examine both the levels of
support and structures of support in order to disentangle these previous findings and see the more
complete picture of potential issue alignment between African-Americans and Latinos.
Which aspects of one’s identity are activated varies based on the situation and location,
but various aspects of identity can strongly impact an individual’s issue positions. It could be that
issues that have a more national application, especially those uniting issues of national security,
are the areas where there is the most agreement; realistically, everyone wants to be protected and
not be attacked. My research question in this area is as follows: which issues produce the most
commonality between the two groups, and which issues are the most divisive? What are the areas
of overlap on less racialized policy positions between Latinos and African-Americans?
My hypothesis in this area is as follows:
H1: There will be the most commonality in issue positions in more national issues (such
as war and terrorism) and less commonality in more personalized issues.
H2: African-Americans and Latinos will have similar policy positions on issue areas that
are less racialized such as the death penalty.
American Values and Ideals
If the two groups do not agree on their general consensus on what America is, or what
American values are prized, that could further complicate attempts to build coalitions based on
issues. A common belief in shared American values could create a foundation for the two groups
to work together, or could become the starting point for issue disagreement. For instance, over
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50% of Latinos see themselves as “typical Americans,” and more than 60% of Latinos agree that
their economic success as a group is linked to that of African-Americans, almost half also
appreciate that they face similar economic challenges to those of Whites (Malave and Giordani
2015). This would appear to indicate a shared perspective of being an “American” as well as a
member of other groups. According to previous research, 73% of Latinos believe in the
American dream and are positive about an increase in their standard of living in the near future
(Malave and Giordani 2015). If these two groups agree that individual effort is what produces
success in America then that creates a common foundation from which a coalition could be
formed. If, on the other hand, one group emphasizes structural impairments to success while the
other is supportive of individual effort, that could indicate a problematic foundation for
coalitions.
A general American identity seems to go a fair way in creating similar issue positions for
both Latinos and African-Americans, but there are other situations where a racial/ethnic identity
is more salient. On issues of a more national (rather than particularized) question it appears that
there would be a greater area of commonality and thus a greater chance for a common foundation
for coalition building. My research question in this area is as follows: Are Latinos and AfricanAmericans closer on issue positions involving conceptions of an American work ethic, or
questions about equality and social groups in American society?
My hypotheses in this section are as follows:
H1: Latinos will be more likely to agree with the traditional conception of the American
work ethic than African-Americans will be.
H2: African-Americans will be more likely to see unfair treatment of groups in society as
more problematic than Latinos will.
Variables
The following dependent variables are coded as dummy variables with the affirmative
position having the higher value: Iraq war involvement, gay marriage, and affirmative action.
The following dependent variable is coded as a dummy variable with increasing levels having
the higher value: increasing immigration level. The following dependent variable has four
response categories and is coded on a scale that ranges from “strongly oppose” to “strongly
favor”: death penalty position. The following dependent variables have four response categories
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that are coded on a scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”: racial profiling
position, terrorist imprisonment position, position on American work ethic, position on equal
opportunity in life, and position on minority position in society. Trust in police has four response
categories and is coded on a scale from “Just about always” to “Never.”
Analysis
The analysis is broken into several parts and the structure reflects the structure of the
literature review. To begin each section there is a table describing the overall levels of support
for each issue for both groups and years. Following the levels of support are tables that examine
in depth the structure of the support for each issue. There is a short summary of each table
directly beneath each table, and following each summary is an analysis of how the data supports
(or not) the relevant hypotheses and research questions.
Race Specific Policies
Table 25
Levels of Support: Race Specific Policy Positions: Percentage of each population who agree
with each statement (top two categories)
AfricanAmericans 2004

Latino 2004

AfricanAmericans 2008

Latino 2008

Pro Racial Profiling

19.22

31.63

19.01

31.72

Terrorist Profiling

65.07

72.59

63.46

71.15

Police Trust

36.31

68.72

41.80

65.59

Pro Affirmative Action

85.65

75.00

91.46

87.06

Increase Immigration Level

9.46

21.19

8.28

18.10

In table 25 we see the levels of support for each group regarding race specific policies.
Neither group is particularly supportive of racial profiling, although Latinos are more likely to be
supportive than African-Americans. Latinos are also more likely to be supportive of terrorist
profiling than African-Americans, although overall half of each population supports this type of
policy. Latinos are much more likely than African-Americans to indicate that they trust the
police, which indicates that this may be an area of contention between the two groups. AfricanAmericans are more likely than Latinos to support affirmative action policies, although well over
half of each population supports this type of policy. Finally, neither group is very supportive of
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increasing the immigration level, although Latinos are more likely to support these policies than
African-Americans are.
Table 26
Attitudes on Affirmative Action (Positive)28
Base Model
2004
2008
-.015 (.014)
.013 (.017)
-.035 (.028)
-.034 (.034)
.00005 (.0009) .005 (.005)
.026 (.030)
.038 (.037)
.016 (.028)
.014 (.036)
-.012 (.013) -.033** (.011)
.001 (.013) -.0006 (.015)
.010 (.010)
.013 (.013)
.067* (.042) .046 (.069)
-.019* (.013) -.009 (.016)
.028* (.019) .019 (.023)
-.085*** (.019) -.053** (.026)
-.010 (.019)
-.042** (.021)
.129*** (.030) .084** (.035)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec. Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
Foreign Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
.847*** (.113) .983*** (.132)
Constant
.0767
.0741
R2
.0606
.0402
Adjusted R2
816
397
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
-.024* (.016) -.003 (.019)
.056* (.032) .004 (.039)
-.0003 (.001) -.0003 (.006)
.056* (.033) -.011 (.043)
.021 (.032)
.070* (.040)
-.018 (.015)
-.040** (.013)
.018 (.015)
.023 (.018)
.019* (.011)
.018* (.013)
.132** (.050) .218** (.085)
-.011 (.015)
.005 (.018)
.024 (.022)
-.003 (.026)
-.086*** (.026) -.054* (.037)
.024 (.022)
-.079*** (.024)

Latinos Only
2004
2008
.012 (.028) .033 (.031)
-.150** (.053) -.082 (.065)
-.001 (.001) .004 (.010)
-.035 (.059) .068 (.068)
-.012 (.054) -.023 (.066)
-.005 (.026) -.029* (.022)
-.012 (.024) -.025 (.028)
-.013 (.022) .001 (.027)
.037 (.077)
-.081 (.115)
-.036* (.025) -.010 (.032)
.013 (.036)
.031 (.040)
-.082** (.033) -.071* (.042)
-.056* (.035) -.003 (.038)

.734*** (.130) 1.02*** (.158)
.0810
.1317
.0562
.0758
495
216

.137* (.080)
.012 (.091)
.084* (.061)
.051 (.102)
-.081 (.196)
-.083 (.272)
1.14*** (.226)
.0845
.0250
312

-.056 (.082)
.058 (.096)
-.091* (.065)
.196 (.215)
.116 (.218)
.112 (.404)
1.06*** (.247)
.1068
-.0020
176

In table 26 I analyze how personal characteristics of the African-Americans and Latino
population affect attitudes toward affirmative action. In table 25 above we saw that the majority
of each group is supportive of affirmative action policies, so where are the greatest areas of
commonality and disparity at the individual level? In this issue area it appears that the best
instances for these two groups to work together are ultimately in favor of affirmative action
policies. My hypothesis that there is not much overlap between groups on highly racialized
policies is not confirmed by this data, as there is more overlap than expected on this issue area.
In general, it appears that the most fertile way for the two groups to work together in this area is
in favor of affirmative action, but this combined effort would still meet significant push back
from parts of both populations.
28

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.18, Latino mean VIF: 1.22; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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Previous research has found that racialized policies are the most likely to create a division
between the two groups, but in this data that does not seem to be the overall case. Individual
differences between members of each group can, however, be important to understanding the
complete picture. Republicans are less likely to support affirmative action. Given the high levels
of overall support, it seems unlikely that there would be enough Republicans in either group to
mount a significant opposition to this policy area. Gender has a differential effect by group. This
is a case where the same characteristic has differential effects based on the group being
examined, and potentially points to women as a better group to work together in this issue area
than men. Increased income is associated with decreased support for affirmative action—in
general higher income people are less supportive of affirmative action, so this result makes
sense. More religious respondents are less likely to support affirmative action.
Being African-American is associated with more support for affirmative action in both
years-this finding confirms the findings from the previous research. Holding all other variables
equal, being African-American makes a respondent more likely to be supportive of affirmative
action policies. Conservative African-American respondents are less likely to support affirmative
action-we could term this the “Clarence Thomas” effect. Employed African-Americans, those
who participate more, and married African-Americans in 2008 are more likely to support
affirmative action. This could be due to increased personal experience with the benefits of these
policies for people in these groups. In this table it appears that traditional participation measures
are associated with increased support for affirmative action policies.
As levels of efficacy increase for Latinos in 2004 support for affirmative action
decreases. If Latinos are dissatisfied with affirmative action policies and perceive that they
overwhelmingly benefit African-Americans, this could be an expression of a zero-sum
perception for scarce resources; however, Table 1 indicates that this is not likely what is
happening. Foreign born respondents are more supportive of affirmative action; this could be due
to a perceived benefit from these policies due to being a recent immigrant. Being Mexican has a
differential effect based on year. This could be due to changes in the Mexican population and the
increase of native born Mexican respondents as opposed to increased numbers of foreign born
respondents in 2004.
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Table 27
Attitudes on Racial Profiling29
Base Model
2004
2008
.085** (.035) .072* (.051)
-.108* (.070) -.196** (.103)
.006** (.002) .032* (.017)
-.104* (.075) .060 (.111)
.036 (.072)
.116 (.108)
-.084** (.033) -.090** (.035)
-.150*** (.033) -.080* (.047)
-.060** (.027) -.069* (.039)
.070 (.103)
-.366* (.200)
.065** (.033) .084* (.050)
.132** (.047) .079 (.069)
.084* (.049)
.131* (.079)
.059 (.047)
.036 (.064)
-.116* (.076) -.086 (.105)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec.Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
For. Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
1.27*** (.282) 1.56*** (.394)
Constant
.1286
.1152
R2
.1146
.0835
Adjusted R2
885
406
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
.072* (.046) .193** (.067)
-.195** (.093) -.165 (.137)
.006** (.003) .016 (.024)
-.036 (.096) .107 (.151)
.028 (.094) -.243* (.143)
-.075* (.043) -.045 (.047)
-.150*** (.044) -.166** (.064)
-.076** (.033) -.063* (.048)
-.051 (.142) -.153 (.302)
.047 (.043) .057 (.064)
.113* (.063) .081 (.095)
.039 (.076) -.014 (.131)
.057 (.062) -.082 (.085)

Latinos Only
2004
2008
.071 (.059) -.124* (.080)
.032 (.111) -.259* (.164)
.003 (.004) .053** (.027)
-.244** (.125) .082 (.173)
.004 (.115)
.525** (.170)
-.076* (.054) -.082* (.058)
-.151** (.053) -.025 (.073)
-.007 (.049) -.055 (.070)
.225* (.156) -.530* (.287)
.071* (.054) .125* (.081)
.110* (.076) .088 (.104)
.128* (.070) .260** (.109)
.018 (.075) .200** (.099)

1.44*** (.367) 2.02*** (.561)
.1164
.1799
.0939
.1279
524
219

.378** (.153)
-.017 (.193)
.138 (.128)
.090 (.212)
.755** (.362)
-.031 (.603)
1.19** (.483)
.1667
.1188
351

.106 (.209)
.030 (.241)
.013 (.167)
-.066 (.554)
.462 (.509)
-.839 (1.04)
.646 (.625)
.1966
.1018
181

In table 27 I analyze how personal characteristics of the African-American and Latino
population affect attitudes toward racial profiling. In table 27 we saw that less than half of each
groups is supportive of racial profiling, with Latinos being more supportive in both years than
African-Americans are. In general there are several common factors between the two groups on
attitudes toward racial profiling, and it appears that this might be a good issue area to work
together on-many segments of both populations oppose racial profiling, but there are also
segments of the populations that support racial profiling. The most support for racial profiling
comes from the Latino population, although there are several segments of the population that do
not support it. In this instance it appears that increased contact decreases support for racial
profiling while specific ethnic indicators are associated (for Latinos) with increased support for

29

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.18, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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racial profiling. My hypothesis is not clearly supported by this data-while there are some areas of
difference in issue positions, there are far more similarities between the two populations.
Ideology has a differential effect based on group and year. This could be due to different
perceptions of racial profiling: for African-Americans profiling is based on race but for Latinos
profiling could be based on immigration status. As levels of income and education increase
support for racial profiling decreases. This is likely due to the personal experiences of wealthier
and more educated respondents who have been unjustly racially profiled due to either their skin
color or their ethnic background. In many of the models too men are less likely to support racial
profiling than women are in each group. Again, this likely relates to the personal experiences of
men who have been racially profiled. In several instances older respondents (in both groups) are
more likely to support racial profiling than younger respondents are. As respondents (regardless
of race) age they often become more conservative, so this makes sense. In 2004 (but not 2008)
increased political trust is associated with increased support for racial profiling across models.
Marriage has a different effect based on group and year. This could be due to the perceived fear
that Latinos have (according to the previous research) of African-Americans and a desire for an
increased level of safety.
Regardless of other variables, African-Americans in general as well as employed
African-Americans in 2004 were less supportive of racial profiling policies. This is not
surprising given that African-Americans are disproportionately affected by racial profiling
policies. This could be due to increased contact with African-Americans in the workplace and
increased exposure to the negative effect of racial profiling policies. Increased efficacy,
increased religiosity, and being Republican is associated with increased support for racial
profiling. While this aligns with general Republican issue positions, it does seem
counterintuitive as religion teaches tolerance of others. Foreign born Latinos and Dominicans
have higher levels of support for racial profiling in 2004. Again, perhaps due to the prejudice and
stereotypes that immigrants bring from their countries of origin they could have a more negative
perception of African-Americans.
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Table 28
Attitudes on Terrorism30
Base Model
2004
2008
.056* (.039) .184*** (.057)
-.217** (.077) -.327** (.116)
.003* (.002) .0004 (.019)
.066 (.082) -.068 (.126)
.009 (.078)
.117 (.121)
-.049* (.036) .051* (.039)
-.114** (.036) -.160** (.053)
-.079** (.030) -.054 (.044)
-.051 (.113) .117 (.230)
-.018 (.036) -.012 (.056)
.149** (.051) .036 (.077)
.026 (.054)
.021 (.088)
.065 (.051)
-.005 (.071)
-.204** (.083) -.110 (.117)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec. Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
Foreign Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
2.99*** (.307) 2.97*** (.443)
Constant
.0855
.0957
R2
.0706
.0626
Adjusted R2
876
398
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
.015 (.051)
.244** (.080)
-.316** (.104) -.285* (.163)
.003 (.003)
-.018 (.028)
.147* (.108) -.003 (.181)
.030 (.104)
-.019 (.170)
-.071* (.048) .064 (.055)
-.136** (.049) -.194** (.077)
-.120** (.038) -.058 (.057)
-.141 (.158)
-.003 (.355)
.024 (.047)
-.014 (.077)
.201** (.070) .087 (.112)
-.045 (.084)
-.101 (.154)
.055 (.069)
-.014 (.099)

Latinos Only
2004
2008
.063 (.065)
.113 (.089)
-.072 (.120) -.335* (.185)
.006* (.004) .037 (.030)
.038 (.135)
-.031 (.196)
-.007 (.124) .296* (.191)
-.015 (.058) .045 (.064)
-.114** (.056) -.120* (.082)
-.006 (.053) -.026 (.079)
-.027 (.169) .201 (.320)
-.060 (.058) -.009 (.092)
.132* (.081) .055 (.117)
.069 (.080)
.042 (.121)
.068 (.080)
.020 (.112)

3.01*** (.407) 3.17*** (.657)
.1120
.1226
.0892
.0662
520
216

-.179 (.167)
.085 (.235)
.028 (.203)
-.321 (.266)
.005 (.138)
-.120 (.185)
-.016 (.229)
.578 (.682)
-.578* (.410) -.161 (.619)
.436 (.646)
-1.01 (1.15)
2.70*** (.519) 2.74*** (.697)
.0672
.1029
.0130
-.0057
347
177

In table 28 I analyze how personal characteristics of the African-American and Latino
population affect attitudes toward terrorist detainment. In table 25 we saw that over half of each
group is supportive of detainment of potential terrorists, with Latinos being more supportive in
both years than African-Americans are. In this case there are more areas of commonality that
oppose terrorist imprisonment, which is surprising. In most cases the African-American
population seems to be less supportive of detainment policies, while the significant Latino
indicators primarily are associated with increased support for the policy. It appears that there
could be the potential for coalition building in this issue area, although it would not be
unanimous by any means. There is not a significant increase in the areas of commonality in this
national security issue, and as such my hypothesis is not supported by the data.
These models have a small amount of explanatory power, but do a better job for AfricanAmericans than Latinos. Education is consistently significant, and as levels of education increase
30

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.26.
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support for terrorist detainment decreases. Due to the potential depravation of due process and
humane treatment of potential terrorists this makes sense: more highly educated people are more
likely to value the equal treatment of people regardless of who they are. In general men are less
likely to support terrorist detainment than women are. This could be due to a shared recognition
that the people being detained are also potentially not terrorists and are being held captive
incorrectly. In 2004 increased political trust is associated with increased support for terrorist
detainment across groups. If one supports and trusts political elites then it makes sense that there
would be increased support for detainment policies.
African-Americans are less supportive of terrorist detainment in both years than Latinos
are. In other words, in 2004 being African-American was associated with lower support for
terrorist detainment, but in 2008 race did not play the same role. Conservative AfricanAmericans in 2008 are more likely to support terrorist detainment. This aligns with general
conservative policy stances in this issue area. Employed African-Americans were more likely to
support terrorist detainment than unemployed respondents were in 2004. This could be due to a
perceived increased threat due to the events of September 11, 2001 and the events that followed.
African-Americans with higher income and more participation are less likely to support terrorist
detainment in 2004. It appears that in many cases where there are significant characteristics that
affect attitudes toward terrorism, those important characteristics often serve to decrease support
of the policy rather than increase it.
Older Latinos are more likely to support terrorist detainment in 2004 as are married
Latino respondents in 2008. Both of these results are indicative of life cycle effects, and are in
the expected direction. Dominicans have lower levels of support for terrorist detainment in 2004.
Again, Dominicans are the outliers within the Latino population. The potential reasons for this
are discussed further in the conclusion.
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Table 29
Attitudes on Trust in the Police31
Base Model
2004
2008
.023 (.024)
-.005 (.036)
-.107** (.048) -.084 (.074)
.003** (.001) .029** (.012)
.036 (.052)
-.066 (.079)
.028 (.049)
.065 (.077)
-.012 (.022)
.010 (.025)
-.010 (.022)
.015 (.033)
-.023 (.018)
-.027 (.028)
.103* (.070)
.065 (.142)
.007 (.022)
-.067* (.035)
.377*** (.032) .323*** (.049)
.066** (.034) .018 (.056)
.025 (.032)
.017 (.045)
-.240*** (.052)-.338*** (.074)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec.Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
For. Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
1.41*** (.193) 1.89*** (.278)
Constant
.2385
.2016
R2
.1728
Adjusted R2 .2263
889
403
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
.007 (.030) .036 (.049)
-.108* *.061) -.148* (.100)
.003* (.002) .038** (.017)
.080 (.063) -.069 (.110)
-.0009 (.061) .087 (.104)
-.040* (.028) -.025 (.034)
-.015 (.029) .040 (.046)
-.014 (.022) .005 (.035)
.025 (.092)
-.099 (.219)
-.014 (.028) -.052 (.047)
.346*** (.041) .422*** (.069)
.061 (.050)
.061 (.095)
.0007 (.041) -.067 (.061)

Latinos Only
2004
2008
.032 (.044) -.077* (.057)
-.119* (.081) -.015 (.116)
.007** (.003) .024 (.019)
-.040 (.092) -.060 (.123)
.092 (.085) .070 (.120)
.043 (.040)
.084** (.041)
.007 (.038) -.033 (.051)
-.050* (.036) -.069* (.049)
.146 (.115)
-.016 (.202)
.038 (.039)
-.127** (.057)
.432*** (.055) .217** (.073)
.053 (.051)
-.002 (.077)
.042 (.056)
.111* (.069)

1.59*** (.241) 1.53*** (.405)
.1536
.2256
.1321
.1763
526
218

.003 (.112)
.144 (.149)
-.198* (.140) -.409** (.169)
-.078 (.094)
.147 (.117)
-.134 (.156)
.184 (.390)
.219 (.282)
-.422 (.358)
-.358 (.444)
.104 (.733)
1.01** (.353) 2.43*** (.439)
.2350
.1942
.1913
.0979
353
179

In table 25 we saw the levels of support of each group in regards to trust in the police,
and in both years Latinos are significantly more likely than African-Americans to trust the police
most or all of the time. In table 29 I analyze how personal characteristics of the AfricanAmerican and Latino population affect attitudes toward trusting the police. In this instance, the
areas of commonality are associated with increased trust in the police. This could potentially be
an area to work together (improving community views of the police), but there are also segments
of each population that have decreased trust in the police. Realistically, there are more common
decreased trust of the police between the two groups, so perhaps the greater majority of each
group could work together to alleviate trust issues. In this instance, my hypothesis is proved by
the data: even though there are not as many “official” areas of agreement, the overall outlook of
each group seems to be the most in agreement.

31

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.23, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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Political trust is consistently significant and as levels of political trust increase so does
trust in the police. These two items should be correlated, and this result makes sense. In general
as respondents get older they are more likely to trust the police. This could be due to the
increased reliance of older people on the police for assistance and order in their communities and
for their protection.
African-Americans have lower levels of trust in the police in both years. Holding all
other factors equal, being African-American is associated with less trust in the police, regardless
of the other characteristics of the respondent. It is well documented that African-Americans and
the police have a contentious relationship in most cases, so this makes sense. Where gender is
significant men are less likely to trust the police than women are. This could be due to increased
experience with racial profiling and poor treatment by the police for men. Income is significant
for African-Americans in 2004 and Latinos in 2008, but the direction of the relationship differs
between the two groups: higher income African-Americans in 2004 are less likely to trust the
police, but higher income Latinos in 2008 are more likely to trust the police. Again, AfricanAmericans are more likely to have increased exposure to racial profiling regardless of their levels
of income, and this could result in these findings.
Conservative Latinos are less likely to trust the police. This is counterintuitive, as
conservatives are generally more trusting of the police. Latinos with more political participation
and higher efficacy have less trust in police. Here there could be an effort to change the status
quo as it regards the police which is expressed by increased political participation. As levels of
religiosity increase for Latinos in 2008 so does trust in the police. This could be due to an
increased trust in authority figures generally that stems from religious teachings. Spanish
speaking respondents have lower levels of trust in the police in both years. This is likely due to
increased exposure to differential treatment based on language usage for these respondents. In
general, it appears that many of the relationships for Latinos are opposite of the expected
direction, which indicates that these factors function differently for the two groups.
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Table 30
Attitudes on Increasing Immigration Levels32
Base Model
2004
2008
-.083** (.036) .009 (.017)
.081 (.071)
.048* (.035)
-.004** (.002) -.004 (.006)
-.097* (.075) -.009 (.038)
-.030 (.072) -.049* (.037)
.025 (.034)
.016* (.012)
.0009 (.034)
.006 (.016)
-.0003 (.027) .016 (.013)
-.019 (.104)
.040 (.070)
.009 (.033)
.040** (.017)
-.027 (.047)
.058** (.023)
.024 (.050)
-.032 (.027)
.104** (.048) .012 (.021)
-.303*** (.077) -.101** (.036)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec.Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
For. Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
.583** (.284) -.147 (.136)
Constant
.0354
.0590
R2
.0192
.0245
Adjusted R2
848
397
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
-.074* (.041) -.001 (.021)
.218** (.082) .029 (.042)
-.004* (.002) -.002 (.007)
-.076 (.085) -.027 (.046)
-.036 (.083) -.043 (.044)
.070* (.039) .021* (.014)
-.035 (.040) .022 (.020)
.011 (.030) .013 (.015)
-.019 (.126) -.032 (.093)
-.008 (.038) .013 (.020)
-.023 (.056)
.092** (.029)
.017 (.068)
-.035 (.040)
.079* (.056) -.014 (.026)

Latinos Only
2004
-.095* (.069)
-.153 (.128)
-.011** (.004)
-.160 (.143)
-.045 (.132)
-.051 (.065)
.075 (.060)
-.004 (.056)
.018 (.182)
.012 (.062)
-.074 (.086)
.054 (.081)
.134* (.087)

2008
.025 (.031)
.038 (.064)
-.013* (.010)
.032 (.067)
-.067 (.065)
-.0005 (.022)
-.004 (.028)
.022 (.027)
.096 (.111)
.079** (.031)
.028 (.040)
-.020 (.041)
.035 (.038)

.255 (.328) -.143 (.173)
.0382
.0751
.0124
.0153
499
215

.647*** (.175)
.055 (.218)
.249* (.145)
.163 (.247)
.126 (.410)
1.30** (.682)
.673 (.548)
.0884
.0343
340

-.024 (.082)
.156* (.092)
.031 (.064)
-.142 (.236)
.170 (.215)
-.146 (.399)
-.365* (.243)
.1045
-.0039
177

In table 30 I analyze how personal characteristics of the African-American and Latino
population affect attitudes toward increasing immigration levels. It is important to note that there
is minimal explanatory power with each of these models. For two out of the three common
variables across times and years, the areas where there is similarity are in opposition to increased
immigration, which indicates that members of both groups are concerned about the potential
impact of immigrants on both broader society and on their personal situations-it appears that
there is some sort of threat perceived by increased immigration levels. While there are several
indicators that are associated with increasing immigration levels for African-American
respondents, overall African-American respondents do not support increasing levels. Latinos, in
general, appear to be more supportive of increasing immigration levels when it comes to the
indicators that specifically apply to their group; what is problematic are the indicators that they
share with African-American respondents that are not supportive of increasing immigration

32

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.25.
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levels, which confirms my hypothesis about African-American respondents. Again, foreign born
respondents are more likely to support immigration, so that hypothesis is again confirmed. It
appears that immigration is a divisive issue for Latinos (as posited by the previous research), and
that the majority of African-Americans do not support increasing immigration levels. This could
potentially be an area for the two groups to work together, but it would be more fruitful to work
against increasing immigration levels.
African-Americans are less supportive of increasing immigration levels. In the case of
immigration, race appears to be more important than all of the other factors when they are held
constant, which could indicate a point of contention. This result confirms the findings of
previous research. African-American men, those with more political trust, and higher income
African-Americans were more likely to support increasing immigration levels. This could be due
to increased contact with other immigrants both at work and in the broader society. Again,
increased exposure with immigrants and a positive view of them is likely the reason for this
result.
As levels of efficacy increase for Latinos in 2004 so does support for increasing
immigration levels. Foreign born, Mexicans, Panamanians, and Spanish speaking respondents
support increasing immigration levels in 2004. Again, due to personal experiences both of these
groups should want to increase immigration. What is interesting is that it does not hold in 2008.
How Different are Issue Positions?
Table 31
Levels of Support: Policy Positions: Percentage of each population who agree with each
statement (top two categories)
AfricanAmerican 2004

Latino 2004

AfricanAmerican 2008

Latino 2008

Pro-Iraq War

15.84

44.33

10.06

24.26

Pro-Gay Marriage

22.17

22.70

28.66

30.66

Pro Death Penalty

46.56

54.05

39.75

53.95

In table 31 we can see the levels of support for some general social policy areas for both
groups. In terms of support for the Iraq war, neither group is particularly supportive, although
Latinos tend to have higher levels of support than African-Americans do. In both groups support
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levels drop from 2004 to 2008, which is reflective of the increased information that was publicly
available about the war. Less than half of each group is supportive of gay marriage, and the
levels of support remain fairly stable across time for both groups. 33 Latinos are more likely to
support the death penalty than African-Americans are, which makes sense given the large
amount of African-American men and women that are incarcerated.
Table 32
Attitudes on the Death Penalty34
Base Model
2004
2008
.034 (.041)
.024 (.058)
.232** (.081) .219* (.118)
.0009 (.002) .010 (.020)
.008 (.086)
.014 (.127)
-.037 (.082) .147 (.123)
.084** (.038) .074* (.040)
-.014 (.038)
-.039 (.054)
-.026 (.031)
.057 (.045)
-.119 (.118)
-.200 (.222)
.060* (.038)
.112** (.057)
.093* (.054)
.129* (.078)
.158** (.056) .039 (.089)
.042 (.054)
.051 (.072)
-.284*** (.087) -.394*** (.119)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec. Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
Foreign Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
1.66*** (.323)
Constant
.0689
R2
.0538
Adjusted R2
876
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

1.67*** (.446)
.0945
.0618
403

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
.020 (.053) .044 (.080)
.176* (.107) .303* (.166)
.002 (.003) .006 (.028)
-.019 (.111) .051 (.181)
.020 (.108) .180 (.173)
.039 (.050)
.014 (.056)
.015 (.050) .031 (.077)
-.032 (.038) .065 (.058)
-.359** (.163) -.513* (.361)
.047 (.049) .109* (.077)
.040 (.072) .160* (.114)
.066 (.088)
-.016 (.156)
.021 (.071) -.030 (.103)

Latinos Only
2004
.052 (.068)
.356** (.127)
-.0009 (.004)
.076 (.144)
-.054 (.132)
.134** (.062)
-.084* (.060)
-.025 (.056)
.167 (.179)
.064 (.062)
.153* (.086)
.176** (.080)
.053 (.086)

2008
-.006 (.090)
.169 (.183)
.036 (.030)
-.081 (.193)
.227 (.190)
.145**(.064)
-.087 (.081)
-.017 (.078)
-.238 (.321)
.113 (.091)
.134 (.116)
.033 (.121)
.180* (.110)

1.94*** (.422) 1.73** (.670)
.0273
.0621
.0021
.0021
515
217

-.298* (.174)
.405* (.221)
-.122 (.145)
.506** (.244)
.249 (.414)
.828 (.690)
.896* (.551)
.1274
.0774
351

-.307* (.234)
-.320 (.269)
-.185 (.186)
.377 (.618)
-.150 (.568)
-1.91* (1.16)
1.74** (.697)
.1322
.0298
181

In table 31 we saw that there are significant differences between levels of support for the
death penalty between Latinos and African-Americans. In table 32 I analyze how personal
characteristics of the African-American and Latino population affect attitudes toward the death
penalty. There are several areas of overlap between the two populations in regards to attitudes
about the death penalty. In both groups, men and those who have higher levels of political trust
and efficacy are more likely to support the death penalty. What is problematic is that African33

I did not include the regression results for gay marriage as they did not provide much more information than the levels of
support do.
34
Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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American respondents in general do not appear to support the death penalty, which could
interfere with potential coalition building. For Latino respondents, there are more factors that
increase support of the death penalty rather than decrease them. While there are some areas of
overlap, there is not as much as I expected. It appears that the death penalty would not be a
useful issue area for the two groups to work together on. Further, in the areas where there is
continuity across time (such as income, race, voting, etc.) the results are in opposite directions; in
other words, the variables with continuity work to pull the issue positions further apart rather
than create further areas of agreement. Given that over half of the Latino population supports the
death penalty, and less than half of the African-American population supports the death penalty,
this is likely an area that would create contention instead of coalition.
African-Americans have lower levels of support for the death penalty in both years.
Again, when holding all other variables constant it appears that race is a key factor to explaining
issue positions on the death penalty. This is likely due to the high proportion of prisoners on
death row being African-American. African-Americans who voted are less likely to support the
death penalty in both years, perhaps due to the disproportionately high incarceration rates of
African-Americans and a desire to change that. Where levels of efficacy and political trust are
significant they are associated with increased support for the death penalty. It appears that trust
and efficacy work together to produce more support for the death penalty-in each case it appears
that a feeling of importance and trust in the existing political system is associated with increased
support for the death penalty.
Wealthier Latinos, Republican Latinos, and more religious Latinos are more likely to
support the death penalty. Highly educated Latinos and foreign born respondents have less
support for the death penalty-most people with higher levels of education are less supportive of
the death penalty regardless of race. This could be due personal experiences with capital
punishment in their respective countries of origin. Spanish speaking respondents and Cubans are
more supportive of the death penalty, while Panamanians are less supportive-it could be in this
issue area that speaking Spanish is associated with more conservative issue positions. Even
within Latino issue positions there are a diversity of opinions which would make it difficult to
reach a consensus on an issue position that could serve as a basis for coalition building.
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Table 33
Attitudes on Iraq War35
Base Model
2004
2008
.038** (.013) .024* (.018)
Ideology
.073** (.027) .047 (.038)
Male
.00002 (.0009) -.004 (.006)
Age
-.040* (.029) -.050 (.041)
Employed
.028 (.027) -.049 (.040)
Married
.002 (.013) .008 (.013)
Income
-.025** (.013) -.015 (.017)
Education
-.001 (.010) -.009 (.014)
Elec.Activity
-.055* (.040) .004 (.073)
Vote
-.038** (.012)-.001 (.018)
Pol. Efficacy
.094*** (.018).080**(.025)
Pol. Trust
.161*** (.019).130***(.029)
Partisanship
.020 (.018) .036* (.023)
Religiosity
-.157***(.029) -120**(.038)
Black
For. Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
-.022 (.018) -.179 (.144)
Constant
.2803
.1605
R2
.2683
.1298
Adjusted R2
852
397
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

AfricanAmericans
2004
.018 (.016)
.053* (.032)
.0003 (.001)
-.021 (.033)
.062**(.032)
-.006 (.015)
-.031** (.015)
.004 (.011)
-.081* (.049)
-.029** (.014)
.096*** (.021)
.136*** (.026)
.015 (.021)

-.097 (.125)
.1524
.1298
507

Latinos
2008
.016 (.021)
.011 (.044)
-.014* (.007)
-.078* (.049)
-.048 (.045)
-.003 (.015)
-.008 (.020)
-.025* (.015)
-.079 (.096)
-.022 (.020)
.045* (.030)
.037 (.042)
-.015 (.027)

2004
2008
.076** (.026) .006 (.032)
.105** (.049) .087* (.065)
.0004 (.001) .015* (.010)
-.048 (.055) -.080 (.069)
-.014 (.051) -.026 (.068)
.008 (.024)
.044* (.023)
-.024 (.023) -.046* (.028)
-.016 (.021)
.022 (.027)
-.028 (.068)
.043 (.113)
-.056** (.023) .016 (.032)
.086** (.033) .132** (.041)
.145*** (.030).165*** (.043)
.004 (.033)
.066* (.039)

.331* (.179)
.1054
.1301
214

-.113* (.068) .133* (.083)
-.162** (.082)-.353***(.095)
.037 (.056)
-.027 (.066)
.247** (.093) -.114 (.219)
.101 (.174)
-.177 (.201)
.232 (.261)
-.310 (.412)
.133 (.212)
-.359* (.247)
.2735
.2880
.2300
.2029
337
179

In table 31 we saw that neither groups was very supportive of the war in Iraq, with
African-Americans in general being much less supportive than Latinos. In table 33 I analyze how
personal characteristics of the African-American and Latino population affect attitudes toward
United States involvement in the Iraq war. Overall, neither groups is highly supportive of the
Iraq war, however, it appears that the main common areas on issues of war are political trust and
partisanship, and in those areas there is common support for the Iraq war across groups and
years. What is more common, however, is for the different factors to be significant in different
ways for both groups and in both years. It would appear that my hypothesis that more general,
national issues would have more areas of commonality is supported by this data. In this instance,
issues related to military action could be a fruitful area to attempt coalition building between
these two groups.

35

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.22; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.21, Black mean VIF: 1.25, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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This model has fairly strong explanatory power for Latinos in both years, but lower
explanatory power for African-Americans (especially in 2008). Political trust is consistently
significant and as levels of political trust increase so does support for military involvement in
Iraq. This makes sense, as increased trust in political elites would be associated with an increased
perception that military action is the correct course of action.
Age has a differential effect in these models by group. This could be due to the
differential emphasis of each group on what they believe government should do (as referenced in
previous literature). Where education is significant, respondents with higher levels of education
are less likely to be supportive of military involvement in Iraq. What is interesting is that these
effects did not hold across time. Efficacy and gender seem to have differential effects across
time. This could be due to perceptions that the United States was wrong to get involved in this
military conflict.
Being African-American is consistently associated with lower levels of support for the
Iraq war in both years-this is not surprising given that many young African-American men either
end up in the armed forces or in prison, and as such bear the brunt of military involvement. As in
previous tables, it appears that race is one of the key characteristics in explaining issue positions
on the Iraq war. In 2008 employed African-Americans and those who participate more are less
supportive of United States involvement in the Iraq war. This could be due to the advantage of
having a number of years to assess the impact of military involvement in Iraq. Married AfricanAmericans and those who voted appear to be more supportive of military involvement in Iraq in
2004, but the effect disappears in 2008. Again, being further removed from 9/11 could help to
explain this. In general, it appears that there are many potential factors that impact AfricanAmerican support of the Iraq war, and most of them serve to decrease support.
Conservative Latinos in 2004 are supportive of the United States’ military involvement in
Iraq-this aligns with a more general conservative stance on military action. In 2008 wealthier
Latinos and more religious Latinos are more likely to support military involvement than less
wealthy respondents. Two of the Latino specific variables are consistently significant across
years: being born outside of the United States and speaking Spanish. Foreign born respondents in
2004 are less likely to support military involvement in Iraq, but in 2008 they are more likely.
This could be due to an increased perception in their country of origin that military intervention
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was necessary. Spanish speaking respondents are consistently less likely to support military
involvement in Iraq. Cubans have higher levels of support for military involvement in Iraq but
only in 2004. It appears that there are equally as many factors that influence Latino attitudes
toward the war in Iraq, but the majority of them serve to increase support.
American Values and Ideals
Table 34
Levels of Support: American Values and Ideals: Percentage of each population who agree with
each statement (top two categories)
African-American
2004

Latino 2004

AfricanAmerican 2008

Latino 2008

American work ethic

77.46

92.56

79.33

93.60

Minority Position

60.24

72.86

49.24

64.28

Equal Opportunity

44.37

54.78

40.87

56.25

Equal Gender Roles

95.46

95.56

78.53

78.82

In table 34 we can see the levels of support for African-Americans and Latinos in both
2004 and 2008 in terms of issues and American values. While well over half of each group are
supportive of the idea of the American work ethic as the key to success, there are different
portions of each population that agree with this statement. In general, Latinos are more likely
than African-Americans to agree that a strong work ethic is the key to success in America. In
terms of who is responsible for minorities positions in America, Latinos are more likely across
years to agree that minorities are responsible for their own lots in life. For both groups, the
percentage of the survey population that agrees with these statements drops from 2004 to 2008.
In terms of if a lack of equal opportunity is a problem for minorities, over half of both groups
agree that a lack of equal opportunities is a problem. Again, in both years the amount of Latinos
who agree with this statement is higher than the number of African-Americans. In terms of
support for equal gender roles, the levels of support are similar across groups and within each
year, with the majority of each population supporting equal gender roles.36

36

I did not include the regressions for minority position in society, equal opportunity, or equal gender roles as they did not
provide much information beyond what the levels of support indicate.
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Table 35
Attitudes on the American Work Ethic37
Base Model
2004
2008
.056** (.029) .103**(.041)
-.066 (.058) -.042 (.085)
-.0009 (.001) .015 (.014)
-.010 (.062) .031 (.091)
.050 (.059)
.097 (.088)
.024 (.027)
.011 (.029)
-.145*** (.027) -.117** (.038)
-.040* (.022) -.034 (.032)
.027 (.085)
.044 (.164)
-.022 (.027) -.078** (.041)
.190*** (.039) .118** (.056)
.046 (.041)
-.039 (.064)
.010 (.039)
.082* (.052)
-.264*** (.063)-.484***(.086)

Ideology
Male
Age
Employed
Married
Income
Education
Elec.Activity
Vote
Pol. Efficacy
Pol. Trust
Partisanship
Religiosity
Black
For. Born
Language
Mexican
Cuban
Dominican
Panamanian
3.36*** (.233) 3.35*** (.322)
Constant
.1394
.1821
R2
.1256
.1529
Adjusted R2
893
407
N
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001

African-Americans Only
2004
2008
.076* (.042)
.169**(.066)
-.107 (.085)
-.038 (.136)
-.002 (.002)
-.024 (.023)
.039 (.088)
-.023(.149)
.082 (.085)
-.089(.141)
-.003 (.039)
-.0007 (.046)
-.183*** (.040) -.143** (.063)
-.027 (.030)
-.029 (.048)
-.056 (.129)
.365(.299)
.022 (.039)
-.126**(.064)
.269*** (.057) .206** (.094)
.060 (.069)
.005 (.129)
.031 (.057)
.161** (.083)

Latinos Only
2004
2008
.005 (.040)
.028 (.048)
.005 (.075)
-.055 (.098)
.003* (.002) .069***(.016)
-.095 (.085)
.061 (.104)
.056 (.078)
.308**(.102)
.054* (.037)
.062* (.035)
-.080** (.035)-.100** (.044)
-.045* (.033) -.037 (.042)
-.002 (.106)
-.170 (.173)
-.091** (.036) -.058 (.049)
.140** (.051)
.043 (.062)
.054 (.047)
-.032 (.065)
-.001 (.051)
.005 (.059)

2.99*** (.335) 2.57*** (.552)
.1206
.1516
.0983
.0980
527
220

.063 (.103)
.125 (.126)
-.005 (.129)
.409**(.145)
.047 (.086)
.074 (.100)
.118 (.144)
.426 (.333)
.469** (.247) -.030 (.306)
.263 (.410)
.445 (.627)
3.36*** (.326) 3.63*** (.376)
.1076
.2236
.0571
.1320
356
181

Members of both groups overwhelmingly support the idea of the American dream and the
role of work in achieving it (as indicated in table 34), but what are the areas of the most
similarity between the two groups? In table 35 I analyze how personal characteristics of the
African-American and Latino population affect attitudes toward the idea of America as a land of
opportunity. In general the majority of both groups are supportive of positive conceptions of the
American dream, but there are segments of each population at the individual level who are less
supportive. This indicates that both groups view success (in general) in America as a matter of
personal achievement. Given that both groups are broadly conceptualized as marginalized in
American society, this is somewhat surprising. While African-American respondents in general
are less supportive of this conception of an American work ethic, there are significant segments
of the population that do agree with this conception; interestingly the positive attitudes toward an
individualized conception of an American work ethic are mostly found among the more

37

Statistical tests indicate multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis: 2004 models: Base mean VIF: 1.19, Black mean
VIF: 1.19, Latino mean VIF: 1.21; 2008 models: Base mean VIF: 1.20, Black mean VIF: 1.24, Latino mean VIF: 1.27.
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conservative parts of the population. As far as the Latino population is concerned, it appears that
the primary aspect of identity that is mobilized by this question is the use of language; it is
important to note that overall Latinos are more supportive of this individualized conception of
the American work ethic. These overall similar conceptions could be helpful because the
perceived factors of a person’s success or failure are fairly similar with one significant
difference: Latinos view it as an individual effort, while African-Americans see a combination
of individual effort and systemic effects on success.
In general, it appears that these models have the most explanatory power for Latinos in
2008, but also consistently explain about 9% of attitudes for African-Americans in both years.
Education is consistently significant and more highly educated respondents are less likely to
think that you only need to work hard in America to succeed. It appears that higher levels of
education are associated with a more negative view of the American dream; this could be due to
an increased recognition of societal and systemic factors that influence an individual’s chances at
success. In general as political trust increases so does the perception that you need to work hard
in America to succeed. The more trusting a respondent is the more they are likely to believe the
ideal of the American dream. As levels of efficacy increase the perception that you only need to
work hard in America to succeed decreases across groups. This has the opposite effect of
political trust, which is odd considering that the two usually work together in most models.
Older Latinos, those with more income, and married Latinos are more likely to believe
that you must work hard in America to succeed. This could be due to life effects of aging, and of
watching their friends and family members succeed who have worked hard; additionally, as most
Latinos who have higher incomes are likely fairly successful, it is intuitive that they would
believe in this ideal. Increased participation among Latinos is associated with an increased
perception that you only need to work hard in America to succeed, as is speaking Spanish.
People who are more likely to participate in the political system (outside of voting) because they
feel that something should change; this finding also aligns with the political efficacy finding that
is present in multiple models. Also, Spanish speaking respondents are likely to be more recent
immigrants with a more positive, idealistic view of American society. Dominicans are more
likely to perceive that you need to work hard in America to succeed in 2004. What is interesting
is that this effect does not carry over to 2008, nor to other ethnic groups.
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Conclusion
It appears that the type of issue does matter in terms of how much commonality there is
between the two groups, but also that it depends on which factors you look at. It does not appear,
from this data, that differences in issue positions are driven by perceptions of scarcity (as
suggested in the previous research) but that support or opposition of particular issues align with
broader support trends based on ideology and partisanship. Further, there are often similar levels
of support for various issues, but at the individual level it appears that the same variables often
function differently for each group.
In terms of the racialized issue areas, it appears that there is more agreement than there is
disagreement, which is contrary to the findings in previous research. Instead of being
characterized as zero-sum relationships, it appears that there is a shared recognition among these
two groups of the same structural factors and benefits in this policy area. Even in immigration,
which is commonly conceptualized as the most divisive issue, it appears that these two groups
have similar levels of support. Finally, in terms of attitudes about police relations, there is a large
amount of overlap in negative attitudes toward the police for both groups. This echoes the
findings about racial profiling in that both groups seem to be opposed to arbitrary or unfair
interference by the police with their pursuit of success. It appears that more general policies are a
better area to attempt coalition building rather than more racially and ethnically charged policies.
It does not appear, from this data, that there are vast differences in opinion in racialized policy
areas.
In terms of more general issue areas, it appears that there is a mixed bag of results about
areas of commonality between the two groups. Issues like the death penalty did produce more
areas of commonality than did issue areas that are more particularized. For example, free speech
is not an issue area that has particularized benefits, and so the two groups may feel more
comfortable coming together to work on it as there is no perceived loss associated with increased
amounts of free speech. Additionally, I found that in issues related to national security there are
more areas of commonality such as ideology and partisanship.
Both groups seem to value individual effort as a means to achieve success and do not
emphasize potential structural factors that could limit an individual’s success in the United
States. It is intuitive that as members of minority groups Latinos and African-Americans would
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be more likely to point to structural factors as responsible for inequality, but that is not what I
found. Instead, there seems to be a continuous thread throughout that respondents largely believe
that success in the United States is based on individual effort and talent, without much
interference of discriminatory structural factors. At the same time, however, there is also a
common conception from each group that individuals should not be subject to arbitrary intrusion
by law enforcement. For example, the majority of each population opposes racial profiling; this
could be due to unfair targeting by law enforcement of people who have not committed a crimeit would appear that these populations are willing to accept individual success and failure but not
unfair treatment based on ascriptive characteristics. In general, there seems to be consensus on
the protection of individual rights and liberties across groups and years.
The general trends in the findings seem to be that there are not any areas where there is
unanimous agreement, but there are several areas where a majority of each population agrees.
Thus, no one issue is a panacea for coalition building, but instead there may be several coalitions
comprised of different segments of the population for different issues. In general, it appears that
the most promising area for coalitions is not necessarily issue based but instead based in
ideology, with an emphasis on coalition building between the more conservative segments of
each population.
One consistent finding across issue areas is that very few of these models have high
explanatory power. While these are the variables that are identified in the previous research as
being the most influential in determining policy positions for these groups, it appears that there is
likely an alternative group of variables that would do a better job at explaining issue positions. In
Chapter 6, I turn to this task to identify possible alternative variable groupings that have greater
explanatory power.
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CHAPTER VI
SO WHAT MATTERS MOST?
In the previous three chapters I have examined three different sets of explanations that
could affect attitudes toward coalition building, as suggested by the previous research. Now, I
switch to a different set of statistical tools to determine which variables actually go together, and
how latent factors function in different groups and across time. In this chapter I begin with
exploratory factor analysis to initially identify the latent factors, then move through confirmatory
factor analysis, path analysis, and structural equation modeling. While the structures in this
chapter look different than those discussed in the previous chapters, this methodology has several
advantages.
First, I am able to use the software to identify the factors and reduce the amount of data.
Additionally, I am able to tweak the factor structures the computer identifies with the knowledge
gained in the previous chapters. One of the main findings of this chapter serves, in a way, to
reinforce some of the findings from the previous chapters: while the same variables matter for
both groups in predicting attitudes about coalition building, they matter and function in different
ways. While the previous chapters have allowed me to examine the nuances that exist at the
individual level, this final empirical chapter allows me to step back out to the larger picture. It
also allows me to test the three schools of limitations that are used in the previous research to see
if respondents actually see things in the same way that previous research says that they do.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Factor analysis is a collection of techniques that does an exploratory analysis to see if
there are clusters of items that go together (Acock 2010). The purpose of conducting an
exploratory factor analysis is to identify a smaller number of latent variables that explain the
shared variance of a set of variables (Acock 2010). Once those latent variables are identified they
are then named and used in subsequent analyses. Because it is an exploratory method there are
no restrictions placed on the pattern of relationships between the variables and the latent
variables (Brown 2006). In this case I am using EFA to determine which factor structure both
explains the largest amount of data, in order to reduce the amount of data, and which of those
factors are theoretically sound within the frameworks of previous research.
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I ran multiple iterations of my models for both years in order to ensure that I did not
overfactor or underfactor the models, both of which can be problematic. Additionally, I used
both the Kaiser-Guttman rule and the scree plots to ensure that I retained the correct number of
factors. The Kaiser-Guttman rule is very straightforward: obtain the eigenvalues derived from
the input correlation matrix, determine how many eigenvalues are greater than 1.0, and use that
number to determine the number of nontrivial latent dimensions that exist in the input data
(Brown 2006). The scree test also uses the eigenvalues and produces a graphical representation
of the factors; the graph is inspected to determine the last substantial decline in the magnitude of
the eigenvalues-or the point where lines drawn through the plotted eigenvalues change slope
(Brown 2006). While there were many factors identified, only those retained passed each of
these thresholds.
The factors were extracted using the correlation matrix in order to find the initial factor
solution and were specified to have a minimum eigenvalue of one; this reduced the number of
retained factors from 23 to four or five (depending on the year). I chose to specify the minimum
eigenvalue due to the small values of the majority of the eigenvalues in the initial extraction and
the fact that those small values accounted for less than one variable did alone (Acock 2010). The
extracted factors then produce loadings, which are used to determine how the items are related to
each other and to the factor (Acock 2010). Those loadings are displayed in Appendix 2.
In order to obtain as close to simple structure as possible the initial factor solution was
orthogonally rotated, which allows the factors to be uncorrelated (Thurstone, 1947). Factor
rotation is a mathematical transformation that is used to increase interpretability of the factors;
this is done by maximizing factor loadings close to 1.0 and minimizing those close to 0.0 (Brown
2006). This allowed for each item to load strongly on just one factor, instead of being crossloaded and confounded (Acock 2010). Salient loadings are considered to be those with values of
> = 0.30, 0.40.
In the 2004 EFA I identified five factors. By specifying that the minimum eigenvalue is
one, the five factors that are retained in this solution account for about 79% of the variance in the
data. In this table, there are high loadings on factor one, called “Perceptions of Competition”, of
the following variables: White economic competition, African-American economic competition,
Latino economic competition, White political competition, African-American political
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competition, and Latino political competition. There are high loadings on factor two, called
“Perceptions of fair treatment”, of the following variables: African-American discrimination,
Latino discrimination, personal discrimination, group treatment, better national economic
position, closeness to Whites, equal opportunity, and trust in police. There are high loadings on
factor three, called “Impact of Others on United States”, of the following variables: immigrants
take jobs, immigrants make America better, pro-war, increase defense spending, pro-racial
profiling, and terrorism. There are high loadings on factor four, called “Stereotypes”, of the
following variables: White stereotypes, African-American stereotypes, and Latino stereotypes.
There are high loadings on factor five, called “Closeness with other groups”, of the following
variables: closeness to African-Americans and closeness to Latinos. While there is some cross
loading, it is minimal. Full information and factor loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
In the 2008 EFA I identified four factors. By specifying that the minimum eigenvalue is
one, the four factors that are retained in this solution account for about 75% of the variance in the
data. In this table, there are high loadings on factor one, called “Societal Forces”, of the
following variables: African-American discrimination, Latino discrimination, personal
discrimination, group treatment, linked fate, closeness to African-Americans, pro-war, American
work ethic, equal opportunity, and minority position. There are high loadings on factor two,
called “Perceptions of Competition”, of the following variables: White economic competition,
economic competition with the other group, White political competition, political competition
with the other group, and same race leaders. There are high loadings on factor three, called
“Impact of Foreigners”, of the following variables: immigrants take jobs, closeness to Latinos,
increase border spending, and terrorism. There are high loadings on factor four, called
“Economic Position”, of the following variables: better national economic position, better racial
economic position, and closeness to Whites. While there is some cross loading, it is minimal.
Full information and factor loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
There are some differences in the EFAs for each year. The 2004 analysis has more factors
than the 2008 analysis, and the variables load differently in the two years. In the next portion of
the analysis, I will apply the solutions suggested by the EFAs to several CFA analyses to
determine how the solutions function in each year. Additionally, I will apply the solutions to
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each group (African-Americans and Latinos) in order to determine if the factorial structure can
be applied to each group in the same way.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Now that I have obtained a general solution from the EFA, the next step is to apply the
solution for both 2004 and 2008 in order to determine how well the solutions function for the
combined model and each group specific model. The purpose of conducting a CFA is similar in
to EFA in that both analyses seek to identify latent factors that account for the variation and
covariation among a set of indicators (Brown, 2006). Although the goals are similar the
processes have differences that often lead to distinct outcomes. In a CFA analysis, the researcher
has more control over the specificity of the relationships between the indicators and factors.
Compared with EFA, where all factors point to all indicators so all indicators have multiple
loadings, in CFA only a prior decided paths are “freely” estimated, the lack of a path means that
the relationship is fixed to zero. Additionally in CFA variances are allowed to correlate if there is
an a priori reason.
In each case I performed a CFA analysis performed with ML estimation and I use fit
indicators such as RMSEA, SRMR, TLI, and CFI to determine the utility of the models. The
underlying idea of ML is to find the model parameter estimates that maximize the probability of
observing the available data if the data were collected from the sample population again (Brown,
2006). Additionally, each of the models in this section of the chapter are over-identified.
I modified based on modification indices only when the modification index is substantial
and I could theoretically justify adding the parameter to the model. Modification indices indicate
that the error terms for various items should be correlated with an approximate correlation, or
what is unique about one of these items with respect to the latent variable is correlated with what
is unique about the other item. The index reflects an estimate of how much the overall model X 2
would decrease if the fixed or constrained parameter was freely estimated (Brown, 2006). The
greater the value of a modification index, the better the predicted improvement in overall model
fit if that path were added to the model (Kline, 2011). I used modification indices to re-specify
each model; only the final models are included in this chapter.
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In running models in each year for the combined group and for each group separately, I
am able to test some of the forms of invariance. One of the primary questions of measurement
invariance is do the dispersion, interrelationships, and levels of the latent factors vary across
groups? This type of analysis determines if the results are generalizable, and one of the main
goals is to determine if the underlying constructs of the scale function differently for AfricanAmericans and Latinos. Invariance tests if the CFA model fits each group in the same way; in
other words, a score is measurement invariant if a person’s score does not depend on their group
membership. In this chapter, there is not invariance from year to year, but within each year it
appears that there is invariance between the groups. Therefore, within each group there is
dimensional invariance (the same number of latent factors) and configural invariance (the factor
structure is the same across groups). The full information for the standardized and
unstandardized loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
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Figure 2. 2004 Modified CFAs: Combined Model
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Closeness to Blacks

In Figure 238 we can see the factor structure for both groups together and the distinct
covariances for the variables that comprise the factors. In this model we can see that perceptions
of combined economic competition is correlated with perceptions of political competition with
Whites. Additionally, perceptions of discrimination against African-Americans is correlated with
perceptions of discrimination against Latinos. It appears that perceptions of discrimination
against minority groups have a combined effect on perceptions of fair treatment. In the factor
“Impact of Others” attitudes toward racial profiling are correlated with attitudes about terrorism.
This set of correlations only occurs when the two groups are analyzed together; the effect
disappears when the groups are separated out. Finally, attitudes about stereotypes about Whites
are correlated with attitudes about stereotypes about Latinos. This effect also disappears when
the two groups are separated out.
In Figure 339 we see again that perceptions of combined economic competition is
correlated with perceptions of political competition with Whites. It appears that AfricanAmerican respondents are driving this correlation, as it does not appear for Latinos in 2004.
Additionally, perceptions of discrimination against African-Americans is again correlated with
perceptions of discrimination against Latinos. This is similar to what we saw in Figure 2. The
full information for the standardized and unstandardized loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
In Figure 440 the pattern of correlations changes. First, perceptions of political
competition with Whites is correlated with perceptions of political competition with African38

The covariance between Competition and Fair Treatment latent variable is .335. The covariance between Competition and
Impact of Others latent variable is .140. The covariance between Competition and Stereotypes latent variable is -.046. The
covariance between Competition and Closeness latent variable is .335. The covariance between Fair Treatment and Impact of
Others latent variable is .697. The covariance between Fair Treatment and Stereotypes latent variable is .166. The covariance
between Fair Treatment and Closeness latent variable is 3.61. The covariance between Impact of Others and Stereotypes latent
variable is .133. The covariance between Impact of Others and Closeness latent variable is 3.64. The covariance between
Stereotypes and Closeness latent variable is 2.72.
39 The covariance between Competition and Fair Treatment latent variable is .410. The covariance between Competition and
Impact of Others latent variable is .225. The covariance between Competition and Stereotypes latent variable is -.093. The
covariance between Competition and Closeness latent variable is .039. The covariance between Fair Treatment and Impact of
Others latent variable is -.420. The covariance between Fair Treatment and Stereotypes latent variable is .059. The covariance
between Fair Treatment and Closeness latent variable is .362. The covariance between Impact of Others and Stereotypes latent
variable is -.112. The covariance between Impact of Others and Closeness latent variable is -.268. The covariance between
Stereotypes and Closeness latent variable is .076.
40 The covariance between Competition and Fair Treatment latent variable is .268. The covariance between Competition and
Impact of Others latent variable is .031. The covariance between Competition and Stereotypes latent variable is .010. The
covariance between Competition and Closeness latent variable is -.128. The covariance between Fair Treatment and Impact of
Others latent variable is -.376. The covariance between Fair Treatment and Stereotypes latent variable is -.138. The covariance
between Fair Treatment and Closeness latent variable is -.103. The covariance between Impact of Others and Stereotypes latent
variable is .085. The covariance between Impact of Others and Closeness latent variable is -.121. The covariance between
Stereotypes and Closeness latent variable is .100.
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Americans. Whereas the other two models had a combined effect of both types of competition,
this model only has a correlation between types of political competition. This suggests that for
Latinos in 2004 it is political competition in general that has an effect on broader perceptions of
competition. Additionally, perceptions of closeness with Whites is correlated with perceptions of
closeness with African-Americans. Again, it appears that it is perceptions of closeness in general
that affect feelings of closeness, not feelings of closeness with one group or another. The full
information for the standardized and unstandardized loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
Table 36
Goodness of fit Statistics for 2004 Models
Chi Squared
RMSEA
AIC
BIC
CFI
SRMR

Combined
1042.963
0.059
66138.943
66554.649
0.747
0.062

African-American Only
501.697
0.048
31512.156
31861.847
0.828
0.059

Latino Only
593.801
0.056
33203.008
33552.405
0.731
0.064

One of the ways to determine if a model fits the data well and to select from other equally
plausible models is to compare goodness of fit indices. In this chapter, I will examine the
goodness of fit statistics of chi-square, SRMR, RMSEA, CFI, TLI, BIC and AIC in order to
determine model fit. The results from the 2004 CFA analyses are displayed in table 36.
The classic goodness of fit index is X2. Chi-square tests the difference in fit between a
given over-identified model and whatever unspecified model would imply a covariance matrix
that perfectly corresponds to the data covariance matrix (Kline, 2011). As it is sensitive to
sample size (among other factors), the researcher must look at additional indices to determine the
fit of the model (Kline, 2011). In the 2004 CFA analyses, the chi-squared value is in the AfricanAmerican only model (501.697). While it is not terribly small, it is the smallest of the three
analyses I conducted. The chi-squared values in both of the group specific models are smaller
than the chi-squared value in the combined model in 2004, which suggests that the models
function better when they are fitted more specifically for each group. It is necessary to examine
other indices to determine if the model fits the data adequately.
Another index that the researcher can look at to determine goodness of fit is the root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The RMSEA is an ‘error of approximation’
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index because it examines how well a model fits reasonably well in the population. (Brown,
2006) Brown (2006) suggests that RMSEA values less than .08 suggest adequate model fit,
RMSEA values less than .05 suggest good model fit, and that models with RMSEA greater than
or equal to .1 should be rejected. It is important to note that the value of the RMSEA decreases
as there are more degrees of freedom or a larger sample size (Kline, 2011). All three values in
table 36 suggest adequate to good model fit for RMSEA.
Two more indices that indicate model fit are the AIC and BIC. Both of these are
parsimony adjusted indices and as such, the model with the smallest AIC value is chosen as the
one most likely to replicate, because it is the model with better fit and fewer parameters when
compared with competing models (Kline, 2011). These indices are most useful in comparing
models and in table 36 we can see that the African-American model has the lowest values for
each of these indices.
I also examine the comparative fit index (CFI) to determine model fit. The CFI measures
the relative improvement in the fit of the researcher’s model over that of a baseline model (Kline,
2011). The CFI has a range of possible values of 0.0 to 1.0, with values closer to 1.0 implying
good model fit (Brown, 2006). Brown (2006) suggests that CFI values below .9 should lead the
research to reject the solution. In table 36, none of the CFI values reach the suggested threshold,
however, the African-American model again suggests the best fitting model. Finally, I examine
the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). The SRMR is the average discrepancy
between the correlations observed in the input matrix and the correlations predicted by the model
(Brown, 2006). The SRMR can take a range of values between 0.0 and 1.0, with 0.0 indicating a
perfect fit (the smaller the SRMR, the better the model fit) (Brown, 2006). In Table 10, all of the
models fit relatively well, but the African-American model again has the best fit of the three.
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In Figure 541 we again see that perceptions of discrimination against African-Americans
is correlated with perceptions of discrimination against Latinos even though there is a different
factor structure in 2008 than there is in 2004. What is interesting is that this correlation
disappears when the groups are separated. Additionally, perceptions of combined political
competition is correlated with perceptions of political competition with Whites. Additionally,
perceptions of closeness with Whites is correlated with perceptions of closeness with Latinos.
Thus, some of the correlations that were observed in the 2004 models remains the same in 2008,
even though the factor structure has changed. The full information for the standardized and
unstandardized loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
In Figure 642 the correlations are a bit different. The discrimination correlation disappears
when African-Americans are separated out. The other two correlations from the combined model
remain. Perceptions of combined political competition is correlated with perceptions of political
competition with Whites. Additionally, perceptions of closeness with Whites is correlated with
perceptions of closeness with Latinos. The full information for the standardized and
unstandardized loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
For Figure 743, the closeness correlation is present again (as it was in 2004) between
perceptions of closeness to African-Americans and perceptions of closeness to Whites.
Additionally, perceptions of combined political competition is correlated with perceptions of
political competition with Whites. It appears that the political competition correlations are robust
across groups. It is also interesting that in both years Latinos are the only group that have the

41
The covariance between Societal Forces and Competition latent variable is .228. The covariance between Societal Forces and
Impact of Foreigners latent variable is .300. The covariance between Societal Forces and Economic Position latent variable is .127. The covariance between Competition and Impact of Foreigners latent variable is .444. The covariance between Competition
and Economic Position latent variable is .013. The covariance between Impact of Foreigners and Economic Position latent
variable is -.109.
42 The covariance between Societal Forces and Competition latent variable is .145. The covariance between Societal Forces and
Impact of Foreigners latent variable is .057. The covariance between Societal Forces and Economic Position latent variable is .408. The covariance between Competition and Impact of Foreigners latent variable is .429. The covariance between Competition
and Economic Position latent variable is -.038. The covariance between Impact of Foreigners and Economic Position latent
variable is -.256.
43 The covariance between Societal Forces and Competition latent variable is .089. The covariance between Societal Forces and
Impact of Foreigners latent variable is -.302. The covariance between Societal Forces and Economic Position latent variable is .009. The covariance between Competition and Impact of Foreigners latent variable is .259. The covariance between Competition
and Economic Position latent variable is -.133. The covariance between Impact of Foreigners and Economic Position latent
variable is -.076.
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closeness correlation present. The full information for the standardized and unstandardized
loadings can be found in Appendix 2.
Table 37
Goodness of fit Statistics for 2008 Models
Chi Squared
RMSEA
AIC
BIC
CFI
TLI
SRMR

Combined
541.891
0.055
26817.525
27148.060
0.820
0.791
0.064

African-American Only
410.060
0.063
11931.589
12195.079
0.793
0.762
0.079

Latino Only
341.508
0.047
14152.267
14429.249
0.797
0.767
0.061

We can compare the goodness of fit indices from 2008 with those from 2004 to see if this
set of models fits better than the other. The results from the 2008 CFA analyses are displayed in
table 37. In the 2008 CFA analyses, the Latino only model has the smallest chi-squared value.
While it is not terribly small, it is the smallest of the three analyses I conducted. The chi-squared
values in both of the group specific models are again smaller than the chi-squared value in the
combined model in 2008, which suggests that the models function better when they are fitted
more specifically for each group. It is necessary to examine other indices to determine if the
model fits the data adequately. All three values in table 37 suggest adequate to good model fit for
RMSEA, with the Latino only model again being the best fitting model in 2008.
Two more indices that indicate model fit are the AIC and BIC. These indices are most
useful in comparing models and in table 37 we can see that the African-American model has the
lowest values for each of these indices. This is the first set of indices where the AfricanAmerican model has performed better than the Latino model. I also examine the comparative fit
index (CFI) to determine model fit. In table 37, none of the CFI values reach the suggested
threshold, however, the combined model suggests the best fitting model. Finally, I examine the
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). In table 37, all of the models fit relatively well,
but the Latino model again has the best fit of the three.
While the goodness of fit indices in both years fail to reach every threshold, they do
suggest some interesting findings. First, although there is the same factor structure across groups
and within years, the models fit differently for each group. This indicates that there are
significant distinctions between the way these variables and factors are applied to African128

Americans and Latinos. What is also interesting is that which group the model best predicts
changes from year to year. This suggests that not only are the factors themselves temporally
distinct, but also that the populations themselves change year to year.
Path Analysis
A path model (also known as a causal model) is the structural component of an SEM
model (Acock 2013) where there are several variables that are related in a specific sense. The
goal of path analysis is to specify a model to explain why certain indicators covary. One of the
difficulties in conducting path models is in model specification-due to the lack of randomization
in the model, there are a huge number of alternate explanations; this means that the model must
be grounded in a strong set of theoretical expectations (Acock 2013). As such, the researcher
must have a strong and substantive rationale for specifying a particular model over other possible
models. In this set of models, the exogenous variables are the latent variables from the previous
CFA models. In these models the endogenous variable is coalition building, as it is the variable
that I am ultimately trying to explain. The path models in this analysis are recursive, in that the
variables are arranged so that they do not have feedback and the disturbances are assumed to be
uncorrelated (Acock 2013). Additionally, the causal relations in these models are unidirectional
because they specify direct effects from the exogenous latent variables to the endogenous
variable.
The path models in this analysis have been analyzed using an ML estimator, which is a
full information, iterative method. ML estimates maximize the likelihood that the data were
drawn from this population, making it a normal theory because ML estimation assumes that the
population distribution for the endogenous variables is multivariate normal (Acock 2013). There
are some general assumptions of ML: independence of the observations, multivariate normality
of the endogenous variables, independence of the exogenous variables and disturbances, the
exogenous variables are measured without error, and correct specification of the model (Acock
2013). In these models, the path coefficients displayed in the diagrams are interpreted as
regression coefficients and control for correlations among multiple presumed causes (Acock
2013). Standard errors are calculated only for the unstandardized solution which means that
results of statistical tests are available only for the unstandardized solution (Acock 2013).
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Impact of Others

Competition
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.234***

-.043
Fair Treatment

Coalition Building
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-.075

Closeness

Stereotypes

Figure 8. 2004 Path Analysis Diagram: Combined Model
Table 38
Standardized effects of Latent variables on Coalition Building in the 2004 Combined Model
Outcome
Impact → Coalition building
Competition → Coalition
building
Fair Treatment → Coalition
Building
Stereotypes → Coalition
Building
Closeness → Coalition
Building

Direct effect
.287
.234***

Indirect effect
-

Total effect
.287
.234***

-.043

-

-.043

-.075

-

-.075

.043

-

.043

**The significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solution***

In Figure 8 we can see the results for the 2004 combined model path analysis. In this
model, only the path between perceptions of competition to attitudes toward coalition building is
significant. This suggests that perceptions of competition matter more in determining attitudes
toward coalition building than do the other factors. In this model, lower perceptions of fair
treatment and lower perceptions of stereotypes are associated with less support for coalition
building.
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Competition
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Closeness
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Stereotypes
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Figure 9. 2004 Path Analysis Diagram: African-American Model
Table 39
Standardized effects of Latent variables on Coalition Building in the 2004 African-American
Model
Outcome
Impact → Coalition building
Competition → Coalition
building
Fair Treatment → Coalition
Building
Stereotypes → Coalition
Building
Closeness → Coalition
Building

Direct effect
.130
.185**

Indirect effect
-

Total effect
.130
.185**

-.082

-

-.082

.012

-

.012

-.062

-

-.062

**The significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solution***

In Figure 9 the results for the 2004 African-American only path analysis are a bit
different than those of the combined model, but there is still only one significant path, and it is
the same as the above model. What is interesting is that the direction on some of the paths have
changed in this figure from the previous one. In this figure, there is a negative association
between feelings of closeness and coalition buildings, as well as perceptions of fair treatment and
coalition building. There are positive associations between perceptions of the impact of others
and coalition building as well as perceptions of stereotypes and coalition building. This indicates
that these factors function differently for African-Americans when they are separated out from
the combined model.
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Figure 10. 2004 Path Analysis Diagram: Latino Model
Table 40
Standardized effects of Latent variables on Coalition Building in the 2004 Latino Model
Outcome
Direct effect
Indirect effect
Impact → Coalition building
.297
Competition → Coalition
.502***
building
Fair Treatment → Coalition
.074
Building
Stereotypes → Coalition
-.036
Building
Closeness → Coalition
9.36
Building
**The significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solution***

Total effect
.297
.502***
.074
-.036
9.36

In Figure 10 the results are again different when we look at the 2004 Latino only model.
While the path from competition to coalition building is still significant, the only negative path is
from perceptions of stereotypes to coalition building; the rest of the paths are positive. This
suggests that while there are some similarities in the structure of these factors in 2004 between
Latinos and African-Americans, the way that the factors function for each group is different. In
terms of commonality, in all of the 2004 path models perceptions of competition remain the
consistent significant factor. It appears that competition functions similarly for both groups,
however, the remaining factors function differently for each group.
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Table 41
Goodness of fit Statistics for 2004 Path Models
Chi Squared
RMSEA
AIC
BIC
CFI
SRMR

Combined
1066.652
0.057
68671.227
69121.093
0.750
0.061

African-American Only
533.899
0.048
32872.652
33251.925
0.823
0.059

Latino Only
609.584
0.054
34386.838
34761.006
0.739
0.063

In terms of the goodness of fit for the models in 2004, in table 41 we can see that
African-American only model is the best fitting, followed by the Latino only model. This
suggests that we get a clearer picture of the structure of how these factors function when we
disaggregate minority groups. Additionally, these factors fit the African-American sample better,
suggesting that there may be additional variables that would contribute to a better fitting model
for Latinos in 2004.

.296

Impact of Foreigners

.359***

Competition

Coalition Building
.089*
Societal Forces

.111*

Economic Position

Figure 11. 2008 Path Analysis Diagram: Combined Model
Table 42
Standardized effects of Latent variables on Coalition Building in the 2008 Combined Model
Outcome
Impact → Coalition building
Competition → Coalition
building
Economic Position →
Coalition Building
Societal Forces → Coalition
Building

Direct effect
.296
.359***

Indirect effect
-

Total effect
.296
.359***

.089*

-

.089*

.111*

-

.111*

**The significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solution***
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In Figure 11 we can see the results for the 2008 combined model path analysis. In this
model, three out of the four paths are significant, which is very different from all three of the
2004 models. Additionally, all of the paths (significant and non-significant) are positive, which is
also different from the 2008 models. This suggests that something has changed from 2004 to
2008 for these groups which has led to an increased importance of more of the factors.

Impact of
Foreigners

Competition
.360***

.333

Coalition Building

Societal Forces

0.36
.043

Economic Position

Figure 12. 2008 Path Analysis Diagram: African-American Model
Table 43
Standardized effects of Latent variables on Coalition Building in the 2008 African-American
Model
Outcome
Impact → Coalition building
Competition → Coalition
building
Economic Position →
Coalition Building
Societal Forces → Coalition
Building

Direct effect
.333
.360***

Indirect effect
-

Total effect
.333
.360***

.043

-

.043

.036

-

.036

**The significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solution***

In Figure 12 we can see the results from the 2008 African-American only path analysis,
and the results are pretty distinct from those in the combined model. In this model, only the path
from competition to coalition building remains significant although all the paths continue to be
positive. This suggests that there is something distinct about the way these factors function for
African-Americans that is masked in a combined model. This also mirrors the 2004 AfricanAmerican only path model, and suggest again that perceptions of competition greatly influence
attitudes toward competition.
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Table 44
Standardized effects of Latent variables on Coalition Building in the 2008 Latino Model
Outcome
Impact → Coalition building
Competition → Coalition
building
Economic Position →
Coalition Building
Societal Forces → Coalition
Building

Direct effect
.455
.477***

Indirect effect
-

Total effect
.455
.477***

-.118

-

-.118

.051

-

.051

**The significance levels shown here are for the unstandardized solution***

In Figure 13 we see the results from the 2008 Latino only path analysis. Similar to Figure
12, only the path from competition to coalition building is significant. In this model, however,
there is a negative path from perceptions of economic position to attitudes toward coalition
building, which was not present in either of the previous 2008 models. This suggests that while
the same structure applies for each group, the way the structure functions is different for Latinos
than it is for African-Americans in 2008. Additionally, this path model confirms that the finding
of the importance of perceptions of competition influencing attitudes toward competition is not
time bound.

Competition
Impact of Foreigners
.455

.477***

Coalition Building
-.118
.051
Societal Forces
Economic Position

Figure 13. 2008 Path Analysis Diagram: Latino Model
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Table 45
Goodness of fit Statistics for 2008 Path Models
Chi Squared
RMSEA
AIC
BIC
CFI
SRMR

Combined
612.083
0.057
27699.571
28054.462
0.807
0.066

African-American Only
460.050
0.066
12275.305
12557.976
0.771
0.081

Latino Only
392.063
0.051
14729.132
15027.280
0.773
0.065

In terms of the goodness of fit for the models in 2008, in table 45 we can see that Latino
only model is the best fitting, followed by the African-American only model. This suggests that
we get a clearer picture of the structure of how these factors function when we disaggregate
minority groups, but also that time matters. The factors themselves and the structure of the
factors changes from year to year, and it appears that the models do a better job explaining one
group over another dependent both on the structure and time. As opposed to the 2004 models,
the 2008 models suggest that there are additional variables that matter for the African-American
sample that would yield a better fitting model.
Structural Equation Modeling
The final steps to this modeling strategy is to conduct a full structural equation model.
There are several assumptions of structural equation modeling. First, it is assumed that there is a
large sample size (at least 100-200) that will allow the researcher to obtain reliable parameter
estimates. The sample sizes in the data are of adequate size to obtain reliable parameter
estimates. There is also an assumption of multivariate normality and of correct model
specification. The measurement model indicates how observed indicators are linked to
underlying variables while the structural model indicates how the latent variables are linked to
each other (Acock 2013). In a path model the disturbance factors of the endogenous variables
reflect both measurement error and all omitted causes. In a CFA model measurement errors are
moved to the unique variances of the observed indicator variables. In a SEM model measurement
errors are reflected in the measurement model and omitted causes are reflected in the disturbance
factors of the endogenous latent variables.
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Figure 14. 2004 SEM: Combined Model
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Figure 15. 2004 SEM: African-American Model
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In the 2004 combined SEM model (Figure 14) we can see that the latent variables of
competition, fair treatment, and the impact of others all have a positive effect on coalition
building, while perceptions of stereotypes and feelings of closeness with other groups have a
negative effect on coalition building.
In the 2004 African-American only model, (Figure 15) perceptions of competition and
the impact of others still have a positive effect on coalition building, but now perceptions of fair
treatment along with stereotypes and feelings of closeness have negative effects.
In the 2004 Latino only model, (Figure 16) perceptions of fair treatment and perceptions
of closeness have a negative effect on coalition building, while competition, the impact of others,
and stereotypes have a positive effect on coalition building. Through this set of models we can
see that while the structure of the factors remains the same from group to group, the effect of the
factors on coalition building does not. This makes it much more difficult to make generalizations
about minority groups in 2004 and the factors that influence attitudes about coalition building.
Table 46
Goodness of fit Statistics for 2004 SEM Models
Chi Squared
RMSEA
AIC
BIC
CFI
SRMR

Combined
1981.554
0.080
69550.130
69910.022
0.480
0.090

African-American Only
789.002
0.063
33099.755
33418.689
0.679
0.080

Latino Only
824.065
0.065
34575.318
34893.576
0.597
0.076

In general in the 2004 SEM models we can see that overall the African-American model
performs the best out of the three. It has the lowest chi-squared value and the closest values to
the significant parameters for several other goodness of fit indices. The combined model
performs the worst, which indicates that measurements are more stable when the groups are
broken apart instead of analyzed together.
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Figure 17. 2008 SEM: Combined Model
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Figure 18. 2008 SEM: African-American Model
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Figure 19. 2008 SEM: Latino Model
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In the 2008 combined SEM model (Figure 17) we can see that the latent variables of
competition, economic position, and the impact of foreigners all have a positive effect on
coalition building, while societal forces have a negative effect on coalition building. The
relationships and the directions of the relationships remain the same in the 2008 AfricanAmerican only model (Figure 18) and in the 2008 Latino only model (Figure 19). Instead of
different relationship directions as we saw in 2004, in 2008 the relationships mostly remain
stable from group to group. Thus, it is possible to infer relationships that would apply to both
groups in 2008 about the factors that affect attitudes about coalition building.
Table 47
Goodness of fit Statistics for 2008 SEM Models
Chi Squared
RMSEA
AIC
BIC
CFI
SRMR

Combined
1008.140
0.078
28071.629
28374.584
0.618
0.085

African-American Only
618.495
0.083
12413.750
12661.087
0.628
0.098

Latino Only
506.513
0.063
14823.582
15084.461
0.633
0.073

In general in the 2008 SEM models we can see that overall the African-American model
performs the best out of the three. It has the lowest chi-squared value and the closest values to
the significant parameters for several other goodness of fit indices. The combined model
performs the worst, which indicates that measurements are more stable when the groups are
broken apart instead of analyzed together. This is the same result overall regarding model fit as
we saw in the 2004 models.
Conclusion
Although the factor structures used in this chapter are different than those in the
preceding chapters, they offer similar insights. 44 Perhaps the most important finding suggested
by this chapter emphasizes the difference between these two groups. While the structure of the
factors is the same between the two groups, the factors themselves function differently once the

44

I also considered running identical models in both years, but ultimately I decided to retain the models in 2004 that included the
stereotype indicators. As indicated by the previous research, levels of affect and belief in stereotypes are too important to the
overall picture of minority relations to be excluded. While it is unfortunate that they were not included in both data years, it
seems important to use all the information possible, especially when it concerns such an important set of indicators.
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groups are broken apart. While the same “stuff” matters to each group, it matters in different
ways.
Another major finding of this chapter is the consistent effect of perceptions of
competition on attitudes toward coalition building. In all of the path models perceptions of
competition are negatively associated with attitudes toward coalition building, indicating that at a
mass level, it is important to address these perceptions before attempting to form coalitions.
Additionally, this chapter illustrates that the way previous research has thought about
how these different variables fit together may be flawed, and quite different in the real world. In
some cases (like the competition latent variables) the contributing variables fit together the way
we expect them to.45 In other cases (like the societal forces latent variable) the variables that
comprise the latent variable are not often put together in coalition building analyses. This is
potentially problematic, because if these factors are influencing each other in the minds of
respondents and we, as researchers, do not recognize that, we are potentially missing a big part
of the puzzle that we are trying to solve. If the previous research had conceptualized these
variables the way that people in the real world do, we would expect the structure of the factors to
match the sets of limitations (competition, sociological factors, and issues), but that is not what
the factor analysis shows. This indicates that researchers need to ensure that research in this area
actually configures the variables in a way that matches what the public sees.

45

I also ran models with an intervening factor of Competition to see if that would improve model fit. In general, the modified
SEM models did not improve model fit significantly, and as a result I retained the original model structure.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This dissertation has examined what attitudes are likely to contribute to support for
coalition building among African-Americans and Latinos in the United States. It examined what
attitudes that are likely to produce strong coalitions between Latinos and African-Americans, and
what attitudinal barriers stand in the way of potential multiethnic coalitions. This research
examined the three prevalent frameworks at a micro level, and used structural equation modeling
to determine how various variables actually fit together in the real world. In this research I was
able to move from the macro-level findings of the previous research to the micro level to
determine which people (in each group) and then back out to the macro level to find out who is
most likely to allow these limitations to be a barrier to coalition building. Additionally, due to
the structure of the empirical chapters, I was able to demonstrate how these variables work
together in reality through the data, which has significant implications for future research. In this
conclusion I discuss contributions to the research, possible directions of future research, and
discuss both the findings within each set of limitations as well as the big picture findings, and
how they may matter for those who try to form coalitions between these two groups.
Contributions to Research
This research contributes to the literature by providing an understanding of the
underlying attitudes that form the basis of support or opposition to coalition building; by using a
national data set this research is able to draw generalizable conclusions, which is not possible
when using only case studies.
Another contribution of this research is a re-conceptualization of how the various factors
that contribute to attitudes on coalition building fit together. This dissertation began by
identifying the three dominant schools of thought in previous research that are considered to be
limitations to coalition building, and examined each in detail to determine which individuals
would be most likely to allow those things to be a limitation. In the final chapter, however, we
see that the way that actual people think of these groups of attitudes does not match (in total) the
way that research has thought of them. This dissertation offers a different configuration of
variables that may better help to determine which people are more likely to have positive
attitudes toward coalition building, and who is not.
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Competition
The first set of limitations I examined centered on perceptions of competition. In general,
the analyses indicate that Latinos and African-Americans do not see high levels of competition
with each other, which indicates that the limitation of competition is not likely to be a
widespread barrier to coalition building. Additionally, both groups are more likely to perceive
increased competition with Whites, which indicates that this could be a common ground for the
two groups to work together. In this data, the highest perceptions of competition (both political
and economic) occur between African-Americans and Whites and Latinos and Whites, not
between members of the two minority groups. It is important to note that it appears that
perceptions of economic competition among minority groups is more contentious than political
competition.
This research also highlights some specific instances where increased perceptions of
competition are more likely. In this data, it does not appear that there are as significant
perceptions of competition with Whites as previous research would indicate. While AfricanAmericans are more likely to perceive competition than Latinos are, this research indicates that
even within the Black samples there is a significant amount of diversity in these opinions-not all
African-Americans think alike. In terms of perceptions of economic competition with each other,
this research suggests that this is not a widely held view at the individual levels. While men are
more likely to perceive competition, the overall levels of support indicate that it is not all men
who hold this view, but instead a minority in each population. The areas where there are
increased perceptions of competition are not surprising: conservatives, Republicans, and men,
but overall this data indicates that significant portions of each population do not see competition
as a limitation. From this data, the most fruitful foundation for coalition building may be in terms
of pursuing combined political power instead of pursing economic issues.
There seem to be several factors that are significant in decreasing perceptions of
competition between Latinos and African-Americans. First, it appears that education appears to
be a significant force in diminishing perceptions of competition across models and years. In most
cases, people with higher levels of education are less likely to perceive competition with other
groups, which indicates that increasing education levels could be a good way to increase support
for coalition politics. Across spectrums, it seems that education is a liberalizing factor in attitudes
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between Latinos and African-Americans, and also creates economic opportunity across groups.
Additionally, being employed seems to help to mediate perceptions of competition with other
groups in general. It would seem, then, that a good place to begin coalition building efforts
would be to provide people in these populations with more jobs-if being employed helps to
mitigate the perceptions of competition then decreasing the unemployment rates of Latinos and
African-Americans is one way to increase support for coalition building. In many cases,
Republican respondents are less likely to perceive competition with other groups or
discrimination, regardless of the type of competition or the reference group. This indicates that
there is potential for coalitions built on Republican partisanship, which is something that
previous research has not found. This, however, seems unlikely given that there are so few Black
Republicans and that there are significant amounts of the Latino population who do not identify
as Republicans either.
Sociological
The second set of limitations focused on societal forces, such as perceptions of
difference, belief in stereotypes, and prioritizing group membership over overall minority
membership in United States society that could influence attitudes toward coalition building. It
appears that, between Latinos and African-Americans, the effect of contact differs and the
circumstance of the contact affects how that contact affects attitudes toward the other group. One
of the biggest factors seems to be the ability to choose the type of contact (for example: neighbor
vs. friend) in affecting if the contact increases or decreases feelings of closeness with the outgroup. I also find that the more the contact occurs in higher-stakes environments, the more
negative it appears the evaluations of the other group are. This indicates that there is both an ingroup and an out-group factor influencing feelings of closeness between the two groups. One of
the most contentious spaces for contact is at work, and it appears that this is where there is the
most evidence for the racial threat hypothesis instead of the contact hypothesis. It appears that
exposure to the dominant group at work is associated with increased recognition of group
difference in terms of majority and minority for Latinos and African-Americans, while exposure
to other minorities does not have the same effect.
One trend in this section is the importance of feeling invested in the political and social
climate and actually participating in mitigating feelings of racial threat and in increasing
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perceptions of closeness and tolerance. One of the strongest findings is that being active in an
organization that helps minorities is consistently associated with more tolerance. Also higher
levels of participation is repeatedly associated with more tolerance as well. People who are more
invested in the political system are more likely to be more tolerant of others and be more willing
to work with them, which could indicate one way to overcome this limitation-involve more
people in the political system.
The effect of identity overall is less consistent. In general it appears that AfricanAmericans are more willing to work with others, feel closer to others, and see their fate as
intertwined with those of other groups; however, racial identity seems to have a negative impact
for members of both groups. Respondents who have higher levels of racial identity are less likely
to want to work with others. It appears that African-Americans use race and conceptions of
difference as a mobilizing factor for linked fate, while differentiation from other groups serves to
depress conceptions of linked fate among Latinos. Ethnic identity has an effect on perceptions of
other groups as well. The general trend seems to be that where there are significant Latinospecific variables, they are associated with less willingness to work with others and negative outgroup evaluations. Additionally, levels of assimilation seem to matter in terms of attitudes
toward other groups: the general trend is that those Latinos who are less assimilated generally
demonstrate higher levels of in-group favoritism and more negative feelings toward members of
out-groups, with African-Americans experiencing the most negative evaluations.
Issues
The third set of limitations focused on areas of issue agreement and disagreement. It
appears that the type of issue does matter in terms of how much commonality there is between
the two groups, but also that it depends on which factors you look at. It does not appear, from
this data, that differences in issue positions are driven by perceptions of scarcity (as suggested in
the previous research) but that support or opposition of particular issues align with broader
support trends based on ideology and partisanship. Further, there are often similar levels of
support for various issues, but at the individual level it appears that the same variables often
function differently for each group.
In terms of the racialized issue areas, it appears that there is more agreement than there is
disagreement, which is contrary to the findings in previous research. Instead of being
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characterized as zero-sum relationships, it appears that there is a shared recognition among these
two groups of the same structural factors and benefits in this policy area. Even in immigration,
which is commonly conceptualized as the most divisive issue, it appears that these two groups
have similar levels of support. It does not appear, from this data, that there are vast differences in
opinion in racialized policy areas, which is not what I expected.
It appears that more general policies are a better area to attempt coalition building rather
than more racially and ethnically charged policies. Issues like the death penalty did produce
more areas of commonality than did issue areas that are more particularized. For example, free
speech is not an issue area that has particularized benefits, and so the two groups may feel more
comfortable coming together to work on it as there is no perceived loss associated with increased
amounts of free speech. Additionally, I found that in issues related to national security there are
more areas of commonality such as ideology and partisanship.
Both groups seem to value individual effort as a means to achieve success and do not
emphasize potential structural factors that could limit an individual’s success in the United
States. It is intuitive that as members of minority groups Latinos and African-Americans would
be more likely to point to structural factors as responsible for inequality, but that is not what I
found. Instead, there seems to be a continuous thread throughout that respondents largely believe
that success in the United States is based on individual effort and talent, without much
interference of discriminatory structural factors. At the same time, however, there is also a
common conception from each group that individuals should not be subject to arbitrary intrusion
by law enforcement. In general, there seems to be consensus on the protection of individual
rights and liberties across groups and years.
The general trends in the findings seem to be that there are not any areas where there is
unanimous agreement, but there are several areas where a majority of each population agrees.
Thus, no one issue is a panacea for coalition building, but instead there may be several coalitions
comprised of different segments of the population for different issues. In general, it appears that
the most promising area for coalitions is not necessarily issue based but instead based in
ideology, with an emphasis on coalition building between the more conservative segments of
each population, which are largely minorities in their own groups.
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The Grand Finale…How Does It All Work?
Finally, after examining each set of limitations at the individual level, I used structural
equation modeling to determine two things. First, I wanted to see how the three sets of
limitations compared against each other in terms of relation to attitudes about coalition building
and explanatory power, and second, I wanted to determine if the respondents saw the variables
fitting together in the same ways as the previous research had conceptualized them. One of the
main findings serves, in a way, to reinforce some of the findings from the previous chapters:
while the same variables matter for both groups in predicting attitudes about coalition building,
they matter and function in different ways. This final set of analyses allowed me to step back out
to the larger picture.
In the confirmatory factor analyses I ran I determined several things. First, I found
evidence of different correlation patterns in all three of the 2004 models, which indicates that the
way that different variables interact and influence each other happens in different ways for each
of the groups. What I found was that there are different configurations for each groups,
indicating that it is difficult to apply broad generalizations about coalition building to distinct
minority groups. What this modeling strategy allowed for was to determine how the respondents
themselves view the various “pieces” of the puzzle fitting together. Second, the findings of the
2008 models were more consistent than the 2004 models, especially in terms of correlations of
competition. Overall, it appears that it is closeness to other groups that matters, not feelings of
closeness to one specific group. Additionally, it makes one wonder what changed from 2004 to
2008 that caused the closeness correlation to be present for both groups.
The path models also helped to confirm some of the findings from the confirmatory
factor analyses. The one consistent finding in the path models is the effect of perceptions of
competition on attitudes toward coalition building. This was consistent across groups and years,
and suggests that it is something that must be addressed before coalition building will be
successful. Aside from the effect of competition, the path models suggest that while there are
some similarities in the structure of these factors between Latinos and Blacks, the way that the
factors function for each group is different in both years.
In terms of the 2004 SEM models, there are some differences of note. In all three models,
the latent variables of competition and the impact of others have a positive effect on coalition
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building. Once the groups are separated out, however, perceptions of fair treatment along with
stereotypes and feelings of closeness have negative effects on coalition building. In the 2004
models the factor “Impact of Others” has the most substantial effect on attitudes toward coalition
building, followed by “perceptions of competition” and “Feelings of closeness”. The effects of
the factors of “Fair Treatment” and “Stereotypes” are much smaller compared with the other
factors. These patterns hold for all three groups. Through this set of models we can see that while
the structure of the factors remains the same from group to group, the effect of the factors on
coalition building does not. This makes it much more difficult to make generalizations about
minority groups in 2004 and the factors that influence attitudes about coalition building.
In all three of the 2008 SEM models I find that the latent variables of competition,
economic position, and the impact of foreigners all have a positive effect on coalition building,
while societal forces have a negative effect on coalition building. Instead of different relationship
directions as we saw in 2004, in 2008 the relationships mostly remain stable from group to
group. What does change, however, is which factor has the strongest effect on attitudes about
coalition building for each group. In the Black model “Impact of Foreigners” has the greatest
effect on attitudes toward coalition building, followed by “Societal Forces”, “Competition”, and
“Economic Position.” In the Latino model “Competition” has the greatest effect on attitudes
toward coalition building, followed by “Economic Position,” “Impact of Foreigners,” and
“Economic Position.” This is indicative of different views of coalition building in each group in
2008, and indicates that Latinos more often allow perceptions of competition to be a limitation,
while Blacks are more likely to allow the impact of others to be a limitation
Perhaps the most important finding suggested by this analysis emphasizes the difference
between these two groups. While the structure of the factors is the same between the two groups,
the factors themselves function differently once the groups are broken apart. While the same
“stuff” matters to each group, it matters in different ways. Additionally, this analysis illustrates
that the way previous research has thought about how these different variables fit together may
be flawed, and quite different in the real world. In some cases (like the competition latent
variables) the contributing variables fit together the way we expect them to. In other cases (like
the societal forces latent variable) the variables that comprise the latent variable are not often put
together in coalition building analyses. This is potentially problematic, because if these factors
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are influencing each other in the minds of respondents and we, as researchers, do not recognize
that, we are potentially missing a big part of the puzzle that we are trying to solve.
Future Research
In future research it would be interesting to analyze the role that Whites play in the larger
context of coalition building, and how attitudes about Whites affect minority perceptions of
coalition importance and viability. Although it is likely that Whites play a role in maintaining
existing political power structures, it is beyond the scope of this research to analyze that as well
as minority attitudes. Another interesting avenue of future research would be to find out if
attitudes among elites toward coalition building mirror those trends that I have identified at the
mass level. Finally, future research should examine actual events where coalition building
occurs, and use attitudinal research as the building blocks through which to conduct the research.
In many of the chapters, Dominicans are outliers within the Latino sample. There are
several potential reasons for that. One reason that Dominicans are an outlier in this study in
various instances may be reflective of their overall position both within wider society and with
Latino society. While most Latinos and African-Americans live in segregated urban
neighborhoods (45% of each population, respectively) with high levels of poverty, pollution,
gangs and crime, Dominicans suffer the highest levels of residential segregation of all Latino
groups (Malave and Giordani 2015). It does not appear that the number of Dominicans (2004:
51; 2008: 16) compared with the number of other respondents in each group (2004: Mexican472, Cuban-56, Panamanian-4; 2008: Mexican-283, Cuban-10, Panamanian-2) are skewing the
results of the data. Future research should examine Dominicans in detail to determine why their
attitudes differ so significantly from other Latino populations.
What did we learn? So what’s the answer? Why don’t they form coalitions?
While it true that neither group is monolithic, this research has identified some general
trends that are applicable to predicting which attitudes are important in future analyses of
coalition building. For those who would attempt to build coalitions between these two groups,
there are some important takeaways to keep in mind. One important finding of this dissertation is
the effect of the diverse experiences not only of both groups, but also of the subgroups within
each group that contribute to various attitudes on coalition building. While it is true that not all of
each group will allow the limitations to be a barrier to coalition building, there are segments that
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will, and often those segments differ based on the category of limitation. While it can be
painstaking to separate these groups out into smaller subgroups, this research points out that it is
not only fruitful, but in many cases necessary. In order to understand the attitudes that may or
may not contribute to coalition building, research needs to recognize that there are distinct
subgroups within these larger populations. There are real differences not only in the Latino
population (by ethnic identity), but also in the Black population. What this means is that in order
to build coalitions, it is important to identify those subgroups of African-Americans and Latinos
who would be most sympathetic to that action.
One of the most fruitful areas for coalition building this research identified is among
those who have higher levels of education and who are employed. Increased education
consistently is associated with more tolerant points of view, increased recognition of structural
factors that can influence minority success, and greater issue agreement. One prescription, then,
for people who try to form coalition between these two groups, is to focus on those with higher
levels of education and to attempt to increase the overall levels of education for members of
these groups. Additionally, people who are employed overall seem to be more willing to work
with members of other groups, evaluate them more positively, perceive less competition, and be
more likely to align on issues. It may be that one way to pursue coalition building among these
two groups is by economically elevating both populations, instead of focusing on specific
subpopulations of both groups that may be more supportive of coalition efforts. By identifying
these portions of each population potential coalition builders would likely have the most success.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FROM NATIONAL POLITICS STUDY
Chapter 3 Variables
Perceptions of economic influence relative to other groups: Please indicate how much you
agree with the following statements: More good jobs for Whites means fewer good jobs for
people like me, More good jobs for Black means fewer good jobs for people like me, More good
jobs for Latinos means fewer good jobs for people like me. (2004; 2008)
Perceptions of political influence relative to other groups: Please indicate how much you
agree with the following statements: The more influence Whites have in politics, the less
influence people like me will have in politics; The more influence Black have in politics, the less
influence people like me will have in politics; The more influence Latinos have in politics, the
less influence people like me will have in politics. (2004; 2008)
Threat of immigrants: Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statements: Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in America. Do you strongly
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Positive Immigrant: Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following
statement: Immigrants make America more open to new ideas and cultures. Do you strongly
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
English as Official Language: Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statement: English should be the official language of this country. Do you strongly
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Discrimination: Now I would like to ask you about how much discrimination or unfair
treatment you think different groups face in the U.S. Do you think that (Whites/Black/Latinos)
face a lot of discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all? (2004; 2008)
Now I would like to ask about YOU. How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think
YOU have faced in the U.S because of your ethnicity or race? Do you face a lot of
discrimination, some, a little, or no discrimination at all? (2004; 2008)
Unfair treatment of racial group: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following
statements: American society just hasn’t dealt fairly with people from my background. Do you
strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Concerns of personal job security: How worried are you about losing your job in the near
future? A lot, somewhat, or not at all? (2004; 2008)
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Chapter 4 Variables
Linked fate: Do you think what happens generally to (R race) people in this country will have
something to do with what happens in your life? Will it affect you a lot, some or not very much?
(2004; 2008)
Environmental racial/ethnic composition: How would you describe the ethnic mix of the place
where you (work/last worked)? Would you say mostly White, mostly black, mostly Latino, or
mixed? (2004; 2008)
How would you describe the ethnic mix of your current neighborhood where you live? Would
you say it is mostly White, mostly black, mostly Latino, mostly Asian, or mixed? (2004; 2008)
How would you describe the ethnic mix of your group of friends? Would you say your friends
are mostly White, mostly black, mostly Latino, mostly Asian, or mixed? (2004; 2008)
How would you describe the ethnic mix of your place of worship? Would you say mostly White,
mostly black, mostly Latino, mostly Asian, or mixed? (2004; 2008)
Closeness to other racial/ethnic groups: Now I have some more questions about different
groups in our society. How close do you feel to each of the following groups of people
(White/Black/Latinos) in your ideas, interests and feelings about things? Very close, fairly close,
not too close, or not close at all? (2004; 2008)
Participation in organization that helps minorities: In the past 12 months have you done any
of the following: participated in any groups or organizations, including your place of worship,
that are working to improve the conditions of racial or ethnic minorities? (2004; 2008)
Importance of working together to help group position: Please indicate whether you strongly
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: It
is important for people to work together to improve the position of their racial or ethnic group.
(2004; 2008)
Stereotypes: I have some more questions about different groups in our society. Imagine a sevenpoint scale on which the characteristics of the people in a group can be rated. In the first question
a score of 1 means that you think almost all the people in that group tend to be ‘LAZY.’ A score
of 7 means that you think that most people in the group are ‘HARDWORKING.’ A score of 4
means that you think most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of
course, you may choose any number in between. (2004)
Where would you rate (Whites/Black/Latinos) in general on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates
lazy, 7 means hardworking, and 4 indicates most Whites are not closer to one end or the other?
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Cultural maintenance: Some people believe that it is better for American if different racial and
ethnic groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others believe that it is better if groups change so
that they blend into the larger society. Which one do you believe? (2004; 2008)
Identification with race or ethnicity: Which would you say is more important to you-being
American, being (R race), or are both equally important to you? (2004; 2008)
Which would you say is more important to you-being (Latino/Asian), being (R
ethnicity/nationality), or are both equally important to you? (2004; 2008)
Chapter 5 Variables
Trust in police: How much of the time do you think you can trust the following institution: the
police? Just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or never? (2004; 2008)
Minorities responsible for their own fate: If racial and ethnic minorities don’t do well in life
they have no one to blame but themselves. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Equality of opportunity: It is not really that big of a problem if some people have more of a
chance in life than others. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or
strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Free speech: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements: Free speech
should be allowed for all political groups, even if insulting to some people? Do you strongly
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Terrorist imprisonment: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements:
The government should be able to imprison a non-citizen as long as they see fit if that person is
suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree,
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Racial Profiling: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements: Law
enforcement should be able to stop or arrest people of certain racial or ethnic backgrounds if they
are thought to be more likely to commit crimes? Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree,
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Affirmative Action: How strongly do you favor or oppose preferential hiring and promotion?
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Death penalty: How strongly do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of
murder? Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed
to it? (2004; 2008)
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Gender equality: Recently there has been a lot of talk about women’s right. Some people feel
that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government.
Others feel that a woman’s place is in the home. Which is closer to the way you feel: men and
women should have equal roles, or a woman’s place is in the home? (2004; 2008)
Positions on immigration: Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who
are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same
as it is now? (2004; 2008)
The Iraq war: Do you think the U.S. did the right thing in sending military forces to Iraq or
should the U.S. have stayed out? (2004; 2008)
Gay marriage: Which of the following statements comes closest to your view concerning samesex couples? Be allowed to marry, be allowed to legally form civil unions but not marry, not be
allowed to marry or form civil unions. (2004; 2008)
American work ethic: America is a land of opportunity in which you only need to work hard to
succeed. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?
(2004; 2008)
Chapter 6 Variables
Support for coalition building: The problems of Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans are too
different for them to be political allies or partners. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree,
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Control Variables
Ideology: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. When it comes to
politics, do you usually think of yourself as liberal or conservative? (2004; 2008)
Gender: Are you male or female? (2004; 2008)
Age: What is the month, day, and year of your birth? (2004; 2008)
Working status: Are you working now full or part time, temporarily laid off, unemployed, on
maternity or sick leave, retired, a homemaker, a student, are you permanently disabled, or
something else? (2004; 2008)
Marital status: Are you currently married, living with a partner, separated, divorced, widowed,
or have you never been married? (2004; 2008)
Income: To get a picture of people’s financial situation we need to know the general range of
income of all people we interview. Thinking about you and your family’s total income from all
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sources, how much did you and all the members of your family living with you receive in the
year 2003/2007 before taxes? (2004; 2008)
Education: What is the highest grade or level of school that you have completed? (2004; 2008)
Primary language: Do you speak a language other than English? (2004; 2008)
Electoral activities: Next, I would like to find out some of the things people do to help a party
or candidate win an election. First, have you ever worked for a political party or campaigned for
a political candidate? Now, thinking about this past election year: Did you talk to any people and
try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates? Did you
talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or
candidates? Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in
support of a particular candidate? Did you give or help raise money for any of the candidates?
Did you help campaign for a racial minority candidate? (2004; 2008)
Voting: In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to
vote because they aren’t registered, they are sick, or they just don’t have time. How about you(will/did) you vote in the elections this November? (2004; 2008)
Political efficacy: Please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: I don’t think public officials care
much about what people like me think. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree, or strongly disagree? (2004; 2008)
Level of political trust: How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in
Washington? Just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or never? (2004; 2008)
Partisanship: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a republican, a democrat,
an independent, or something else? (2004; 2008)
Race: 5 categories: White, African American, Latino, Asian, and Caribbean (2004; 2008)
Religiosity: How religious would you say you are-very religious, fairly religious, not too
religious, or not religious at all? (2004; 2008)
Foreign born: Were you born in the United States or in another country? (2004; 2008)
Latino ethnicity: Four categories: Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, and Panamanian (2004; 2008)
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER SIX ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Table A1: EFA 2004 (Unrotated): Principle Factors; Factor Analysis/Correlation with Minimum
Eigenvalues of 1 (Full Sample)
Factor
Eigenvalue
Difference
Factor 1
3.85664
0.82606
Factor 2
3.03058
1.10617
Factor 3
1.92441
0.71904
Factor 4
1.20536
0.12613
Factor 5
1.07924
0.26911
Factor 6
0.81013
0.05096
Factor 7
0.75917
0.11484
Factor 8
0.64434
0.01659
Factor 9
0.62774
0.07175
Factor 10
0.55600
0.09159
Factor 11
0.46441
0.02384
Factor 12
0.44057
0.10770
Factor 13
0.33286
0.02323
Factor 14
0.30963
0.04753
Factor 15
0.26210
0.01824
Factor 16
0.24836
0.03366
Factor 17
0.21020
0.01650
Factor 18
0.19371
0.04781
Factor 19
0.14590
0.05763
Factor 20
0.08827
0.00453
Factor 21
0.08373
0.04064
Factor 22
0.04309
0.01842
Factor 23
0.02467
0.04219
Factor 24
-0.01752
0.00081
Factor 25
-0.01834
0.03875
Factor 26
-0.05709
0.01429
Factor 27
-0.07138
0.02519
Factor 28
-0.09657
0.00754
Factor 29
-0.10410
0.01545
Factor 30
-0.11955
0.02340
Factor 31
-0.14295
0.03113
Factor 32
-0.17408
0.00714
Factor 33
-0.18122
0.02025
Factor 34
-0.20147
0.01259
Factor 35
-0.21406
0.01290
Factor 36
-0.22696
0.03257
Factor 37
-0.25953
0.01381
Factor 38
-0.27334
0.01615
Factor 39
-0.28949
0.01644
Factor 40
-0.30593
0.01832
Factor 41
-0.32425
0.03283
Factor 42
-0.35708
.
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2 (861) = 3441.84 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
N = 343; Retained Factors = 5; Number of parameters = 200
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Proportion
0.2774
0.2180
0.1384
0.0867
0.0776
0.0583
0.0546
0.0463
0.0452
0.0400
0.0334
0.0317
0.0239
0.0223
0.0189
0.0175
0.0151
0.0139
0.0105
0.0063
0.0060
0.0031
0.0018
-0.0013
-0.0013
-0.0041
-0.0051
-0.0069
-0.0075
-0.0086
-0.0103
-0.0125
-0.0130
-0.0145
-0.0154
-0.0163
-0.0187
-0.0197
-0.0208
-0.0220
-0.0233
-0.0257

Cumulative
0.2774
0.4954
0.6339
0.7206
0.7982
0.7982
0.8565
0.9111
0.9574
1.0026
1.0426
1.0760
1.1077
1.1316
1.1539
1.1727
1.1903
1.2054
1.2193
1.2298
1.2362
1.2422
1.2453
1.2471
1.2458
1.2445
1.2353
1.2283
1.2208
1.2122
1.2019
1.1894
1.1764
1.1619
1.1465
1.1302
1.1115
1.0918
1.0710
1.0490
1.0257
1.0000

Table A2: 2004 EFA (full sample) with specified eigenvalues-rotated46
Factor
Variance
Difference
Factor 1
3.05406
0.25874
Factor 2
2.79532
0.97235
Factor 3
1.82297
0.06539
Factor 4
1.75758
0.09129
Factor 5
1.66629
.
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2 (861) = 3441.84 Prob>chi2 =0.0000
Variable
White Discrimination
Black Discrimination
Latino Discrimination
Personal Discrimination
Group Treatment
Pro-Immigration
Immigrants Take Jobs
Immigrants Make America Better
Pro-English
Better National Economic Position
Better Racial Economic Position
White Economic Competition
Black Economic Competition
Latino Economic Competition
White Political Competition
Black Political Competition
Latino Political Competition
Fear of Job Loss
Importance of Working Together
Linked Fate
Closeness to Whites
Closeness to Blacks
Closeness to Latinos
White Stereotypes
Black Stereotypes
Latino Stereotypes
Pro-war
Pro-Gay Marriage
Increase Education Spending
Increase Defense Spending
Increase Social Security Spending
Increase Border Spending
Pro-Affirmative Action
Pro-Death Penalty
Pro-Racial Profiling
Terrorism
Pro-Free Speech
American Work Ethic
Equal Opportunity
Minority Position
Same Race Leaders
Trust in Police

Factor 1
-0.0201
-0.1672
-0.3033
-0.0318
0.1310
0.1009
0.0431
-0.0337
0.0946
0.0989
0.0728
0.4937
0.6512
0.7256
0.4666
0.7807
0.8014
0.0921
0.1644
0.0938
-0.0582
-0.0588
-0.0476
0.1130
-0.1271
-0.0514
-0.0594
-0.0589
-0.0006
0.0195
0.0737
0.0363
0.0004
-0.0105
0.1382
0.0471
-0.0352
0.1110
0.1001
0.1023
0.2427
-0.0349

Factor 2
-0.0545
-0.4719
-0.3999
-0.4261
-0.4699
-0.1102
-0.0074
0.0016
0.2555
0.4288
0.2633
-0.4383
-0.0783
-0.1082
-0.2767
0.1723
0.0806
-0.0853
-0.0715
-0.1886
0.3877
-0.1229
0.0375
0.1535
-0.0988
-0.0396
0.3487
-0.1228
-0.2112
0.0169
-0.2925
0.0894
-0.2385
0.2329
0.3051
0.2377
-0.0595
0.3110
0.4207
0.2463
-0.0521
0.4773

46

Proportion
0.2197
0.2011
0.1311
0.1264
0.1199

Factor 3
0.2968
-0.2016
-0.1518
-0.0185
-0.0393
-0.1562
0.3034
-0.3077
0.0241
0.1788
0.0699
0.0650
0.2503
0.3134
-0.2628
-0.1336
-0.1199
-0.0393
-0.0254
-0.2124
0.1177
0.1180
-0.0105
-0.0382
-0.0428
-0.0353
0.3855
-0.2024
0.1266
0.4816
0.1161
0.2123
-0.0196
0.1630
0.3936
0.5174
0.0382
0.1933
0.0914
0.2720
-0.0825
0.0328

Cumulative
0.2197
0.4208
0.5519
0.6783
0.7982
Factor 4
0.0017
0.1771
0.0778
0.0026
0.0033
-0.0651
0.1647
-0.1743
0.0855
-0.0704
-0.0394
0.0527
0.0626
0.0188
0.1075
-0.1443
-0.0621
-0.0322
0.0471
-0.1996
-0.1039
0.3826
0.2257
0.4373
0.7304
0.5718
-0.1117
-0.0271
0.1594
-0.0573
0.2559
-0.0108
0.2258
-0.2133
-0.2446
-0.0241
0.1000
0.0351
-0.0776
-0.0874
-0.0935
-0.0212

Factor 5
0.1720
0.0376
0.0648
0.1690
0.2688
0.2083
-0.2487
0.1580
-0.2910
0.0624
0.0843
0.0809
-0.0711
-0.0478
0.0310
-0.0168
0.0226
0.1722
0.2821
0.2300
0.3070
0.5483
0.6539
-0.0271
0.1638
0.1337
0.0686
0.1496
0.1894
0.1557
0.2459
-0.0877
0.1982
-0.1649
0.0486
0.0248
0.0189
-0.1062
0.0300
-0.0957
0.1040
0.0386

Uniqueness
0.8789
0.6759
0.7148
0.7885
0.6882
0.9057
0.8171
0.8488
0.8332
0.7655
0.9118
0.5506
0.4982
0.3610
0.6242
0.3218
0.3326
0.9520
0.8854
0.8177
0.7274
0.5205
0.5177
0.7702
0.4120
0.6497
0.7091
0.9174
0.8781
0.7398
0.7696
0.9378
0.8525
0.8464
0.6707
0.6724
0.9834
0.8411
0.7977
0.8381
0.9120
0.7680

There were several previous iterations of the 2004 EFA, but in order to come as close to a simple structure as possible with the
most concise number of factors only the final rotation is presented here.
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Table A3: Factor Rotation Matrix
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5

Factor 1
0.2884
0.9453
-0.0140
-0.0202
0.1506

Factor 2
0.7354
-0.3053
0.1825
0.1788
0.5484

Factor 3
0.4000
-0.0125
0.5881
-0.2310
-0.6638

Factor 4
-0.3590
0.0290
0.5762
-0.5504
0.4851

Factor 5
-0.2952
0.1109
0.5373
0.7819
0.0239

Table A4: EFA 2008 (Unrotated): Principle Factors; Factor Analysis/Correlation with Minimum
Eigenvalues of 1 (Full Sample)
Factor
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5
Factor 6
Factor 7
Factor 8
Factor 9
Factor 10
Factor 11
Factor 12
Factor 13
Factor 14
Factor 15
Factor 16
Factor 17
Factor 18
Factor 19
Factor 20
Factor 21

Eigenvalue
3.23878
2.02409
1.73790
1.16988
0.77850
0.75991
0.70705
0.64016
0.48642
0.46937
0.37996
0.33700
0.31032
0.26882
0.20528
0.12521
0.10603
0.09699
0.06702
0.05174
0.02618

Difference
1.21470
0.28619
0.56802
0.39137
0.01859
0.05286
0.06689
0.15373
0.01705
0.08941
0.04296
0.02668
0.04150
0.06354
0.08006
0.01919
0.00903
0.02998
0.01528
0.02556
0.02548
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Proportion
0.2989
0.1868
0.1604
0.1080
0.0718
0.0701
0.0653
0.0591
0.0449
0.0433
0.0351
0.0311
0.0286
0.0248
0.0189
0.0116
0.0098
0.0090
0.0062
0.0048
0.0024

Cumulative
0.2989
0.4857
0.6461
0.7540
0.8259
0.8960
0.9613
1.0203
1.0652
1.1085
1.1436
1.1747
1.2033
1.2282
1.2471
1.2587
1.2684
1.2774
1.2836
1.2884
1.2908

Factor 22
Factor 23
Factor 24
Factor 25
Factor 26
Factor 27
Factor 28
Factor 29
Factor 30
Factor 31
Factor 32
Factor 33
Factor 34
Factor 35
Factor 36
Factor 37

0.00070
-0.03768
-0.06525
-0.08297
-0.10918
-0.14443
-0.15380
-0.21212
-0.21666
-0.24260
-0.26754
-0.28562
-0.30219
-0.32568
-0.32754
-0.37818

0.03838
0.02757
0.01772
0.02621
0.03525
0.00938
0.05832
0.00454
0.02594
0.02493
0.01808
0.01658
0.02348
0.00186
0.05065
.

0.0001
-0.0035
-0.0060
-0.0077
-0.0101
-0.0133
-0.0142
-0.0196
-0.0200
-0.0224
-0.0247
-0.0264
-0.0279
-0.0301
-0.0302
-0.0349

1.2908
1.2874
1.2813
1.2737
1.2636
1.2503
1.2361
1.2165
1.1965
1.1741
1.1494
1.1231
1.0952
1.0651
1.0349
1.0000

LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2 (666) = 1839.45 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
N = 262; Retained Factors = 4; Number of parameters = 142

Table A5: 2008 EFA (full sample) with specified eigenvalues-rotated47
Factor
Variance
Difference
Proportion
Factor 1
2.66476
0.14154
0.2459
Factor 2
2.52322
0.74711
0.2329
Factor 3
1.77612
0.56957
0.1639
Factor 4
1.20654
.
0.1113
LR Test: independent vs. saturated: chi2 (666) = 1839.45 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Variable
White Discrimination
Black Discrimination
Latino Discrimination
Personal Discrimination
Group Treatment
Pro-Immigration
Immigrants Take Jobs
Immigrants Make America Better
Pro-English
Better National Economic Position
Better Racial Economic Position
White Economic Competition
Economic Competition with Other Group
White Political Competition
Political Competition with Other Group
Fear of Job Loss
Importance of Working Together
Linked Fate
Closeness to Whites
Closeness to Blacks
Closeness to Latinos
Pro-war
Pro-Gay Marriage
Increase Education Spending
Increase Defense Spending

Factor 1
-0.0729
0.5922
0.3603
0.4478
0.4407
-0.0170
0.2400
-0.0033
0.0547
-0.0011
-0.0189
0.1218
0.0759
0.1322
-0.0677
-0.0157
0.2347
0.3508
-0.1127
0.4460
-0.1131
-0.4592
0.1301
0.1388
-0.2265

Factor 2
-0.0774
0.1584
0.2443
0.1455
0.2589
0.0272
0.2357
-0.1155
-0.0111
0.0071
-0.0694
0.6380
0.6910
0.6599
0.7137
0.1489
0.1329
0.1583
-0.1121
0.0399
0.0782
-0.0614
0.0065
0.1526
0.0775

47

Factor 3
0.2338
0.1447
-0.2640
0.0613
0.1024
-0.2306
0.5295
-0.1825
0.4281
0.0221
0.0586
0.1414
0.1470
-0.1330
-0.0349
-0.0888
-0.0186
0.0290
-0.1151
0.2273
-0.4166
0.1373
-0.2243
-0.1807
0.1699

Cumulative
0.2459
0.4788
0.6427
0.7540
Factor 4
0.2160
-0.0524
-0.0522
-0.0233
0.0407
-0.0443
0.0001
0.1236
-0.0347
0.4909
0.4457
-0.0531
0.1174
-0.1486
-0.0132
-0.0068
-0.0121
-0.0426
0.5163
0.3299
0.2342
0.0980
0.1160
-0.0638
0.1257

Uniqueness
0.8874
0.6005
0.7381
0.7740
0.7266
0.9438
0.6065
0.9381
0.8124
0.7585
0.7928
0.5553
0.4814
0.5073
0.4846
0.9697
0.9268
0.8493
0.6949
0.6389
0.7527
0.7570
0.9193
0.9207
0.8980

There were several previous iterations of the 2008 EFA, but in order to come as close to a simple structure as possible with the
most concise number of factors only the final rotation is presented here.
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Increase Social Security Spending
Increase Border Spending
Pro-Affirmative Action
Pro-Death Penalty
Pro-Racial Profiling
Terrorism
Pro-Free Speech
American Work Ethic
Equal Opportunity
Minority Position
Same Race Leaders
Trust in Police

0.1038
0.0064
0.1740
-0.2779
-0.3640
-0.2749
0.0092
-0.5121
-0.3283
-0.3666
-0.0440
-0.3824

0.1454
0.0017
0.1065
0.1312
0.1443
0.1192
0.0971
0.0008
0.1299
0.0380
0.4545
-0.0555

0.0574
0.5494
-0.2446
0.1787
0.0789
0.3246
0.0819
0.0079
-0.1408
0.1408
-0.0639
-0.2545

0.0182
0.0963
0.1733
0.0185
0.0761
-0.0736
0.2576
0.0072
0.2105
0.1133
0.0372
0.0633

Table A6: Factor Rotation Matrix
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4

Factor 1
0.7381
-0.6549
0.0508
0.1541

Factor 2
0.6524
0.7156
-0.2497
-0.0012

Factor 3
0.1362
0.2126
0.9653
-0.0670
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Factor 4
-0.1054
0.1177
0.0573
0.9858

0.9645
0.6888
0.8685
0.8733
0.8347
0.7994
0.9174
0.7376
0.8112
0.8315
0.7861
0.7819

Table A7: Unstandardized Loadings (U) (Standard Errors) and Standardized Loadings (S) for 5
factor CFA for the 2004 Combined Model48
U

U

S

Immigrant
s-negative

1 (-)***

Immigrant
s-positive
Pro-War

-.226
(.122)*
-.916
(.116)*
**
-.596
(.094)*
**
-1.31
(.215)*
**
-.993
(.208)*
**

.241
(.024)*
**
-.075
(.040)*
-.570
(.041)*
**
-.349
(.038)*
**
-.340
(.039)*
**
-.242
(.041)*
**

Loadings
White jobs

Combined
jobs
White
politics
Combined
politics
Black
discrim.
Latino
discrim.
Personal
discrim.
Group
Treatment
National
econ.pos.
White
closeness
Equal
opportune.
Police trust

1 (-)***
1.22
(.094)**
*
1.35
(.109)**
*
.905
(.057)**
*

S

U

S

1 (--)***

.460
(.032)***
.215
(.038)***
.459
(0.33)***
.520
(.031)***
-.278
(.035) ***
-.290
(.035)***
-.245
(.036)***
-.445
(.033)***

S

1(--)***

.403
(.024)***
1 (.061)***

.578
(.026)**
*
.760
(.030)**
*
.777
(.031)**
*
.777
(.031)**
*

.447
(.076)***
1.21
(.131)***
1.50
(.151)***
-.273
(.042)***
-.681
(.100)***
-.754
(.127)***
-1.04
(.120)***

Increase
defense
spending
Racial
Profiling
Terrorism

White
stereotypes
Black
stereotypes
Latino
stereotypes

48

U

2.54
(.276)***
.740
(.068)***

Dashes (--) indicate the standard error was not estimated.
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.322
(.028)***

U

S

Black
closeness
Latino
closeness
Variances
e.whitejob
e.combine
djobs
e.whitepol
e.combine
dpol
e.blackdisc
rim
e.hispdiscr
im
e.personal
discrim
e.grouptx
e.ntnlecon
post
e.whiteclos
eness
e.equalopp
e.policetru
st
e.negimmi
grant
e.posimmi
grant
e.prowar
e.increased
efense
e.racialpro
filing
e.terrorism
e.whitester
eo
e.blackster
eo
e.hispstere
o
e.blackclos
eness
e.hispclose
ness
COMPETI
TION
FAIRTX
IMPACTO
FOTHERS
STEREOT
YPES
CLOSENE
SS
Covariance
s
e.combine
djobs X
e.whitepol

1 (--)***

.855
.467

.665
.421

.516
.726

.395
.673

.429

1.00

.131
.079

1.00
1.00

.386

1.00

.008

1.00

-.339

-.812

.490

.788

.539

.728

.757

.922

.803
.117

.915
.939

.663

.801

1.17
.585

.941
.994
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1.28

.941

.719

.994

.138
.203

.674
.877

1.05

.884

1.26

.941
1.98

.837

2.09

8.37

1.82

.895

-.338
(.075)***

.098
(.401)
-.037
(.153)

.870

.990

.711

.998

e.blackdisc .159
.310
rim X
e.hispdiscr
im
e.racialpro
.228
.198
file X
e.terrorism
e.whitester .487
.256
eo X
e.hispstere
o
COMPETI .079
.335
TION X
FAIRTX
COMPETI .025
.140
TION X
IMPACTO
FOTHERS
COMPETI -.018
-.046
TION X
STEREOT
YPES
COMPETI .020
.335
TION X
CLOSENE
SS
FAIRTX
.071
.697
X
IMPACTO
FOTHERS
FAIRTX
.037
.166
X
STEREOT
YPES
FAIRTX
.121
3.61
X
CLOSENE
SS
IMPACTO .023
.133
FOTHERS
X
STEREOT
YPES
IMPACTO .095
3.64
FOTHERS
X
CLOSENE
SS
STEREOT .156
2.72
YPES X
CLOSENE
SS
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001; N = 1106
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Table A8: Unstandardized Loadings (U) (Standard Errors) and Standardized Loadings (S) for 5
factor CFA for the 2004 Black Model49
U

S

White
stereotype

1 (-)***

Black
stereotype

1.27
(.154)
***

.569
(.04
2)*
**
.749
(.04
5)*
**

White
jobs
Latino
jobs
White
politics
Latino
politics
Black
discrim.
Latino
discrim.
Personal
discrim.
Group
Treatment
National
economic
position
White
closeness
Equal
oppor.
Police
trust
Immigrant
s-negative
Immigrant
s-positive
Pro-War

U
1 (--)***

1.11
(.125)**
*
1.28
(.140)**
*
.858
(.082)**
*

S
.582
(.037)**
*
.665
(.044)**
*
.745
(.041)**
*
.558
(.034)**
*

U

S

1 (--)***
.712
(.109)***
1.59
(.195)***
1.56
(.202)***
-.162
(.048)***

.503
(.043)***
.318
(.050)***
.576
(.042)***
.570
(.041)***
-.184
(.050)***

-.625
(.143)***
-.849
(.191)***
-.667
(.127)***

-.246
(.050)***
-.251
(.049)***
-.314
(.048)***

Increase
defense
Racial
Profiling
Terrorism

U

S

1 (--)***

.306
(.053)***
-.324
(.053)***
.235
(.054)***
.366
(.051)***
.547
(.048)***
.519
(.049)***

-.835
(.194)***
.245
(.077)**
.478
(.113)***
1.54
(.332)***
1.69
(.354)***

* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001; N = 554

49

Dashes (--) indicate the standard error was not estimated.

184

U

S

Latino
stereotype

.997
(.110)
***

.605
(.04
2)*
**

Black
closeness

1 (-)***

Latino
closeness

.598
(.213
)**

.848
(.148)*
**
.436
(.083)*
**

.144

.280

.562

.809

Variances
e.whitejob
s
e.hispjobs
e.whitepol
e.hisppol
e.blackdis
crim
e.hispdisc
rim
e.personal
discrim
e.grouptx
e.ntnlecon
post
e.whiteclo
seness
e.equalop
p
e.policetru
st
e.negimmi
grant
e.posimmi
grant
e.prowar
e.increase
defense
e.racialpro
filing
e.terroris
m
e.whiteste
reo
e.blackste
reo
e.hispstere
o
e.blackclo
seness
e.hispclos
eness
COMPET
ITION
FAIRTX
IMPACT
OFOTHE
RS

.816

.661

.653
.547
.681

.556
.443
.688

.418

1.00

.112
.125

1.00
1.00

.330

.746

.507

.898

.573

.667

.571
.083

.674
.965

.680

.939

1.20

.936

.455

.901
1.20

.905

.747

.894

.128
.185

.944
.865

.701

.700

.977

.730
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1.57

.676

.960

.438

1.29

.633

STEREO
TYPES
CLOSEN
ESS
Covarianc
es
e.hispjobs
X
e.whitepol
e.blackdis
crim X
e.hispdisc
rim
COMPET
ITION X
FAIRTX
COMPET
ITION X
IMPACT
OFOTHE
RS
COMPET
ITION X
STEREO
TYPES
COMPET
ITION X
CLOSEN
ESS
FAIRTX
X
IMPACT
OFOTHE
RS
FAIRTX
X
STEREO
TYPES
FAIRTX
X
CLOSEN
ESS
IMPACT
OFOTHE
RS X
STEREO
TYPES
IMPACT
OFOTHE
RS X
CLOSEN
ESS
STEREO
TYPES X
CLOSEN
ESS

.753

1.00

.370

1.00

-.357

-.597

.152

.371

.089

.410

.051

.225

-.052

-.093

.015

.039

-.049

-.420

.017

.059

.073

.362

-.034

-.112

-.057

-.268

.040

.076
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Table A9: Unstandardized Loadings (U) (Standard Errors) and Standardized Loadings (S) for 5
factor CFA for the 2004 Latino Model50
U

S

Immigrantsnegative

1 (-)***

Immigrantspositive

-.420
(.204)*
*
1.00
(.327)*
*
.699
(.236)*
*
2.07
(.643)*
**
2.23
(.660)*
**

.228
(.061)*
**
-.132
(.061)*
*
.478
(.062)*
**
.334
(.059)*
**
.426
(.058)*
**
.461
(.057)*
**

White jobs
Black jobs
White
politics
Black
politics
Black
discriminatio
n
Latino
discriminatio
n
Personal
discriminatio
n
Group
Treatment
National
economic
position
White
closeness
Equal
opportunity
Police trust

U
1 (--)***
.913
(.090)***
.673
(.073)***
.704
(.079)***

S
.723
(.038)***
.745
(.038)***
.476
(.043)***
.536
(.040)***

U

S

1 (--)***

.418
(.049)*
**
.671
(.052)*
**
.465
(.048)*
**
.270
(.053)*
**
-.181
(.054)*
**
-.331
(.053)*
**
-.034
(.055)
-.088
(.054)*

1.41
(.205)**
*
1.29
(.231)**
*
.802
(.194)**
*
-.205
(.068)**
-.779
(.171)**
*
-.104
(.165)
-.219
(.139)*

Pro-War

Increase
defense
spending
Racial
Profiling
Terrorism

White
stereotypes

50

Dashes (--) indicate the standard error was not estimated.
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U

S

1 (-)***

.665
(.079)*
**

U

S

Black
stereotypes

.799
(.191)*
**
.661
(.130)*
**

Latino
stereotypes

.497
(.069)*
**
.462
(.054)*
**

Black
closeness

1 (-)***

Latino
closeness

.053
(.10
5)

1
(.97
4)
.066
(.07
2)

2.19

2.67

.532

.995

Variances
e.whitejobs
e.blackjobs
e.whitepol
e.blackpol
e.blackdiscri
m
e.hispdiscri
m
e.personaldis
crim
e.grouptx
e.ntnleconpo
st
e.whiteclose
ness
e.equalopp
e.policetrust
e.negimmigr
ant
e.posimmigr
ant
e.prowar
e.increasedef
ense
e.racialprofil
ing
e.terrorism
e.whitestere
o
e.blackstereo
e.hispstereo
e.blackclose
ness
e.hispclosen
ess
COMPETIT
ION
FAIRTX
IMPACTOF
OTHERS
STEREOTY
PES
CLOSENES
S
Covariances

.615
.451
1.04
.831

.476
.443
.773
.712

.677

1.00

.126
.056

1.00
1.00

.970

1.00

.821

1.00

.597

.825

.308

.549

.772

.783

1.03
.157

.926
.967

.624

.890

1.14
.774

.998
.992
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1.02

.948

.556

.982

.190
.218

.771
.888

1.09

.818

1.04

.787
1.21

.556

1.88
1.56

.752
.786

e.whitepol X .334
.358
e.blackpol
e.whiteclose
.182
493
ness X
e.blackclose
ness
COMPETIT
.078
.268
ION X
FAIRTX
COMPETIT
.006
.031
ION X
IMPACTOF
OTHERS
COMPETIT
.008
.010
ION X
STEREOTY
PES
COMPETIT
-.095
-.128
ION X
CLOSENES
S
FAIRTX X
-.031
-.367
IMPACTOF
OTHERS
FAIRTX X
-.048
-.138
STEREOTY
PES
FAIRTX X
-.033
-.103
CLOSENES
S
IMPACTOF .020
.085
OTHERS X
STEREOTY
PES
IMPACTOF -.026
-.121
OTHERS X
CLOSENES
S
STEREOTY .089
.100
PES X
CLOSENES
S
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001; N = 552
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Table A10: Unstandardized Loadings (U) (Standard Errors) and Standardized Loadings (S) for
4 factor CFA for the 2008 Combined Model51

U

S

National
Economic
Position
Racial Economic
Position

1 (--)***

White closeness

1.91
(.869)**

.437
(.119)
***
.571
(.161)
***
.148
(.071)
**

Black
Discrimination
Latino
Discrimination
Personal
Discrimination
Group Treatment
Linked Fate
Black Closeness
Pro War
American Work
Ethic
Equal
Opportunity
Minority Position
White Jobs

U
1 (--) ***

S
.581 (.039)***

.492 (.069)***

.333 (.049)***

1.10 (.123)***

.551 (.040)***

1.03 (.136)***
.411 (.059)***
.831 (.116)***
-.240 (.046)***
-.756 (.105)***

.461 (.043)***
.392 (.044)***
.423 (.043)***
-.284 (.047)***
-.428 (.044)***

-.701 (.131)***

-.293 (.048)***

-.680 (.127)***

-.290 (.048)***

Combined Jobs

U

S

1 (--)***

.716
(.034)***
.799
(.033)***
.433
(.042)***
.490
(.038)***
.315
(.043)***

1.06
(.092)***
.614
(.068)***
.626
(.067)***
.405
(.062)***

White Politics
Combined
Politics
Same Race
Leaders
ImmigrantNegative
Latino Closeness

Terrorism

51

S

1 (-)***

.891
(.076)
***
-.251
(.054)
***
.355
(.049)
***
.205
(.045)
***

-.222
(.061)
***
.181
(.037)
***
.234
(.061)
***

Increase Border
Patrol Spending

Variances
e.blackdiscrim
e.hispdiscrim
e.personaldiscrim

U

2.07
(1.10)*

.409
.406
.587

.661
.888
.696

Dashes (--) indicate the standard error was not estimated.

190

e.grouptx
.833
.787
e.linkedfate
.194
.846
e.blackcloseness
.660
.820
e.prowar
.137
.918
e.amerworkethic
.532
.816
e.equalopportun
1.09
.913
e.minoritypstn
1.04
.915
e.whitejobs
e.combinedjobs
e.whitepolitics
e.combinedpol
e.sameraceleader
e.negimmigrant
e.hispcloseness
e.increaseborder
e.terrorism
e.ntnleconpost
e.racialeconpost
e.whitecloseness
SOCIETAL
.209
1.00
FORCES
COMPETITION
.607
1.00
IMPACT OF
.934
1.00
FOREIGNERS
ECON. POST.
.004
1.00
Covariances
e.blackdiscrim X
.156
.383
e.hispdiscrim
e.blackclose X
.195
.289
e.whiteclose
e.whitepol X
.447
.517
e.combinedpol
e.hispcloseness X .190
.276
e.whitecloseness
SOCIETAL
.081
.228
FORCES x
COMPETITION
SOCIETAL
.132
.300
FORCES X
IMPACT OF
FOREIGNERS
SOCIETAL
-.003
-.127
FORCES X
ECON. POST.
COMPETITION
.335
.444
X IMPACT OF
FOREIGNERS
COMPETITION
.0006
.013
X ECON. POST.
IMPACT OF
-.006
-.109
FOREIGNERS X
ECON. POST.
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001; N = 572

.575
.389
.991
.753
.904

.486
.360
.360
.812
.900
.240
.687
.213
1.16

.204
.936
.873
.957
.017
.037
.692
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.808
.672
.978

Table A11: Unstandardized Loadings (U) (Standard Errors) and Standardized Loadings (S) for
4 factor CFA for the 2008 Black Model52

Black
Discrim.
Latino
Discrim.
Personal
Discrim.
Group
Treatment
Linked Fate
Black
Closeness
Pro War
American
Work Ethic
Equal
Opportunity
Minority
Position
White Jobs
Combined
Jobs
White
Politics
Combined
Politics
Same Race
Leaders
ImmigrantNegative
Latino
Closeness
Border
Patrol
Terrorism

U
1 (--)***
.774
(.080)***
.773
(.120)***
.565
(.126)***
.300
(.058)***
.149
(.087)*
-.101
(.037)**
-.630
(.128)***
-.676
(.156)***
-.842
(.153)***

S
.811
(.042)***
.651
(.046)***
.476
(.058)***
.314
(.064)***
.376
(.062)***
.120
(.069)**
-.186
(.067)*
-.367
(.069)**
-.317
(.065)***
-.410
(.061)***

U

S

1 (--)***
1.13
(.129)***
.736
(.106)***
.724
(.098)***
.490
(.097)***

.704 (.046)***
.792 (.043)***

52

S

1 (--)***

1
(.146)***
.008
(.060)
.178
(.063)**
.298
(.071)***

S

1 (--)**

.505
(.087)***

1.60
(.364)*
**
3.10
(1.22)*
*

.568
(.095)***

.553 (.053)***
.363 (.062)***

.006
(.049)
.081
(.035)**
.307
(.108)**

.148

U

.505 (.057)***

National
Economic
Position
Racial
Economic
Position
White
closeness
Variances
e.blackdiscri
m

U

.341

Dashes (--) indicate the standard error was not estimated.
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.319
(.091)***

e.hispdiscri
m
e.personaldis
crim
e.grouptx
e.linkedfate
e.blackclose
ness
e.prowar
e.amerworke
thic
e.equaloppor
tun
e.minorityps
tn
e.whitejobs
e.combinedj
obs
e.whitepoliti
cs
e.combinedp
ol
e.sameracele
ader
e.negimmigr
ant
e.hispclosen
ess
e.increasebo
rder
e.terrorism
e.ntnleconpo
st
e.racialecon
post
e.whiteclose
ness
SOCIETAL
FORCES
COMPETIT
ION
IMPACT
OF
FOREIGNE
RS
ECON.
POST.
Covariances
e.whitepol X
e.combinedp
ol
e.hispclosen
ess X
e.whiteclose
ness
SOCIETAL
FORCES x
COMPETIT
ION

.231

.575

.578

.772

.832
.155
.435

.901
.858
.985

.080
.726

.965
.864

1.16

.899

.996

.831

.285

1.00

.580

1.00

1.14

1.00

.008

1.00

.447

.562

.327

.440

.059

.145

.589
.441

.504
.371

.914

.743

.691

.694

.917

.867
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1.45

1.27

.764

.999

.230

.968

1.10

.910
.024

.744

.045

.677

.721

.897

SOCIETAL
.033
.057
FORCES X
IMPACT
OF
FOREIGNE
RS
SOCIETAL
-.020
-.408
FORCES X
ECON.
POST.
COMPETIT .350
.429
ION X
IMPACT
OF
FOREIGNE
RS
COMPETIT -.002
-.038
ION X
ECON.
POST.
IMPACT
-.025
-.265
OF
FOREIGNE
RS X
ECON.
POST.
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001; N = 260

194

Table A12: Unstandardized Loadings (U) (Standard Errors) and Standardized Loadings (S) for
4 factor CFA for the 2008 Latino Model53

Black
Discrim.
Latino
Discrim.
Personal
Discrim.
Group
Treatme
nt
Linked
Fate
Black
Close.
Pro War
Amer.W
ork Ethic
Equal
Oppo.
Minority
Position
White
Jobs
Combine
d Jobs
White
Politics
Combine
d Politics
Same
Race
Leaders
Immig.
Negative
Latino
Closen.
Border
Patrol
Spending
Terroris
m
National
Econ.
Position
Racial
Econ.
Position
White
closeness
53

U
1 (--)***
.985
(.151)**
*
.780
(.141)**
*
.625
(.153)**
*
.203
(.070)**
.146
(.113)*
-.168
(.064)**
-.218
(.090)**
-.337
(.147)**
-.354
(.149)**

S
.599
(.057)***
.700
(.059)***

U

S

1 (--)***

.692
(.054)***
.779
(.057)***
.370
(.066)***
.473
(.055)***
.357
(.060)***

U

S

1 (--)***

.431
(.110)***
-.281 (.097)**

U

S

1 (--)**

1 (.532)*

.206 (.235)

.108 (.076)*

.535 (.626)

.076 (.060)

.439
(.062)***
.317
(.065)***
.206
(.067)**
.086
(.067)*
-.193
(.068)**
-.174
(.068)**
-.162
(.068)**
-.171
(.068)**

1.01
(.147)***
.555
(.102)***
.643
(.108)***
.476
(.091)***

-.478
(.248)**
.483
(.170)**
1.01
(.401)**

Dashes (--) indicate the standard error was not estimated.
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.421
(.097)***
.357
(.088)***

Variance
s
e.blackdi
scrim
e.hispdis
crim
e.person
aldiscrim
e.groupt
x
e.linkedf
ate
e.blackcl
oseness
e.prowar
e.amerw
orkethic
e.equalo
pportun
e.minorit
ypstn
e.whitejo
bs
e.combin
edjobs
e.whitep
olitics
e.combin
edpol
e.samera
celeader
e.negim
migrant
e.hispclo
seness
e.increas
eborder
e.terroris
m
e.ntnleco
npost
e.raciale
conpost
e.whitecl
oseness
SOCIET
AL
FORCES
COMPE
TITION
IMPACT
OF
FOREIG
NERS
ECON.
POST.
Covarian
ces

.453

.640

.255

.509

.645

.806

.887

.899

.237

.957

.713

.992

.185
.385

.962
.969

1.06

.973

1.05

.970

.253

1.00

.532

1.00

.150

1.00

.012

1.00

.578

.520

.352

.392

1.03

.863

.762

.775

.825

.872
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.658

.813

.401

.920

.163

.822

1.05

.872
3.32

2.63

.045

.988

.622

.994

e.blackcl .259
.388
ose X
e.whitecl
ose
e.whitep
.418
.471
ol X
e.combin
edpol
SOCIET
.033
.089
AL
FORCES
x
COMPE
TITION
SOCIET
-.059
-.302
AL
FORCES
X
IMPACT
OF
FOREIG
NERS
SOCIET
-.0005
-.009
AL
FORCES
X
ECON.
POST.
COMPE
.073
.259
TITION
X
IMPACT
OF
FOREIG
NERS
COMPE
-.010
-.133
TITION
X
ECON.
POST.
IMPACT -.003
-.076
OF
FOREIG
NERS X
ECON.
POST.
* = p <.1; ** = p<.05; *** = p<.001; N = 312
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